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ABSTRACT 
Market discipline in the banking sector, which is the ability of private sector agents 
to discipline bank behaviour by pricing their debt according to their risk profile, has 
gathered significant attention from both regulators and academics in recent years. 
Despite conflicting ideas about the optimal way on how to attain market discipline in 
the banking sector, it is agreed that traditional supervisory methods have to be 
complemented with market forces. 
The literature on market discipline is usually on the US banking sector. The 
contribution of this thesis to the literature is achieved by extending the analysis to the 
UK and Turkish banking sectors and by looking at the subject from a depositor's 
angle. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and to empirically test to what extent 
depositor market discipline exists in the UK and Turkey. To do this, a survey 
method, namely the questionnaire, was conducted and then analysed by descriptive 
analysis and statistical significance testing. In addition, using panel data estimation 
methods on individual bank balance sheets and income statement information, this 
research study also examined the evidence of market discipline in the banking 
industries of the UK and Turkey by testing the sensitivity of (i) deposit growth, and 
(ii) deposit interest rates to indicators of bank risk. The latter could only be applied to 
Turkish banks due to data limitations concerning the UK banks. 
The descriptive analysis and statistical significance testing for the UK and Turkish 
surveys show that while the main conditions necessary for depositors to exert market 
discipline are absent in the UK, these conditions exist in Turkey. Pooled least squares 
regression analysis points out that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between bank risk-taking and deposit growth in the UK. However, for the Turkish 
banking sector, the empirical findings indicate that Turkish depositors exert market 
discipline. 
The evidence found concerning the existence of market discipline in Turkey, despite 
the existence of full explicit coverage, highlights the importance of the credibility of 
the guarantees and of the delays and other costs involved in recovering funds from 
the guarantor. On the other hand, the findings of the UK leg of the study show that a 
careful safety net design is not enough by itself to promote depositor market 
discipline. Therefore, this study recommends that the depositors' awareness and 
understanding of available compensation schemes and levels of financial literacy be 
improved, and the disclosure of information has to be enhanced to deliver the goal of 
depositor market discipline. 
Keywords: Deposit insurance, Market Discipline, Banking, Safety Net Design, The 
United Kingdom, Turkey 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Banks have a crucial role to play in the well being of an economy. By gathering 
savings from depositors and providing funds for investment, running the payments 
system and coordinating financial transactions, they operate at the centre of the 
exchange of money throughout the economy. However, not only developing but also 
developed economies around the globe have experienced several banking failures, 
which has increased the concern of regulators over the safety and soundness of 
financial systems. Therefore, in response to the dramatic rise in bank failures, market 
discipline has been considered as a complementary instrument to improve the safety 
and soundness of the banking system by regulators. 
The issue of market discipline in the banking sector, which is defined by Berger 
(1991) as a situation in which private sector agents (depositors, debt holders or 
stockholders) face costs that are increasing in the risks undertaken by banks and take 
action on the basis of these costs, such as by asking for higher interest rates or 
withdrawing their funds from riskier banks, has also attracted considerable attention 
from academics. However, while the importance of market discipline in banking is 
widely recognised, there is much less consensus among researchers as to its actual 
presence (Birchler and Maechler, 2001). Therefore, the aim of this research is to 
empirically analyse the existence of market discipline in the banking industries of the 
UK and Turkey. 
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In this chapter, an introduction to the thesis is provided. The background of the 
research is explained in the next section. The rationale of the research and research 
questions are described in Section 1.3. Outlines of the following chapters are 
presented in the last section. 
1.2 Background ofthe Research 
Since the 1980s, more than two thirds of the member countries of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have experienced either banking crisis or significant banking 
problems (Barth et aI., 1997). Bank failures, which can have systemic effects on the 
financial system, cause a number of problems. The relationship between banks and 
customers could cease, which would adversely affect both depositors and customers 
who have loan relationships. Ceasing bank lending also leads to disruption in the 
payments system and may also cause a reduction in investment and other economic 
activities. Besides, governments face huge costs in resolving banking crisis. 
Therefore, financial safety nets are introduced to reduce the fragility of the financial 
system and cap costs if they occur. In conclusion, financial safety nets have the dual 
objectives of offering protection to depositors and reducing banks' incentives to 
engage in risky activities. There are two mechanisms where financial safety nets 
depend on restraining bank risk-taking: (i) bank regulation, and (ii) market discipline. 
In general, bank regulators have a direct impact on banks' behaviour. Bank 
regulators may ask banks to take corrective steps when they believe it is necessary 
(Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). However, while some academics and policy-
makers claim that, in order to avoid bank failures, governments have to regulate and 
supervise banks more effectively, other believe that tight regulation may restrict 
business activities and result in welfare losses. 
In the last 15 years, market discipline has attracted a great deal of attention from 
regulators around the globe. The main reason for bank supervisors to rely on market 
forces derives from the current situation of banking business, which is becoming 
increasingly complex. As the adequacy of the traditional supervisory tools is 
questioned, reliance on market discipline is gaining importance. 
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Recently, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, headquartered at the Bank 
for International Settlements in Switzerland, proposed a revision of the Basel Accord 
and specified market discipline as one of the three pillars, along with improved 
capital standards and supervisory review, for safeguarding the banking system (BIS, 
2000). It is argued that enhanced public disclosure allows market discipline to work 
earlier and more effectively, therefore strengthening the incentives for banks to 
behave in a prudent and efficient manner. 
Furthermore, the chairman of the United States Federal Reserve System, Alan 
Greenspan (2001a), has stated that "The real pre-safety-net discipline was from the 
market, and we need to adopt policies that promote private counterparty supervision 
as the first line of defence for a safe and sound banking system." 
The widely accepted argument for greater reliance on market discipline is that it will 
restrain managerial risk-taking and reduce potential losses to the deposit insurance 
funds. Opponents of this view favour the traditional reliance on supervision by the 
bank regulatory agencies as the primary method to maintain the safety and soundness 
of the banking system and the integrity of the deposit insurance funds. They question 
the ability of outsiders, in particular depositors, to evaluate the credit quality of bank 
portfolios and therefore to assess their risk without more detailed inside information 
available to bank examiners (Simons and Cross, 1991). However, countries' banking 
sectors can enjoy a number of social benefits from enhanced market discipline. 
Firstly, the influence of moral hazard because of government guarantees will decline 
if market discipline is increased. Secondly, the efficiency of banks may be improved 
by putting pressure on the relatively-inefficient banks, which they can be forced to 
become more efficient or to exit from the banking industry (Berger, 1991). Finally, if 
regulators rely more on market forces, the social cost of bank supervision may be 
reduced. Especially when the anonymity of the market is taken into consideration, it 
can be said that it is hard to "lobby for its forgiveness" and the market forces may 
even react more quickly than regulators to increases in bank risk-taking (Martinez-
Peria and Schmukler, 2001). 
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Flannery (2001) also states the potential ability of market information to support 
supervisory assessments. He argues that market assessment of bank condition 
complements standard supervisory procedures and acts as an early warning system, 
either by providing information that is already known to supervisors and can 
reinforce their action or by presenting new information. 
Benston et al. (I986) argue that some creditors must be at risk as a prerequisite of 
market discipline, and that creditors will select among competing banks on the basis 
of capital ratios and other measures of financial strength, and the resulting discipline 
will be a force for conservatism. They also point out that creditors should demand 
higher rates of return on funds placed with an institution that they perceive to be too 
risky; the institution can either pay the higher rates and/or cut back on risky activities 
to reduce overall exposure, or else face the loss of funds as they mature. In addition, 
they also state that runs and system-wide panics represent the extreme form of 
market discipline. 
As a result, although it is generally agreed that bank supervisors should increasingly 
rely on market forces to supplement their traditional supervisory methods, the ability 
of market forces to impose market discipline still remains an open question. 
1.3 The Rationale of the Research and Research Qnestions 
As market discipline is considered an efficient means of discouraging banks from 
excessive risk-taking that could cause them to fail (Park and Peristiani, 1998), the 
question of whether market forces are able to impose discipline on banks has been 
approached in the literature in a number of different ways. It is discussed in the 
literature whether stockholders, depositors and the creditors at large can be a source 
of market discipline to prevent banks from undertaking excessive risk-taking. 
However, empirical studies provide mixed evidence. 
Most of the existing academic literature on market discipline focuses on the 
experience of the United States (US) commercial banking over the last two decades. 
There are few studies concerning the experience of European countries or developing 
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countries, and I could not trace any study concerning depositor market discipline in 
the United Kingdom (UK) and Turkey, and the extent to which depositors in these 
countries could impose market discipline remains an empirical question. 
Therefore, in this research, the existence of market discipline in the UK and Turkish 
banking sectors is analysed and depositors will be studied as the source of market 
discipline. A multi -dimensional approach is adopted while conducting this research. 
Theoretical discussions on the subject are evaluated. Besides, regulators' views were 
also obtained, which provided invaluable insight on the area of research. Two-step 
quantitative analysis IS implemented. The survey instrument, namely the 
questionnaire, is used III both countries to obtain information about depositors' 
ability to be a source of market discipline. In addition, an econometric analysis 
evaluates whether there is evidence of market discipline, i.e. whether depositors 
respond to bank risk-taking by withdrawing their deposits or by requiring higher 
interest rates on deposits. The framework of this research is shown in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1: The Research Process Diagram 
Theoretical Discussion 
I Quautitative Study I 
.------ -----------. 
Survey Questionnaire I I Econometric Analysis 
Presentation and 
Discussion of Results 
Presentatiou and 
Discussion of Results 
CONCLUSIONS 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
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This research attempts to make a contribution to the literature by evaluating the 
potential for the British and Turkish depositors to impose market discipline. 
Therefore, the main research problem of this study is 'Can a bank depositor be an 
effective source of market discipline in the UK and Turkey?'. A number of factors 
make the banking sectors of the UK and Turkey very important to study market 
discipline, and regulatory views obtained from both the UK and Turkish authorities 
reinforce the importance of depositor market discipline accompanied by strong 
prudential regulation. 
London has a very good reputation as an international financial centre. Moreover, the 
UK has a very sound financial system and does not frequently experience bank 
failures. The simultaneous failure of banks. that potentially threatens the stability of 
the financial system has been very rare in the UK and the small banks' crisis in the 
1990s was the last widespread occasion where the Bank of England provided 
emergency liquidity support to the UK banks. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that the banking sector is one of the most rapidly 
growing sectors in the 1990s, the Turkish banking sector has suffered several 
transformations (the latest one was in 2001), and almost one third of private banks 
operating in Turkey have failed since 1997. 
The objective of this research is also to examine whether the extent of market 
discipline is related to different regulatory environments and whether certain design 
features of deposit insurance schemes undermine market discipline. Although both 
these two countries have adopted explicit deposit insurance schemes, the design 
features of the systems differ significantly, and the discrepancies between the 
schemes is very important for the analysis. In the UK scheme, there is a co-insurance 
principle where depositors bear some standard proportion of any deposit loss; this 
means giving all depositors an incentive to monitor the risk-taking of banks with they 
place their money (Dale, 2000). It is a very crucial feature of all the compensation 
arrangements that were adopted and indicates the regulators' keen interest on 
depositor discipline in the UK. On the other hand, Turkey's deposit insurance 
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scheme has been modified because of banking CrIses and currently Turkish 
depositors are enjoying full coverage. 
Although depositors are seen as one of the principal sources of market discipline in 
these countries, lack of any study that analyses depositor behaviour and the facts 
about depositors is seen as a gap in the literature. To fill this gap, a survey method 
namely the questionnaire, is used. The aim of the questionnaire is to find out 
depositors' ability to exert market discipline. Also, it aims to gain insight about their 
understanding concerning financial systems and the regulations that they operate 
under, as well as their awareness about the compensation arrangements. The general 
purpose of the questionnaire is to explore to what extent we can expect depositors to 
be a source of market discipline in the UK and Turkey, and specific research 
questions concerning the questionnaire are presented below: 
I. Do the pre-conditions for effective market discipline exist among 
depositors? 
2. What is the importance of risk for depositors when investing their funds? 
3. Are they able to obtain and use the information about the risk-taking of 
their banks? 
4. Do people who know about deposit protection schemes differ in their 
attitudes from other people who do not know? 
5. Does publicity surrounding default and the fact that some depositors have 
borne losses act as a warning to other consumers to be more careful? 
6. What are the attitudes of depositors' towards the "too-big-to-fail" policy? 
7. Do customers who know about the deposit protection scheme diversify 
their savings? 
8. How important is it to make people aware of the deposit protection 
arrangements? What actions could be expected? 
In addition to survey analysis, the existence of depositor market discipline is also 
investigated by econometric analysis. Using panel data estimation on bank balance 
sheets and income statement information, econometric analysis examines market 
discipline by testing whether there is a significant relationship between depositor 
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behaviour and bank perfonnance. The two mam questions that the econometric 
analysis is concerned with are; 
1. Do bank specific risk variables significantly explain bank deposit growth, 
i.e. do riskier banks experience slower growth of deposits? 
2. Do bank specific risk variables significantly explain bank deposit interest 
rates, i.e. do riskier banks pay higher interest rates? 
The econometric analysis also investigates the following questions: 
I. Do large banks enjoy the "too-big-to-fail" policy? 
2. Do the failing banks in Turkey pay significantly higher interest rates and 
experience slower growth of deposits than other banks in the period prior 
to their failure? 
3. Did the introduction of full coverage deposit insurance scheme in Turkey 
make a significant impact on bank behaviour? 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
In the first chapter of this thesis, the theme of the research was introduced. The rest 
ofthe thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter Two examines the rationale for banking and financial safety nets. In 
addition, the features of deposit insurance schemes are discussed, followed by 
examination of the moral hazard problem. Next, deposit insurance schemes in the 
UK and Turkey are evaluated. The chapter concludes with a summary of the issues 
discussed in the chapter. 
Chapter Three provides a review of the literature relevant to the development of the 
research. Firstly, the market discipline concept is explored, and then depositor 
discipline and other sources of market discipline, namely equity holders and debt 
holders, are discussed. Next, examination of empirical studies concerning market 
discipline is presented. In order to complete the framework of the research, 
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regulators' views on market discipline have also been assessed and presented in this 
chapter. 
Chapter Four describes the research methodology utilised in the survey, including the 
data collection method, the sampling frame, the questionnaire development and the 
implementation of the study. Moreover, the survey questions and hypotheses, which 
emerged as a result of the theoretical discussions and were shaped by the regulators' 
views, are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Five presents the empirical results of the UK and Turkish surveys. The 
findings are provided firstly for the UK study followed by the Turkish study. Next, 
the results of the comparison between the two country is presented. The chapter 
concludes with a summary ofthe important findings of the survey for the research. 
Chapter Six aIms to test the existence of depositor discipline by applying 
econometric analysis. The theoretical basis for the analysis for the empirical 
investigation is provided followed by presentation of the methodology used, 
including the panel data that is collected. Finally, the results of the econometric 
analysis are provided followed by a summary of the main findings. 
Finally, Chapter Seven summarises all the key findings and draws conclusions 
pertinent to policy-makers. The limitations of this work are discussed and 
recommendations for future research are made. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RATIONALE FOR FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS 
AND DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
Banks have a crucial role in economies, not only as they act as financial 
intennediaries to provide a link between creditors and borrowers but also because 
they influence the functioning of securities markets and affect the quantity of money, 
the levels of investment and economic growth (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
Because of their crucial role in every economy, banks attract the attention of policy-
makers who attempt to counter the potential effects of bank failures by operating 
financial safety nets. The main underlying rationale of these safety nets is to avoid 
the systemic risk that could result in a financial crisis in the economy. As Allen and 
Herring (2001) state "The primary justification for bank regulation that is usually 
given is the avoidance of systemic risk, or in other words, the avoidance of financial 
crisis. " 
Therefore, all countries implement financial safety nets to prevent systemic bank 
insolvencies that could give rise to massive costs, not only to banks themselves and 
their depositors, but also to society at large (Demirgiis;-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). 
Together with the prudential regulation of banking and the provision of a lender of 
last resort, deposit insurance is one of the three components of the safety net that 
policy-makers rely on to ensure the stability of the financial system. Deposit 
insurance is generally considered necessary to protect small depositors and to prevent 
bank runs, and thereby to enhance the stability of the financial system. However, 
deposit insurance is also considered to have associated costs, the main one being 
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moral hazard. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the rationale for deposit insurance and 
present an overview of the deposit insurance schemes in the UK and Turkey. The 
chapter is divided into seven sections, including this introduction. In the second 
section, the theoretical reasons for the existence of banks and their intermediary role 
in economies are introduced. The rationale for financial safety nets is presented in 
the third section. In the fourth section, the deposit insurance concept is reviewed and 
the moral hazard problem is explained. The overview of the UK deposit insurance 
scheme is presented in the fifth section, which is followed by the Turkish deposit 
insurance scheme in the sixth section. Finally, in the seventh section, a chapter 
summary is drawn. 
2.2 The Rationale for Banking 
In order to examme the rationale for bank regulation, and particularly deposit 
insurance, I first need to explain the existence of banks in an economy. Traditionally, 
banks are defined as institutions that act as intermediaries between depositors and 
borrowers throughout the economy (Heffernan, 1996). Gathering savings from 
depositors, providing loans and investment funds, running the payments system and 
coordinating financial transactions make them crucial to the well-being of the 
economy, and these roles distinguish them from other commercial institutions. In 
developing countries, they are by and large the heart of the financial market and even 
in industrial countries with complex financial markets they still have a role as 
primary providers of financial services (Garcia, 1997). 
According to Santomero (1997), depository institutions serve at least two primary 
functions. First, they create financial assets and second, they provide payment 
systems to liability holders and a positive return for their savings. Banks create assets 
by their financial intermediary role, using the funds of entities that have financial 
surpluses and lending those funds to entities that are in financial deficit. Therefore, 
the liability side of a typical bank balance sheet consists of funds borrowed by the 
bank, primarily deposits. The asset side of a bank balance sheet, on the other hand, is 
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comprised primarily ofloans and investments. Considering the two different sides of 
a bank's balance sheet, while a number of people argue that banks are in the business 
of managing assets, some other people model banking as a business of managing 
liabilities. However, there is no doubt among academics that banks fundamentally 
perform an important intermediary role by lending the funds that they accept from 
depositors. 
Heffeman (1996) presents two reasons for the importance of the intermediary 
function of a bank between borrowers and lenders: first, information costs; and 
second, liquidity preferences. According to information cost theory, through their 
intermediary function, banks can allow depositors to offer their funds to borrowers 
with lower associated information costs than would be otherwise incurred by 
depositors or lenders. Heffeman points to four types of information costs, search, 
verification, monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Search costs arise when a borrower or a lender searches for and obtains information, 
and then chooses and negotiates with the other party of a contract, whereas 
verification costs arise when a lender needs to verify the accuracy of the information 
about the borrower. Monitoring costs occur while monitoring the activities of a 
borrower. In their survey of banking theories that explain the economic role of banks, 
Bhattacharya et al. (1998) argue that, instead of lenders, intermediary institutions 
monitor the attributes of investment projects because, without the intermediation of 
an institution, either all the many investors involved in funding that investment 
project would need to be involved in monitoring it or investors would be forced to 
lend large amounts of funds to a very few projects which they could monitor, thereby 
losing the benefits of diversification. Diamond (1984) examines the monitoring 
activity of institutions for investment projects and argues that institutions that 
intermediate to many investment projects achieve diversification by monitoring them 
and therefore offer this intermediation service to investors at a lower cost compared 
to a non-intermediated contract. 
The last form of information cost, namely enforcement costs, occur when the lender 
takes legal action against the borrower to enforce the contract or to seek 
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compensation if the borrower is unable to meet the contractual conditions. 
Therefore, a potential lender may prefer to do business with a potential borrower 
through the intermediation of a bank, as banks incur lower information costs than 
depositors because of economies of scope'. As banks obtain information when 
lending to borrowers, they have access to this privileged information while it is 
unlikely to be available to depositors who try to lend directly. Therefore, because of 
this comparative advantage in the gathering of information, banks can offer 
intermediation services for lending and borrowing activities at a lower cost compared 
to the cost incurred when two parties arrange a contract among themselves. 
Besides information costs, liquidity preference is another factor that explains the 
importance of the intermediary function of a bank between borrowers and lenders. 
As borrowers and lenders are likely to have different liquidity preferences, it would 
be very difficult and costly for a potential lender to find the potential borrower with 
the same liquidity preferences. However, as banks are able to pool large numbers of 
deposits and loans, it is likely to match both parties with the same liquidity 
preferences. Besides, banks could transform iIIiquid assets into liquid funds and 
therefore have the necessary liquidity. Providing liquidity is an important facility that 
banks offer to their customers at a lower cost than would be incurred without the 
intermediation of banks (Heffernan, 1996). 
In their pivotal study, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) analyse demand for liquidity and 
transformation services provided by banks. They conclude that, by offering a range 
of deposit instruments with greater liquidity and a smoother pattern of returns over 
time than the illiquid assets financed by these funds, banks can transform iIIiquid 
assets into liquid funds and provide a form of liquidity insurance as they can make 
payments to depositors who require cash before maturity. The Diamond-Dybvig 
model shows that without an intermediary, risk averse depositors who are uncertain 
about the timing of their future consumption needs and who invest in iIliquid 
investments that offer a higher return in the long term, could have a very low return 
I According to the economies of scope, which are also known as synergies, with the increasing level 
of production of different outputs, the average cost falls (Ross et al., 1993). 
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if they face a short-term liquidity need, as liquidation of a long-term investment 
could be costly. 
Besides their traditional role of intermediation between borrowers and lenders, and 
as well as providing payment systems to its lenders, banks engage in many other 
profit-making activities. These activities include: 
1. Acting as an intermediary in foreign exchange transactions as well as 
providing off-balance sheet activities for risk management purposes, 
2. Offering a wide range of other non-bank financial or related activities 
such as securities and commodities trading, brokerage, underwriting, 
custodial services and corporate finance (Heffernan, 1996; Latter, 1997). 
However, regulators are not only concerned with the banks' classic role as 
intermediaries. According to Edward Kelley (1997), who is a member of the Board 
of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the US, in addition to their 
traditional role of providing the basic financial services of borrowing and lending 
and providing liquidity to depositors, banks supply the linkage between the financial 
system and the conduct of monetary policy. 
The above-mentioned intermediary roles of banks distinguish them from other 
institutions and make them among the most heavily regulated industries in every 
economy. Latter (1997) argues that banks are unique in an economy because of their 
deposit-taking activity and are therefore subject to particular attention from the 
regulatory authorities. Latter identifies five reasons why the deposit-taking activity 
makes banks unique: 
1. "A bank deposit is typically an unsecured and capital-certain claim. 
2. It therefore implies a strong element of trust. 
3. Borrowers, on average, require funds for longer periods of time than that 
for which depositors, on average, are willing to forego their funds; even 
overdrafts, which may technically have to be repaid on demand, have to 
be regarded, in total, as a fairly illiquid claim; thus, maturity 
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transformation is central to the economic function of a bank, and is at the 
same time a key source of risk 
4. Deposits constitute money, notably in the transactions sense: funds on 
current account or at call, or term deposits at maturity, can generally be 
used, and are accepted, as a means of executing payments and settling 
debts with third parties. 
5. Consequently, banks find themselves at the centre of the payments 
system, the efficiency of which is vital to the broader economy. " 
2.3 The Rationale for Financial Safety Nets 
In the previous section, the role of the banks in an economy and the underlying 
theories that seek to explain that role were reviewed. A well-functioning banking 
system is crucial in every economy as it provides intermediation between borrowers 
and lenders, payment services and a variety of financial and non-financial services. 
These critical contributions to an economy attract the attention of policy-makers 
concerned with the safety and soundness of the banking system. Therefore, in order 
to ensure that the banking system functions efficiently, it is the most heavily 
regulated industry almost everywhere. Barth et al. (1997) explain the regulatory 
attention devoted to banking systems by stating: "The occurrence of banking crisis 
or significant banking problems merits special attention because they can lead to 
severe disruptions in both a country's payment mechanism and its credit system. " 
However, like all other institutions, banks can fail for a number of reasons. Latter 
(1997) categorises the causes of bank failure under seven headings; macroeconomic 
instability, deficient supervision, poor strategies, weak management, inadequate 
control systems, operational failures and fraud. 
If the failure of a bank is unlikely to endanger the solvency of other institutions in the 
system, its consequences cannot be called systemic and regulators may well allow it 
to fail (Goodhart, 1996). In fact, regulators may well not wish to allow inefficient 
banks to remain in business as a policy of general tolerance can impose social costs 
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on other banks and the community. Kane (1987) explains this by arguing that if 
inefficient insolvent banks compete aggressively for deposits and loan business, they 
can harm better managed and fundamentally sound banks as they are forced to 
compete in an unhealthy financial system. 
The main concern regarding the failure of a bank is therefore the possibility of a 
systemic problem that can arise because of the contagious effects of a bank failure. 
Herring and Santomero (1999) define systemic risk " .. . as the risk of a sudden, 
unanticipated event that would damage the financial system to such an extent that 
economic activity in the wider economy would suffer." According to Herring and 
Santomero, these sudden and unanticipated events can occur because of a failure of a 
major participant in the financial system, a technological breakdown of settlements 
or payments system, or a political shock2• 
As failure of a bank could lead other depositors' to be suspicious about the condition 
of their banks, deposit withdrawals could have a domino effect and threaten the 
existence of even financially sound institutions. There are three main reasons behind 
this argument. Firstly, as Dale (1984) argues, a severe liquidity squeeze resulting 
from sudden deposit withdrawals can be very quickly transformed into a solvency 
problem, as the victim bank tries to unload illiquid assets, thereby depressing their 
prices and incurring losses. Secondly, depositors have a natural tendency to try to 
withdraw their funds ahead of others at times of financial distress, which would 
continue as a chain reaction and threaten the existence of other banks. Thirdly, 
publicly available information could be inadequate to permit an accurate assessment 
of the financial condition of banks and the depositors might misinterpret the signals. 
Therefore, contagious effects could result in banking instability and the occurrence 
of such instability might have serious negative impacts on a nation's economy as it 
could spread to other sectors in an economy and trigger a fully-fledged crisis. 
DemirgUy-Kunt and Kane (2001) cite Turkey as an example of a country where 
weaknesses in the banking sector triggered a crisis of confidence in other domestic 
, It should be noted that, not only internal but also external shocks could be the reason for the systemic 
risk in today's global financial system where a crisis in one country can easily spread to others. 
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financial institutions during February 2001 and led to a large-scale flight of foreign 
capital and a severe currency crisis that resulted in the alteration of the currency 
regime. 
Latter (1997) argues that the cost to government budgets of resolving banking crises 
has been highly significant and, in addition to the transfer cost within the national 
economy, there are likely to be real net costs in tenns of the welfare losses to the 
economy as a whole. Latter also argues that administrative costs, the consequences 
of any diversion of macroeconomic policy enforced by the crisis, the possible 
benefits of averting a more serious crisis, the implications for the efficiency of 
financial intennediation of either supporting failed or failing institutions or allowing 
a shake-out in the banking sector to run its course, should also be considered when 
calculating the real costs of a banking crisis. 
McKenzie and Khalidi (1994) argue that the externalities of a bank failure could 
impose costs on other sectors of the economy and society as a whole. They identify 
four externalities: 
1. As depositors have cheque accounts at banks, a bank failure could affect 
the ability of depositors to undertake routine payment transactions. 
2. Borrowers could be driven into insolvency if the receivers of the failed 
bank recall the loans, and this could result in a further contraction in 
economic activity. 
3. The failure of a bank can generate contagion effects throughout the 
system which might develop into a deposit run, i.e. failure of a bank 
leads to uncertainty about the safety of other banks and depositors might 
seek to withdraw their savings from other banks. 
4. When a failure happens, the deposit guarantee fund is placed under 
pressure, which in turn increases the cost of the guarantee system. 
In order to prevent banking system failures that could cause these externalities, a 
number of measures are usually adopted, which together may be said to constitute a 
financial safety net (Dale, 1984). The chief of these are: 
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I. Banking laws and regulations, which aim to constrain excessive risk-
taking, and supervision and examination of banks, which provide further 
protection against excessive risk-taking. 
2. Providing liquidity to banks that are solvent but having liquidity 
problems under the heading of the classic "lender oflast resort" function. 
3. Deposit insurance schemes. 
While summarising the core objectives of financial regulation as being to sustain 
systemic stability, to maintain the safety and soundness of financial institutions and 
to protect the consumer, Llewellyn (1999) also discusses the components of the 
economic rationale for safety nets in banking and financial services under seven 
headings: 
1. 
2. 
"Potential systemic problems associated with externalities. 
The correction of other market imperjections and failures. 
3. The need jor monitoring financial firms and the economies of scale that 
exist in this activity. 
4. The need jor consumer confidence, which also has a positive externality. 
5. The potential jor gridlock, with associated adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. 
6. Moral hazard associated with the revealed preference of governments to 
create safety net arrangements: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, 
and compensation schemes. 
7. Consumer demand jor regulation in order to gain a degree of assurance 
and lower transactions costs. " 
According to the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Thomas M. 
Hoenig (1997), the purpose of financial safety nets is not only to perfonn the 
traditional functions of depositor protection and systemic stability, but also to 
maintain the integrity of the payments system, which he considers as an important 
issue that draws the line between banks and other financial and non-financial 
institutions. 
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As banks are more prone to contagion than other commercial entities because of 
financial linkages and confidence effects, policy-makers have established financial 
safety nets. In general, financial safety nets have three components; the prudential 
regulation of banking, a lender of last resort and deposit insurance. These financial 
safety nets are considered vital in almost every country to promote the stability ofthe 
banking system and therefore prevent financial crises. The components of financial 
safety nets are considered in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
2.3.1 Prudential Regulation of Banking 
In order banks to operate in a safe and prudent manner, policy-makers impose 
control mechanisms through regulation of the domestic banking systems. The control 
mechanisms can be examined under two headings: 
1. Prudential regulation, that focuses on the solvency and safety and 
soundness of financial institutions; and 
2. Conduct of business regulation that focuses on how financial firms 
conduct business with their customers. 
Allen and Herring (2001) argue that, although the regulation for banks is primarily 
designed to prevent systemic risk, there are three more objectives of bank regulation; 
investor protection, efficiency enhancement and achievement of broader social 
objectives3. Table 2.1 presents the role of different types of bank regulation in 
achieving those regulatory objectives. 
, Anti-money laundering regulations designed to combat organised crime is an example of such a 
social objective. 
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Table 2.1: Regulatory Measures and Objectives for Banks 
Regulatory Objectives 
Broader 
Regulatory Measures Systemic Investor Efficiency Social 
Risk Protection Enhancement Objectives 
Antitrust enforcement! competition policy 
'" '" '" Asset restrictions 
'" '" Capital adequacy standards 
'" '" Conduct of business rules 
'" '" '" Conflict of interest rules 7' 
'" Customer suitability requirements 
'" Fit andDrooer entrY tests 
'" 
7' 
'" Interest rate ceilings on deposits 
'" '" Interest rate ceilin,s on loans 
'" '" Investment feauirements 
'" Liquidity requirements 
'" '" Reporting reauirements for large transactions 
'" '" Reserve Teouirements 7 7 
Restrictions on geographic reach 
'" Restrictions on services and product lines 
'" '" Adapted from Alien and Hernng, 200 I. 
2.3.2 Lender of Last Resort 
In general, besides enhancing price stability, central banks are also responsible for 
preventing financial crises by acting as a lender of last resort, which can be defined 
as the emergency liquidity assistance of a central bank. This facility allows financial 
institutions, generally depository institutions such as banks, that have critical 
liquidity needs to achieve central bank funds through discount windows and open 
market operations. In order to provide an efficient lender of last resort facility, the 
central banks should consider the following issues (Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren, 
1998): 
I. The lender oflast resort should be available to the whole banking system. 
2. Only solvent but illiquid institutions should use this facility. 
3. The central bank should lend speedily, only for a short tenn and at a 
penalty rate. 
4. The loan should be collateralised and collaterals should be accepted at a 
conservative value in nonnal times. 
5. The central bank (or other bank regulators if there is a separate regulatory 
agent) should allow individual institutions to fail and be closed. 
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The advocates of the lender of last resort argue that protecting the integrity of the 
payments system, avoiding bank runs and preventing illiquidity at an individual bank 
from unnecessarily leading to its insolvency are the main objectives of this policy 
(Fo1kerts-Landau and Lindgren, 1998). However, this facility is criticised for causing 
a moral hazard problem, as banks may be less willing to operate a prudent liquidity 
policy if they are aware that liquidity problems would be addressed by the lender of 
last resort facility of the central bane. The moral hazard problem is also considered 
to be a drawback of deposit insurance, which is examined in Section 2.5 in detail. 
2.3.3 Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance is another vital component of a financial safety net, which is 
generally implemented to prevent bank runs. In addition to that, deposit insurance 
serves the aim of protecting small depositors by covering the losses of those who are 
unable to foresee a bank failure. 
Depositors place funds in banks and they expect to be able to withdraw their deposits 
whenever they want. During a bank run, as depositors fear that their banks may be 
about to fail, they rush to withdraw their savings, as each depositor has a strong 
incentive to withdraw his/her fund before other depositors if there is any serious 
doubt about the safety of a particular bank (Dale, 1993; Kuritzkes et al., 2002). 
However, such sudden withdrawals of deposits could result in bank runs, which 
could lead to a systemic problem. 
As most of the depositors may be unable to distinguish safe banks from risky banks, 
deposit runs could force both solvent and insolvent banks to fail. However, existence 
of deposit insurance may help to prevent bank runs and stabilise the deposit bases of 
the banks. On the other hand, the existence of deposit insurance leads to a moral 
hazard that allows failing banks to continue engaging in their risky activities and 
taking deposits until they are closed by the regulators. In the next section, the 
concepts of deposit insurance are reviewed in detail. 
4 Central banks generally address the problem of moral hazard caused by the lender of last resort 
facility by imposing liquidity requirements on banks and using 'penalty' lending rates. 
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2.4 Deposit Insurance Schemes 
As banks play a crucial role in an economy, policy-makers have given deposit 
insurance a clear role in the safety net structure. Santomero (1997) defines the use 
and role of deposit insurance as the protection of depositors and investors after a 
crisis in a bank's balance sheet has begun that could result in losses. The existence of 
deposit insurance is also seen as a mechanism to prevent panic by assuring depositors 
in other banks about the integrity of the system as a whole, thereby providing 
systemic stability. 
Some argue the main role of deposit insurance is consumer protection. It is aimed at 
protecting small depositors in the case of bank failure. This is based on the view that 
depositors cannot be expected to assess the risk-taking of the banks that they place 
their money with and cannot monitor the financial conditions of the banks. On the 
other hand, a further rationale of deposit insurance is to prevent bank runs through 
establishing confidence in the banking system, as small depositors seek to withdraw 
their funds from not only financially troubled banks but also healthy banks in the 
case of a panic (Dale, 1993). 
Deposit insurance schemes have been established in a number of countries, in many 
cases as a result of bank failures in that country, and in recent years the number of 
countries offering explicit deposit insurance has increased rapidly (Demirgiis;-Kunt 
and Kane, 2001). There are also a nnmber of countries, especially outside Western 
Europe where explicit deposit insurance has been legally required by the European 
Union since 1994, which adopt implicit deposit insurance systems. However, implicit 
deposit insurance is criticised for having adverse effects, as the lack of a well-
designed system of deposit insurance creates depositor uncertainty, that can worsen 
runs on banks, and requires in the end greater coverage than otherwise would have 
been offered (Garcia, 1997). 
Demirgiis;-Kunt and Kane (2001) argue that, in the short run, policy-makers consider 
explicit deposit insurance schemes a costless answer to problems of bank runs or 
panics, as no immediate budgetary expenditure needs to be booked. They also point 
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out the political benefits, such as protecting small depositors and providing 
opportunities for small banks to compete with larger institutions for deposits. 
However, in their cross-country empirical research Demirgiiy-Kunt and Kane found 
that, even in favourable circumstances, using explicit deposit insurance to increase 
depositor confidence threatens to heighten financial fragility by reducing the degree 
of market discipline that banks experience. 
An analysis of different deposit guarantee schemes indicates that deposit insurance 
practices differ among countries. Comparative information on different countries' 
deposit insurance schemes is presented in Appendix 1. It seems that there is no 
perfect solution that fits the needs of every country. Therefore, when establishing 
deposit insurance schemes, it is very important to understand the financial and 
regulatory systems of the country as well as depositors' behaviour within the country. 
However, there are some basic principles that are widely judged relevant to any 
deposit protection scheme. Garcia (1996) argues that a deposit insurance system 
must: 
1. Be explicitly formulated in law. 
2. Be compulsory. 
3. Be accompanied by well-crafted procedures for accounting, loan 
valuation, regulation, and supervision. 
4. Have the authority and necessary information to reform faltering banks 
and deal effectively with insolvent banks. 
5. Be established only after unsound banks have been restructured. 
6. Treat large, small, private and state-owned banks equally. 
7. Provide for prompt reimbursement when a bank fails. 
While these principles are critical for any deposit insurance scheme in general, 
policy-makers should consider three additional features of the deposit insurance 
scheme, namely administrative forms, financing and extent of coverage. These are 
examined in the following sub-sections. Demirgiiy and Huizinga (1999) found that 
higher coverage, government-funding only reduce market discipline, while private 
and especially joint management of insurance schemes may improve market 
discipline. 
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2.4.1 Administrative Forms of Deposit Insurance Schemes 
The administrative forms of deposit insurance schemes differ between countries. 
Protection may be supplied by government, or by a combined body representing both 
the government and banks operating in that country, or by a banking association. 
Membership to the scheme may be compulsory or voluntary. Demirgiiy-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) analysed 64 countries deposit insurance schemes and found that 
private and especially joint management of insurance schemes may improve market 
discipline. 
2.4.2 Financing Deposit Insurance 
A number of different financing principles have been adopted among countries. The 
funded type of scheme is the one that many countries prefer. In this system banks 
pay periodic contributions to an established fund. The alternative type is the system 
where no premium is regularly paid by the banks. In starting the insurance fund, an 
initial contribution is requested from banks and the new banks that apply to 
participate in the scheme have to pay for being a member of the scheme in case of 
non-compulsory membership. In case of non-compulsory membership, banks are 
called upon to share the burden after a bank fails. As a variant, an additional 
premium can be collected if the deposit insurance fund amount falls below a certain 
level. In the absence of a formal scheme, the burden of a failed bank might fall on the 
government or its agencies in the case of an implicit guarantee. Demirgiiy-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) found that government funding is obstacle towards the aim of 
market discipline. 
In many cases banks are called upon to pay a premium to the deposit insurance 
scheme calculated as a fixed percentage of total deposits or the insured deposit base 
of the bank. Generally, these premiums range from 0.01-0.05 percent of the above-
mentioned deposit bases and do not exceed 1 percent. On the other hand, a number of 
countries apply risk-related premiums, which are calculated according to a bank's 
risk characteristics. Until 1995, only the US had a system with risk-related 
premiums. However, as of 2000, the number of countries that had risk-adjusted 
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premIUm systems has risen to 21 (Demirgii<;:-Kunt and Sobaci, 2000). These 
countries are presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Deposit Insurance Systems With Risk Adjusted Premiums 
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Micronesia 
Bulgaria Finland Peru 
Cameroon Gabon Portugal 
Central African Re~ublic Hungal'L Romania 
Chad Italy Sweden 
Republic of Con EO Macedonia Turkey 
El Salvador Marshall Islands United States 
.. Source: DemlrgUI'-Kunt and Sobacl, 2000 
2.4.3 Extent of Coverage 
The types of account that the insurance scheme excludes differ across countries; 
deposits of other banks or financial institutions, deposits belonging to the directors, 
managers, shareholders and auditors of a failed bank, deposits arising out of 
transactions in connection with which there has been a criminal conviction for 
money laundering, and deposits denominated in foreign currency are generally 
excluded. The reason behind the exclusion of banks' deposits (or financial 
institutions deposits) is the assumption that the financial institutions are sophisticated 
investors and therefore able to exert market discipline. 
Countries where the primary objective is to protect the payment systems typically 
offer deposit insurance to depositors who place their funds with commercial banks 
and to other depository institutions providing payment transactions. In a number of 
countries, experience suggests that regulators may build up separate insurance 
schemes for commercial banks and for other deposit taking institutions (Demirgii<;:-
Kunt and Sobaci, 2000). 
While deposit insurance schemes vary in the extent and amount of coverage that they 
provide to depositors, in general, there are three types of deposit coverage practices: 
1. 100 percent coverage: Under this system, all eligible deposits are fully 
covered. Dale (1993) summarises the outcome of full deposit insurance 
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as a banking system characterised by excessively-risky assets and high 
incidence of insolvency, as well as heavy claims on the deposit insurance 
fund and the taxpayer. 
2. Insurance cut-off based on deposit size: Under this system, up to a certain 
amount of each deposit is covered and depositors are exposed to a default 
risk in the amount ofthe excess. 
3. Co-insurance: Under this system, the insurance extends up to a certain 
percentage of the deposit up to a specific amount and therefore the 
depositor bears some portion of all losses. As of spring 1999, there were 
17 countries that have deposit insurance schemes with co-insurance 
mechanisms (DemirgUy-Kunt and Sobaci, 2000). These countries are 
presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: De osit Insurance S stems With Co-Insurance 
Austria Ireland 
Chile Lithuania 
Colombia 
I-_...",--=Czech Republic 
Dominican Re ublic I-_..::...c:..:c 
Estonia 
German 
Gibraltar 
Iceland 
Source: Dernirgiil'-Kunt and Sobaci, 2000 
Luxembour 
Macedonia 
Oman 
Poland 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
As a matter of fact, the design of a deposit insurance scheme faces a trade-off 
between its major objectives, namely to prevent bank runs and to protect small 
depositors. Besides, the policy-makers also consider protecting the deposit insurance 
fund from bankruptcy while designing such a scheme. If the concern of the policy-
makers is to protect small depositors and protect deposit insurance funds from large 
losses, the schemes that have limited coverage should be implemented. However, the 
schemes that have limited coverage undermine the objective of preventing bank runs 
by depositors (Gilbert, 1990). On the other hand, in order to prevent bank runs and 
reduce the risk arising from bank runs, full coverage deposit insurance scheme 
should be implemented. However, full coverage of deposit insurance not only has the 
potential to increase the losses of the deposit insurance fund in case of a bank failure, 
but also to create the moral hazard problem, which is examined in the next section. 
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2.5 The Problem of Moral Hazard 
Opponents of deposit insurance argue that a deregulated financial system is the best 
for a country's economy and that, in the long run, deposit insurance has an adverse 
effect on the system by reducing incentives for economic agents to act efficiently 
(Santomero, 1997). Santomero explains this by stating that deposit insurance poses 
the moral hazard problem for depositors, i.e. deposit insurance affects the willingness 
of banks to undertake risks, making an unstable system even more susceptible to 
instability. Since depositors are no longer interested in the bank's financial condition, 
believing that all or most of their liabilities are insured by a government agency, they 
no longer need to watch or even worry about bank risk or bank solvency, as their 
claim is on the government, not the bank itself. Consequently, a bank's management, 
which recognises this fact and its full implication, is now capable of attracting funds 
at a risk-free rate as the constraints of market discipline are diminished. 
As a result, deposit insurance could encourage risk-taking by insured institutions, 
which is called the moral hazard problem. The moral hazard argument states that if 
no one charges a bank a higher price for accepting more risk, profit-maximising 
bankers will exploit the risk-return trade-off by assuming as much risk as possible 
(Flood, 1993). With the existence of a 100 percent deposit insurance guarantee, 
depositors do not have an incentive to monitor the activities of the bank where they 
place their money and do not require any risk premium on their funds. 
In order to improve market discipline and reduce moral hazard, Demirgiiy-Kunt and 
Kane (2001) identify the conditions that a deposit insurance scheme should contain. 
These are: 
1. Credibly low coverage limits per account; 
2. Narrow coverage; 
3. Co-insurance; 
4. Compulsory membership; 
5. Ex-post funding; 
6. Targeting surviving banks to cover losses; 
7. Private-public joint management. 
27 
Moral hazard is also caused by the application of fixed rate premiums. It is argued 
that the effect of moral hazard increases under a 100 percent coverage and flat-rate 
deposit insurance system, as no one charges a risk premium to the bank (Balaban and 
<;illi, 1997). 
Senior executives, directors and influential shareholders may also contribute to moral 
hazard. Knowing that the depositors are protected and therefore not asking for a 
premium, they will engage in riskier types of businesses. If they lose, the deposit 
insurance fund will cover the depositors for some or all of their losses, and if they 
win, they will directly get the benefit. Therefore, excluding the deposits of senior 
managers, directors and influential shareholders from insurance coverage may 
discourage them from taking excessive risk. This is not, however, the only 
mechanism that acts to limit excessive risk-taking by banks. For a start, when a bank 
fails the bank manager's reputation will be adversely affected and he/she may lose 
their job. Besides, there is a value attached to property rights in the bank's charter 
and this charter value is lost to shareholders in the case of bank failure. Therefore, 
shareholders may try to protect the charter by giving up expected profits from high 
risk-taking. Bank regulators can also legally force bank owners and managers to act 
more prudently. 
2.6 History of Deposit Insurance 
The US system is one of the oldest, adopted in 1934. Although there has always been 
a compensation limit, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) policy 
from 1933 to 1982 was to address the problem of failing banks by arranging assisted 
mergers and providing blanket coverage for all depositors. During the period 1933-
1983, there were 620 bank failures in the US where 99.8 percent of all depositors had 
their deposits repaid in full. In 1983, this arrangement gave way to a "modified 
payoff' policy, which was a payoff of uninsured depositors and other creditors based 
on the predicted collections from a failed bank's receivership. However, this 
procedure ceased following the collapse of the Continental Illinois National Bank 
and Trust Company in May 1984. Continental Illinois, which at the time was the 
28 
nation's seventh-largest bank, was also the largest commercial and industrial lender 
in the US and the FDIC fully-covered all deposits in the bank, an example of the 
"too-big-to-fail" policy. The period 1985-1990 saw the highest number of bank 
failures since the 1930's, and 99 percent of uninsured deposits with failed banks 
were protected. However, at the end of 1991, the US Treasury enacted the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). Under the act, risk-
related deposit insurance premiums were introduced, a form of structured early 
intervention and resolution to the regulatory treatment of troubled banks was agreed, 
and the FDIC's discretion to protect uninsured depositors with failed banks was 
restricted. In addition to those measures, the FDIC's power to bailout large banks 
has been controlled by introducing strict procedures. After the enactment of the law, 
the FDIC essentially left uninsured depositors to bear their losses (Dale, 2000). 
The US has the oldest history of deposit insurance being the first country to 
introduce a national deposit insurance system. Following the experience of the US, 
the number of countries that have adopted explicit deposit insurance has been 
increasing. Graph 2.1 shows the increase in the number of countries that have 
explicit deposit insurance schemes. 
Graph 2.1: Number of Explicit Deposit Insurance Systems in Existence 
1934-1999 
Cumulative Frequency of Explicit Deposit Insurance Systems Established 
80 
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Source: DemirgO,-Kunt and Sobaci, 2000 
Recently, in May 2002, an association by the name of the International Association 
of Deposit Insurers was founded under the auspices of the Bank For International 
Settlements (BIS), embracing the participants from 24 entities that provide deposit 
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insurance within 23 developed and developing countries5. The objectives of the 
association are to contribute to the stability of financial systems by promoting 
international cooperation in the field of deposit insurance and to set out guidance to 
enhance the effectiveness of deposit insurance systems. 
2.7 Deposit Insurance Schemes in the UK 
The UK has had a deposit insurance scheme since 1979 and in this section the 
developments concerning the deposit insurance arrangements since their adoption are 
discussed. While evaluating these developments, the main banking failures in the UK 
are also assessed in the context of deposit insurance. The rules of the Single 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme are examined to provide an understanding 
of the current arrangements for depositors of both banks and building societies. 
2.7.1 Background to the Deposit Protection Scheme in the UK 
and the Main Bank Failures 
During the period 1973-1975, the UK experienced the secondary bank crisis (Reid, 
1982). The causes of the secondary bank crisis can be analysed under two main 
headings: developments in the structure of the financial system; and the economic 
conjuncture. The secondary banks were depository institutions that were not 
reporting to the Bank of England (BOE) and not subject to the BOE's supervision 
and regulation. Their primary assets were long term loans for the purchase of land 
and buildings and their primary liabilities were short-term wholesale deposits. Due to 
the tightening of monetary policy in 1971 as a response to the hike of the price of oil 
by OPEC countries, the real property market collapsed. The secondary banks were 
badly hurt by defaults on loans they granted for the purchase of property and on the 
fall in the value of their equity stakes in development projects. The crisis was also 
triggered by the run of the wholesale depositors due to a loss of confidence. The 
BOE organised a "lifeboat" to rescue some secondary banks with the assistance of 
5 These countries are Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada (with two entities), Czech 
Republic, El Salvador, France, Hungary, Japan, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Peru, Philippine, Taiwan, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine and the US. 
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commercial banks and merchant banks. Twenty-six institutions received support and 
eight of them were placed in receivership or liquidation. Two other banks received 
support from the BOE. As a result, it is estimated that the BOE lost GBP 100 million 
with the commercial banks losing GBP 50 million (Bank of England, 1978). 
After the secondary banking crisis, there was a call for the reform of banking 
supervision, which resulted in the adoption of the Banking Act of 1979 (Radecki, 
1990; Hall, 1999). The Act introduced two main provisions. Firstly, it required all 
banks and other institutions taking deposits to be recognised or licensed. Secondly, a 
deposit insurance scheme was introduced. The Deposit Protection Scheme, which 
took effect from February 1982, required all recognised banks and licensed deposit-
takers to pay a levy, proportionate to the size of their deposit base and subject to a 
minimum payment of GBP 2,500 and a maximum of GBP 300,000 (Hall, 1993). 
That scheme covered the funds of each depositor up to 75 percent of GBP 10,000. In 
1987, this was increased to 75 percent ofGBP 20,000. 
Under another amendment made in 1995 to comply with European Union law, the 
Deposit Protection Scheme began to cover 90 percent of a bank's total liability to a 
depositor in respect of deposits made with European Economic Area (EEA) offices 
to a maximum payment to anyone individual of GBP 18,000 or ECU 20,000 
(whichever is greater) per bank. The scheme covered deposits denominated in 
European currency units and deposits in the currencies of the following currencies: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The 
scheme was funded by banks authorised in the UK (excluding branches of banks 
from other EEA countries unless they had "topped-up" the cover offered by their 
domestic schemes using the UK scheme) based on their holdings of deposits in EEA 
currencies and ECUs. 
During the period 1982-1996, 29 UK-authorised banks were placed either in 
administration or in liquidation, and Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) and the 
National Mortgage Bank (NMB) were purchased by the BOE as part of support 
operations. Of the failed institutions, the NMB, the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
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International (BCCI), the British & Commonwealth Bank and Barings were big 
banks, whereas the others were small institutions. The relatively small size of most 
banks that failed was reflected in the small size of the total payments from the 
Deposit Protection Fund (Jackson, 1996). 
In 1984, JMB, which was mainly involved in banking and bullion business, faced 
problems as a result of holding a loan portfolio with concentrated risk. JMB had 
loans and overdrafts exceeding GBP 300 million, of which half was judged 
irrecoverable (Hall, 1999; Dale, 1995). Although it was a small-scale institution, the 
BOE refrained from allowing it to fail to avoid contagion and possible damage to the 
reputation of the London bullion market or its status as a financial centre more 
generally (Dale, 1995). The BOE organised ajoint support operation with the help of 
the major clearing banks. The BOE and the major clearing banks provided GBP 130 
million and GBP 50 million was contributed by the JMB's parent company out of the 
GBP 245 million required. This was followed by the purchase of JMB by the BOE 
for GBP 1 (one pound), which provided an indemnity of up to GBP ISO million to 
meet losses in the commercial loan book. The major banks and other gold dealers 
agreed to counter-indemnify the BOE up to GBP 75 million. This incident led to the 
Banking Act 1987 under which there is only one category of bank and the system of 
authorisation and supervision was intensified (Hall, 1999). 
rn 1991, as a result of an auditing firm report that stated that BCCr management had 
been involved in fraudulent activities, BCCr was closed by a co-ordinated action 
headed by the BOE and followed by more than 6 countries in which it operated 
(Hall, 1999). The auditing firm reported that BCCr booked fictitious loans, failed to 
keep records of the deposits, and violated lending limits. A distinctive feature of the 
closure of BCCr was the BOE's willingness to allow BCCr to default on the 
uninsured liabilities to ordinary depositors. The depositors were provided with 
protection up to the limit of the Deposit Protection Scheme, which was 75 percent of 
the deposit with a ceiling of GBP 15,000. The Deposit Protection Scheme paid out 
GBP 78 million in compensation and more than 6,000 depositors lost over GBP 500 
million (The Times, 31.7.1997). The BCCr failure showed the importance of the role 
of both management and directors for the maintenance of internal controls and 
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effective and appropriate accounting systems, and led the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision to review arrangements regarding cross-border supervision 
(Hall, 1999). 
During the period 1990-1991, four small banks collapsed as a result of financial 
difficulties, which was followed by widespread withdrawals from the small banks by 
depositors. However, the clearing banks that had joined the lifeboat operation in the 
mid-1970s refrained from providing support this time, as they were not prepared to 
risk their capital in the interests of financial stability. As a result, the BOE provided 
covert support to those banks i.e. guaranteed the recycling of deposits from large to 
small banks. 
Barings, which was founded in 1762 and had a reputation as the oldest established 
UK merchant bank, collapsed in 1995. At that time Barings had total assets of GBP 6 
billion and deposits of around GBP 3 billion. The collapse was a result of losses 
incurred through unauthorised derivatives dealings in a Singapore trading unit (Dale, 
1995; Hall 1996). Although the BOE attempted to arrange a rescue package through 
a group of clearing and merchant banks and GBP 600 million was put together, the 
BOE failed to implement the plan as the losses of Barings due to the derivative 
positions were continuously increasing. Finally, Barings was acquired by 
Intemationale Nederlanden Group (ING) for the sum ofGBP I (one pound) and ING 
later iI1iected a further GBP 660 million and took over the losses. Depositors were 
protected by this arrangement and the business of Barings was revived (Dale, 1995; 
Hall, 1996). With the Barings case, attention turned to the supervisory and auditory 
failings and raised the importance of both management and directors in maintaining 
internal controls, which will enhance both internal governance and accountability 
within banks. 
After the Barings crisis, it became clear that many small merchant banks faced a 
liquidity crisis. The BOE organised support through the clearing banks to prevent 
contagion from the Barings crash leading to runs in such banks (Dale, 1995). 
During the period 1982-1996, payments to depositors in failed UK banks amounted 
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to GBP 144 million gross and GBP 88 million net after the recovery of funds from 
liquidation or administration. The UK scheme is less generous than those operating 
in many other countries, reflecting concerns that full cover would reduce the 
incentives for depositors to take a view on the soundness of individual banks and 
therefore reduce market discipline on bank management (Jackson, 1996). 
2.7.2 Background to the Building Societies' Investor Protection Scheme 
The scheme was established by the Building Societies Act 1986 and amended by the 
Credit Institutions (Protection of Depositors) Regulations 1995 and by the Building 
Societies Act 1997. 
The scheme was to be funded by levies on building societies as and when required, 
and there was no standing fund. The Building Societies' Commission (BSC) covered 
its administration costs, as the Building Societies Investor Protection Board had no 
funds of its own. The Board could borrow temporarily, the amount being limited to 
that which the Board may levy. 
The scheme was designed to be triggered by the insolvency of a building society or a 
determination by the BSC that deposits, which are due and payable, cannot be paid. 
Each protected investor received payments of 90 percent (25 percent initially) of the 
aggregate ofhislher protected deposit up to a maximum of GBP 18,000 (GBP 10,000 
initially) or the sterling equivalent ofECD 20,000, whichever is greater. 
The scheme covered most share accounts and deposits in the UK building societies 
and in any institution authorised in another EEA member state which had joined the 
scheme to provide top-up cover to depositors with its UK branches (FSA, 1997). 
Prior to its replacement by the Single Financial Services Compensation Scheme, the 
scheme had not been triggered and therefore there have been no payouts. 
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2.7.3 Current Deposit Insnrance Scheme in the UK 
The Single Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) came into effect on 
I December 2001. Besides the Deposit Protection Scheme, the Building Societies 
Investor Protection Scheme and two further schemes were also replaced by the new 
scheme. The objectives of the New Compensation Scheme are discussed further in 
the next chapter. Under the single scheme, payments under the Scheme are limited to 
lOO percent of the first GBP 2,000 of a depositor's total deposits with the bank and 
90 percent of the next GBP 33,000, resulting in a maximum payment of GBP 31,700. 
Most depositors, including individuals and small firms are covered. The 
compensation limit applies to each depositor and covers the total of all their deposits 
held with that firm. The Scheme covers deposits made with all offices of the bank 
within the EEA and deposits denominated in all currencies are treated alike. The 
limits shown above are those that will apply in the majority of cases. However, if a 
deposit is made with the branch of a UK bank in another EEA state or with a branch 
in the UK of a bank incorporated in another EEA state, the limits may be different. 
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme is triggered when an authorised 
institution goes out of business, for example, if it is subject to an insolvency action, 
such as liquidation or administration. It may also be triggered when the FSA 
considers that an authorised institution is unable to repay its depositors, or is likely to 
be unable to do so (Hall, 2002). 
The Financial Services Compensation Scheme is funded by levies on participating 
firms authorised under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. For levying 
purposes, the Scheme comprises three sub-schemes: accepting deposits; insurance 
business; and designated investment business. For levying purposes, the costs of the 
scheme are divided into two main categories; management expenses and 
compensation payments, which include Pension Review claims. Management 
expenses consist of base costs (the core costs of running the Scheme), specific costs 
(the costs of assessing and making compensation payments) and establishment costs 
(the costs of setting up the Scheme, which are being recovered through levies over 
three years from 1 December 2001). 
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By paying annual levies, finns fulfil their obligation to contribute to the base costs 
element of the management expenses and to the establishment costs. On the other 
hand, levies are allocated to Contribution Groups for the specific costs and 
compensation payments. This means that such levies are only raised against finns 
that are authorised to carry out the same type of business as those of the failed finns. 
There are limits to the amounts that the FSCS can levy in a financial year. For 
compensation purposes, the limits for each sub-scheme are: 
1. Accepting deposits: no more than 0.3 percent of a participant finn's 
protected deposits on a cumulative basis. 
2. Insurance business: no more than 0.8 percent of a participant finn's net 
premium income on protected policies. 
3. Designated investment business: the total levy must not exceed GBP 400 
million. 
The management expenses levy is subject to an annual limit, following consultation 
with the industry by the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
2.8 Deposit Protection Schemes in Turkey 
Turkey has had a deposit insurance scheme since 1933 and in this section the 
developments concerning the deposit insurance arrangements since their adoption are 
discussed. While evaluating these developments, the main banking failures in Turkey 
are also being assessed in the context of deposit insurance. The rules of the Deposit 
Insurance Scheme under the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency are also 
examined to provide understanding of the current arrangements for depositors and 
banks. 
2.8.1 Background to the Deposit Protection Scheme in Turkey 
The protection of deposit holders from bank failure has evolved since 1933 as a 
result of successive banking crises. The Turkish banking system witnessed five main 
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banking crises during the period 1933-2001. 
Due to the influence of the Great Depression, the first major banking crisis occurred 
in the 1930s. Following the bank failures, "The Law for the Protection of Deposits" 
was enacted in 1933, which protected savings deposits through the reserve 
requirements that banks held within the Central Bank as the preferential reserves for 
savings deposits. Nevertheless, the protection was criticised for being insufficient, 
and in 1936, with an amendment to the Banking Law, the protection was increased 
by allowing depositors to be treated as preferential creditors in respect of 40 percent 
of their savings deposits and, in the case of bankruptcy, this portion would be paid to 
the depositors without waiting for the result of the liquidation. This portion was 
increased to 50 percent with an amendment to the Banking Law in 1958. This 
process has been criticised due to the fact that there is no upper limit on the 
protection and all depositors, whether personal account holders or companies can 
benefit from this arrangement as the term "savings deposit" is not defined properly. 
The Banks' Liquidation Fund system was established in the 1960s after the failure of 
15 commercial banks. Economic stagnation and the depression of the 1950s and the 
effects of the stability programme led to the closure of those banks and they were 
acquired by public banks during the period 1960-1964. The relevant article of the 
Banking Law that allowed 50 percent of the savings deposits of the depositors as 
preferential creditors in the case of bank bankruptcy stayed enforced. In addition, in 
the case of a decision by the Ministry of Finance for a gradual liquidation of a bank 
that could not fulfil its liabilities, another bank would be appointed to assist the 
gradual liquidation of the bank by providing technical and financial help. The 
financial gap that would arise due to the liquidation would be met by the Banks' 
Liquidation Fund, to be formed under the wing of the Central Bank of Turkey 
(CBT), which would be financed by contributions collected from the banks 
representing 0.05 percent of their total savings and commercial deposits on an annual 
basis. In the case of insufficiency of this fund, the CBT would lend funds in the 
amount and conditions set by the Committee for the Credit for Banks. The fund was 
financed by banks and aimed to repay bank depositors in the case of failure. 
However, the banks' contribution never reached an adequate level, and the 
37 
repayment of deposits to the depositors of the failed banks necessitated the 
bOlTowing of TRL 352 million from the CBT. The Fund reimbursed the above-
mentioned amount to the CBT by 1978. The B ank's Liquidation Fund system was in 
force until 1983. 
The third round of banking crisis was in 198 
liberalised and rose sharply as a consequence 0 
3. In July 1980, interest rates were 
f the competitive environment in the 
financial sector. High inflation coupled with high interest rates worsened the 
Ives unable to repay their loans. The 
y and six banks were closed and 
and the liquidation of six banks, the 
established to replace the Bank's 
f the SDIF was not only to safeguard 
financial position of firms, which found themse 
bad loans of the banks increased substantiall 
acquired by public banks. Following bank runs 
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) was 
Liquidation Fund system in 1983. The purpose 0 
and maintain confidence and stability in the ba 
banks, but also to strengthen and if necessary 
nking system by insuring deposits in 
reform the financial structure of the 
banks. 
The SDIF was managed and staffed by the C 
system, all banks that accept deposits are obli 
collected in Turkey. The main source of the 
BT until the year 2000. Under this 
ged to insure their savings deposits 
fund are the premiums, which are 
h Turkish lira and foreign currency, calculated based on total savings deposits in bot 
including Turkish lira certificate of deposits 
accounts. The precise coverage of the scheme 
economic developments, especially changes in 
since the establishment of the SDIF in 1983 are s 
(CDs) but excluding commercial 
has changed several times due to 
the rate of inflation. The changes 
ummarised in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Deposit Coverage Changes in Turk ey 
Years Covera e 
1983-1986 100% ofTRL 3 million 
1986-1992 Up to TRL 6 million, 100° Vc of first TRL 3 million, 60% of remainin 
1992-March 1994 Uyto TRL 50 million, 100 % of first TRL 25 million, 60% of remaining 
1994 March-May 100% of TRL 150 million 
1994 May- 2000 June 100% of all savings accou nts 
2000 June- 2000 Dec Up to TRL 100 billion 
2000 Dec-today 100% of all savings accou nts 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey, (1989-2002). 
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The variable premium system, which is based on the capital adequacy ratio of banks, 
replaced the fixed rate premium application in March 1994. The undercapitalised 
banks, whose capital adequacy ratios are below 8 percent6, are obliged to pay a 
premium of 0.26 percent of their total savings deposits subject to insurance 
denominated in TRL (including TRL denominated certificates of deposit) lodged by 
real persons in the branches of the banks that operate and are authorised to receive 
deposits in Turkey, as well as the foreign currency deposits lodged by real persons 
who are residents in Turkey. The premium percentage was 0.25 percent for 
adequately-capitalised banks. The premiums were paid quarterly. 
In early 1994, Turkey experienced a run on the Turkish lira, triggered by a loss of 
confidence in economic policy and concerns over the country's ability to service its 
external debt. Until the last quarter of 1993, the excess liquidity created in the money 
markets was used to finance public deficits. However, 1994 started with huge 
movements in interest rates and exchange rates. In the first months of 1994, the 
amount of TRL expanded excessively since the public sector was not able to borrow 
from the market and relied on central bank resources. These developments, combined 
with the downward pressure on domestic interest rates, led to a weakening of the 
TRL. In response to excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate, the CBT increased 
the interbank interest rates and tried to withdraw the liquidity surplus, therefore 
preventing it from being used to acquire foreign currency. The overnight interbank 
rate rose to 700 percent in March 1994. At the same time, the CBT intervened in the 
market by selling foreign currency. Those developments decreased the CBT's 
official foreign exchange reserve from USD 6.3 billion to USD 3.5 billion. 
Banks, which relied heavily on non-deposit liabilities and financed their activities 
mostly via foreign currency borrowings, were adversely affected by these 
fluctuations in the financial markets. As a result, banks increased their lending rates, 
and loans slowed down dramatically. In addition, the amount of overdue loans 
6 The calculation of deposit premiums based on capital adequacy ratios has been in force since 5 May 
1994 (Source; Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 5.5.1994, Decision of the Council of 
Ministers No. 94/5465.) 
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increased. Another important development was observed in the decline in residents' 
deposits as a result of a lack of confidence to the system. 
As a result of these developments, three banks were closed down: TYT Bank and 
Marmara Bank, two small private banks, were banned from taking depositors' cash 
on II April 1994 and 20 April 1994 respectively; and Impexbank, an import-export 
bank, was told by the Treasury on 23 April 1994 not to open its doors the following 
day. Other banks operating in Turkey suffered runs on their deposits. 
As can be observed from Table 2.5, the position of the three banks that failed in 
April 1994 was not very important for the system. At the end of 1993, according to 
their balance sheets, their share in the total net worth of the banking system was 2 
percent; they gave only 2 percent of total loans and their off-balance sheet activities 
constituted 2.5 percent of the total. The only item that had significance was deposits, 
which reached 5.75 percent of total deposits at the end of 1993. On the other hand, 
the deposits of the failed banks constituted mainly interbank deposits, rather than 
retail deposits. Retail deposits were only 2.4 percent of total deposits at the year-end 
of 1993. Nevertheless, the decision to liquidate those banks and allow them to default 
on their depositors without being transferred to public banks reduced confidence in 
the banking sector. In addition, rumours that the government might freeze the funds 
in foreign currency-denominated accounts further deepened the crisis. Finally, in 
order to re-establish confidence in the system and maintain stability, the deposit 
insurance which had covered 100 percent of TRL 150 million of savings accounts at 
the time of the failures was extended to full coverage. 
Table 2.5: Share of Failed Banks in Turkish Banking System in 1994 Crisis 
Number of Number of Total Net 
Failed Banks Branches Employees Capital Loans Deposits Profits 
% % % % % % 
MARMARA BANK 0.18 0.33 0.65 1.47 2.36 0.25 
IMPEXBANK 0.12 0.23 0.63 1.67 2.77 0.38 
TYTBANK 0.18 0.25 0.67 1.46 0.62 0.21 
TOTAL 0.48 0.81 1.95 4.6 5.75 0.84 
Source: Adapted from Banks ASSOClatlOn of Turkey, 1995. 
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The decision to provide blanket coverage was an emergency action to rebuild 
confidence in the banking system; and, although the government announced that 
there would be a smooth and gradual movement towards the abolition of the full 
guarantee for savings deposits, it took six years to make any changes, mainly because 
of political concems. During the period 1994-1996, many political parties criticised 
the implications of full coverage for savings deposits. The criticisms were mainly 
based on the moral hazard effects of the deposit insurance, i.e. the adverse effects on 
banks' behaviour and the loss of an incentive for depositors to monitor their banks' 
activities. It was argued that, to continue the full coverage policy that hindered the 
degree of market discipline, the government provided an incentive for banks to 
increase risk-taking with the expectancy of earning higher profits. 
As well as implementing full deposit insurance coverage, the "Economic Measures 
Plan", which was put into effect in April 1994, limited the loans that the central bank 
could give to the Treasury and introduced changes relating to liquidity requirements, 
auditing principles, eligible activities for banks, and principles concerning entry and 
exit from the banking system. 
2.8.2 New Banking Law Prior to the Banking Crisis of 2000 
In June 1999, parliament approved a new Banking Law. With the enactment of the 
new Law, certain changes were made to strengthen key prudential regnlations and 
place the banking supervision framework on a proper foundation by increasing 
transparency and independence in the operation of the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA), and by providing all the tools needed for the improved 
resolution of problem banks. 
The Board of BR SA became fully autonomous as the involvement of the Council of 
Ministers in all decisions in the area of supervision (other than the appointment of 
the members of the Board) was removed. The decisions to licence and de-license 
banks and to approve provisioning regulations now rest with the Board. With the 
recent amendments, the three-year period during which a Board member was 
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prohibited from being employed as a senior executive in the banking sector (a 
provision which had made it difficult to find active professionals to take Board 
positions) was eliminated as well. 
Prudential standards relating to bank lending to owners and to single or related 
parties were also strengthened. The ratio of total loans to those having an indirect 
relationship is to be reduced from the current 75 percent of capital to 25 percent 
between 2002 and 2007, with a 5 percent decline occurring every six months. 
With the new amendments, the SDIF was given authority and responsibility for 
restructuring problem banks, to facilitate their sale in full or in part, and to liquidate 
the residual business in accordance with existing laws. The fund is no longer 
permitted to lend or otherwise provide liquidity support to banks other than those 
under its full control. 
Necessary modifications have been made recently to the regulations relating to the 
capital adequacy and foreign exchange exposure limits of banks to ensure that they 
apply on a consolidated basis. Within this context, two decrees related to "The 
Principles Concerning the Accounting and Implementation of the Standard Ratio for 
Foreign Currency Net General Position/Capital Base on a Consolidated Basis" and 
"The Principles and Procedures on the Measurement and Valuation of Capital 
Adequacy of Banks on a Consolidated Basis" were published in the Official Gazette 
dated 21 December 1999, taking effect after 30 June 2000. With these decrees, 
aiming at enhancing transparency and improving the monitoring capabilities of the 
authorities, banks are required to issue consolidated financial statements for 
themselves and their financial affiliates and to report twice a year. 
2.8.3 Current Deposit Protection Scheme in Turkey 
Regulation on the SDIF introduced by the Board of BRSA on 26 August 2000 
defined the organizational structure, duties and responsibilities of the Fund. 
The BRSA IS responsible for the management, functioning and auditing of the 
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"Savings Deposits Insurance Fund" and for establishing the principles of savings 
deposits insurance. 
The official decision on "Saving Deposits Subject to Insurance and Premiums to be 
collected by the Saving Deposits Insurance Fund No. 2000/682" was published in the 
Official Gazette dated I June 2000. According to the decision, saving deposits in 
both Turkish lira and foreign currency deposit accounts, which are of the nature of 
saving deposits opened by real persons (both residents and non-residents), held with 
domestic branches of banks operating in Turkey and authorised to accept deposit, are 
subject to deposit insurance. 
With the decision, the level of coverage on saving deposit accounts opened and/or 
renewed after the publication of this decision changed. According to the change, the 
coverage limit was reduced to up to TRL 100 billion per account until 31 December 
2000, and to up to TRL 50 billion as from I January 2001, but the fund still covers 
100 percent of saving deposit accounts opened before the decision. However, the 
banking crisis that emerged in December 2000 interrupted this application and 
blanket coverage still holds. 
The premium rate is as follows, on the basis of the quarterly totals of the Turkish lira 
saving deposits and foreign currency deposits being of the nature of saving deposit 
account opened by real persons: 
I. TRL 25 per TRL 10,000 for banks who fulfil all of the prudential ratios; 
and 
2. TRL 26 per TRL 10,000 for banks who cannot fulfil prudential ratios. 
2.8.4 The Banking Crisis of 2000 
At the end of 1999, with the coordination of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Turkey adopted a stabilisation programme aimed at decreasing the inflation rate 
below 10 percent by 2002. Finn monetary and exchange rate policies were the core 
elements of the programme designed to provide a nominal anchor for reducing 
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inflation expectations, healthy public finances aimed at eliminating the principal 
source of inflation pressures, and wide-ranging structural reforms designed to 
liberalise and modernise the economy. Significant progress was made during 2000. 
However, a severe banking crisis blew up in late November of that year, 
accompanied by a massive capital outflow. 
On 22 November 2000, the financial markets entered into turmoil due to an extreme 
liquidity squeeze. It can be said that the recent liquidity problem emerged mainly due 
to changes in the behaviour of the banking sector. Expecting a decline in the 
profitability of investment in Treasury bills, banks switched to the credit market, 
which is, by definition, less liquid. More specifically, the financial problems emerged 
from a small number of banks, which had aggressively taken market positions in 
anticipation of further declines in interest rates by investing in longer term 
investments, highly leveraged by short-term (CBT, 2002b). 
Such changes in behaviour had resulted from a substantial fall in interest rates from 
the inception of the new economic programme. During this period, the deposits of 
the banking sector fell in real terms and the maturity of deposits declined. This 
development further constrained the liquidity position of the banking system. 
Interest rates started to increase from mid-October caused by the unpredicted 
increase in the current account deficit and delayed structural reform, i.e. delays to the 
privatisation programme. 
On 27 October 2000, the BRSA announced its decision to transfer two commercial 
banks, namely Bank Kapital and Etibank, to the SDIF. Those two banks were unable 
to take the necessary measures previously asked by the BRSA in order to overcome 
the problems in their financial structure. 
The banks had open foreign exchange positions caused by borrowing from foreign 
resources, generally in the form of syndicated loans. However, the liquidity problem 
intensified due to the seasonal year-end foreign exchange demand of foreign 
institutional investors. The strengthened open position requirements, accompanied by 
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the long holiday period at the year-end, intensified the local banks' foreign exchange 
demand earlier than usual. Foreign investors' seasonal foreign exchange demand was 
also augmented due to the deterioration in the economic situation in Argentina as 
well as the delays in structural reforms in Turkey. Shortfalls in the expected foreign 
exchange revenues from privatisation raised concerns about the future of the 
economic program. 
In 20 November, rumours that some banks were facing liquidity crises spread 
rapidly, leading first-tier banks to cut their lines of credit to the interbank market, 
while foreign investors who were not willing to expose themselves to Turkish 
banking risks ceased to invest in the overnight money market. 
Consequently, on 22 November the CBT intervened to the foreign exchange market 
by selling USD 1.5 billion and the overnight repo rate hit 250 percent, while the rates 
on the secondary bond and bill market rose to 500 percent. However, these increases 
in interest rates did not curb the demand for foreign exchange. In fact, the squeeze in 
Turkish lira liquidity fuelled the demand for foreign exchange as it caused an 
increase in Turkish lira interest rates. These significantly high interest rates were 
perceived as a risk rather than a higher yield and the foreign exchange demand from 
international players continued. 
In the period between 17 and 30 November, the CBT sold approximately USD 6.2 
billion to the markets and the foreign exchange reserves of the CBT were estimated 
to have declined from USD 24.2 billion to USD 18.5 billion. 
The CBT announced that the net domestic assets ceiling would be restored at the new 
level attained in the last few days, which was around TRL2,000 trillion. Originally, 
the net domestic assets target was set at TRL 1,200 trillion, allowing for a fluctuation 
within a band of +/- 5 percent of the previous quarter's monetary base. It was 
apparent from this announcement that the CBT had firmly reassured the markets 
about its decision to stick to its original monetary program and to the principle that 
Turkish lira liquidity would be created only through foreign exchange purchases. 
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The government and the CBT resorted to certain measures in order to cope with the 
negative expectations of the market. Firstly, the government announced the time 
schedule for the privatisation of Turkish Telecom; it declared that 33.5 percent of 
Telecom would be sold to a strategic partner, with management rights and details of 
the auction to be announced on 14 December. Secondly, the law concerning the 
rehabilitation and privatisation of the state-owned banks and the supplementary tax 
package was approved by the parliament. On 6 December, a new IMF loan totalling 
over USD 10 billion was announced aimed at supporting the government's measures. 
In addition to those developments, the BRSA announced its decision to take over the 
nation's sixth largest private bank, namely Demirbank, which was at the centre of the 
liquidity problem. This was followed by the declaration of the Treasury stating that 
all deposits and credit of Turkish banks were under the guarantee of the Treasury. 
With this announcement not only the domestic players' but also the international 
players' confidence was restored. This was the end of the experiment with limited 
coverage, which had been adopted earlier in the same year. 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to review the underlying rationale for the 
existence of banks and bank safety nets. I particularly examined the deposit 
insurance and moral hazard problems. In addition, the UK and Turkish deposit 
insurance schemes were reviewed. Deposit insurance is not a new phenomenon for 
either the UK or Turkey. In the UK, after the Secondary Banking Crisis (1973-1975), 
the Banking Act of 1979 was introduced and the deposit guarantee system was 
established and began to operate in 1982 under the supervision of the Bank of 
England. In Turkey, the initial deposit insurance arrangements started in 1933 and 
the fonnal Savings Deposit Insurance Fund was established in 1983 as a legal entity 
functioning to insure the savings deposits of depositors and to preserve confidence 
and stability in the banking sector. 
Recently, regulators and economists have been increasingly arguing about the role of 
depositors in exercising market discipline. According to the theory of market 
discipline, bank depositors can exert market discipline either by withdrawing their 
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funds or by demanding higher interest rates from riskier banks. However, equity 
holders and debt holders could also be a source of market discipline. In the next 
chapter, r present the concept of market discipline and the views of regulators in the 
UK and Turkey on this issue. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF AND 
THE REGULATORY VIEW ON MARKET DISCIPLINE 
3.1 Introdnction 
Recently, market discipline has been considered as an instrument to ensure the safety 
and soundness of the banking system by regulators and academics. According to 
Park and Peristiani (1998), because of the increasing complexity of banking business, 
it has become more difficult to effectively regulate banks exclusively based on 
prearranged rules. Stem (l998b) argues that greater market discipline, accompanied 
by effective bank supervision, should better protect the taxpayer from expensive 
bailouts and better guard the economy against serious resource allocation. Moreover, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's consultative paper puts forward 
some specific proposals for achieving a greater role for market discipline and 
considers market discipline as one of the three complementary elements, along with 
minimum capital requirements and a supervisory review process, to promote safety 
and soundness in the banking system. (BIS, 2000) 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the second section, the theoretical 
discussion about market discipline and the potential sources of market discipline -
namely the depositor, the debt holder and the stockholder are identified. As the 
prerequisites for market discipline are discussed in the literature by a number of 
authors, after defining market discipline, looking for the prerequisites for the 
potential forces exerting market discipline is essential for the sake of the research. 
Therefore, in the third section, the literature on market discipline is reviewed. In 
particular, the prerequisites for depositors to deliver market discipline are identified, 
and these are used as the basis for the questionnaire design in this research. Besides, 
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the empirical evidence concerning the alternative forms of market discipline provides 
direction for the econometric analysis that examines the evidence of market 
discipline by studying whether depositors monitor their banks and punish risky banks 
either by withdrawing their deposits or by requiring higher deposit interest rates. In 
the fourth section, the regulatory view on market discipline is provided. In this 
section, I present the views of the UK and Turkish policy-makers, as well as an 
overview of the recent consultative paper of the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, namely "A New Capital Adequacy Framework: Pillar 3 Market 
Discipline" (BIS, 2000). A summary section ends the chapter. 
3.2 Market Discipline 
Financial intermediaries as depository institutions issue different types of liabilities: 
deposits; debts; and stock. On the other hand, they invest their funds in two major 
types of financial asset, namely marketable securities and loans, and the margin 
between the interest rate paid and earned is the basic source of profit. The risk to the 
suppliers of funds is determined primarily by the risks associated with these assets. 
The suppliers of funds will attempt to control their risk exposures either by 
restricting the risk assumed by the business or by demanding a rate of return 
appropriate to the level of risk underlying the firm's investments. This is referred to 
as market discipline (Mantipragada, 1992). 
Berger (1991) describes market discipline in the banking sector as a situation in 
which private sector agents, such as depositors, stockholders or creditors face costs 
that increase as a result of banks' excessive risk-taking and take action on the basis 
ofthese costs. Private sector agents, who are profit-maximising economic agents, can 
exert market discipline by discouraging risky activities of a bank as they penalise 
those activities through raising the cost or restricting the volume of funding 
(Crockett, 2002). 
Recently, the application of market discipline has attracted considerable attention 
from both academics and bank regulators. Flannery (200 l) explains this interest by 
arguing that the increasing complexity of financial institutions, which makes them 
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difficult to monitor and control, requires bank regulators to rely more on market 
discipline to supplement their traditional bank supervisory procedures. 
Policy-makers also express the benefits of increased market discipline. The new 
Basle Capital Accord, therefore, makes market discipline as one of the three pillars 
of financial regulation, by stating that market discipline imposes strong incentives on 
banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner (BIS, 2000). 
In a speech made by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan (Seiberg and 
Anason, 1997), governments are asked to rely more on market discipline to police 
financial institutions: "The appeal of market-led discipline lies not only in its cost-
effectiveness and flexibility, but also in its greater adaptability to changing financial 
environments. " 
On the other hand, whether market discipline should be a component of the financial 
safety net is a matter of intense debate, especially among academics. Some argue that 
market discipline cannot be effective as market participants would not be able to 
understand the risk-taking of banks. However, Stem (1998b) argues that in 
economies where the markets set prices, and in that way the resources for the great 
preponderance of goods and services are allocated effectively, the market should be 
responsible for economic progress, and therefore additional market incentives to 
contain excessive risk-taking in banking should be introduced. 
Randall (1989) states that the market discipline concept rests on the assumption that 
the market recognises, properly evaluates, and discounts problems before they 
become so large as to threaten a banking institution. However, according to the 
results of his study, stock prices under-performed and bond ratings were downgraded 
only at a late stage in the development of the problems after substantial, sometimes 
fatal damage had been done. Randall (I990) also argues that market analysts, 
whether they represent bank stock investors or creditors, have relatively little to go 
on in forming a judgement on the potential for major losses in a bank's loan portfolio 
and cannot monitor bank performance in a timely fashion. He also argues that co-
insurance leaves the banking system subject to dangerous deposit volatility. 
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On the other hand, Flannery (2001) argues that investors have a comparative 
advantage in monitoring, while supervisors have a comparative advantage in 
influencing bank conditions. Accordingly, supervisors should take into account the 
market's input so as to minimize the social cost of their supervisory process. 
In general, there are five factors for market discipline to effectively ensure the safety 
and soundness of the banking system (Lane, 1992; Crockett, 2002). These are: 
1. Market participants should have sufficient information to reach informed 
judgements, 
2. Information should be readily available, 
3. Market participants should have the ability to process information 
correctly and have the right incentives, 
4. There must be no bailout anticipated, 
5. The banks must respond to market signals. 
In general, market discipline is regarded as being present where market participants 
monitor and identify changes in bank condition and send signals to those banks. On 
the other hand, as Flannery (2001) points out, there is another phenomenon that 
market discipline is commonly supposed to incorporate, i.e. market participants' 
ability to influence a bank's actions. However, in this research, I am only concerned 
with the former, and analyse whether market participants exert market discipline by 
demonstrating actions. As Eisenbeis and Gilbert (1985) point out, market participants 
could demonstrate two general types of action: first through the higher prices that 
liability holders charge depository institutions for their funds and second through a 
reduction in the supply of funds. 
An example of the existence of market discipline in the banking sector is where 
depositors penalise riskier banks by requiring higher interest rates or by withdrawing 
their deposits. However, in the literature, not only deposits but also debt and equity 
holders are among the sources that are capable of providing market discipline. These 
are described in the following sub-sections. 
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However, there is another source of market discipline that is briefly addressed in the 
literature, which is bank management. It is expected that bank managers who are 
concerned with protecting their own (and those of others) jobs will tend to operate 
the bank in a conservative manner. However, the degree to which management can 
be viewed as a source of restraint against risk·taking depends on compensation 
arrangements and the personal attitude of managers. Garcia (1997) argues that the 
bank managers of the insured bank, knowing that runs are unlikely, may take on 
additional risk in their asset portfolios, and reduce the amount of capital and liquid 
reserves they hold to enable them to weather shocks. It is also stressed that tying the 
base of the managers' salaries to short run profits lessens the aptitude to behave in a 
conservative manner. 
3.2.1 Depositor Market Discipline 
Since deposits constitute the bulk of the liabilities of depository institutions, 
depositors are regarded as the most logical source of market discipline. Jordan (2000) 
argues that depositors, who are not fully protected by a deposit insurance scheme, 
which might be implicit or explicit, have an incentive to monitor banks' activities as 
they face default risk and should therefore penalise risky banks by either demanding 
risk premiums i.e. higher interest rates, or withdrawing their deposits. 
Mantripragada (1992) views depositor market discipline as a potential supplement to 
the regulatory supervision of depository institutions and describes an effective 
depositor monitoring system as one which succeeds in curbing the risk·escalating 
behaviour of depository institutions without destabilising the financial system or 
leaving the small depositor unprotected. 
The widely·accepted argument for greater reliance on depositor market discipline is 
that it would restrain managerial risk·taking and reduce potential losses to the deposit 
insurance fund (Simons and Cross, 1991). Furthermore, Martinez·Peria and 
Schmukler (I998) point out three potential social benefits from enhancing depositor 
market discipline in the banking sector. These are: 
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1. By punishing bank risk-taking, increased market discipline may reduce 
the moral hazard that deposit guarantees create (i.e. the incentive for 
banks to undertake excessive risks). 
2. Market discipline may improve the efficiency of banks by forcing the 
relatively inefficient banks either to become more efficient or to exit the 
industry. 
3. The social cost of supervising banks may be lowered if regulators transfer 
greater control to market forces that can distinguish healthy from bad 
banks. 
Given such benefits, it is important for a banking system that depositors exert market 
discipline effectively. Therefore, the prerequisites of depositor market discipline are 
discussed immediately below. 
Garten (1988) suggests a number of conditions that need to be met in order for 
depositor market discipline to work effectively: 
1. There must be a group of depositors for whom risk is a primary concern 
in choosing a depository. 
2. Depositors must have access to information to judge the risks involved. 
3. The discipline imposed by depositors must be severe enough to be felt by 
the management of a depository, but not so drastic as to preclude an 
opportunity for the management to respond to the concerns of the 
depositors. 
4. The deposit market must be able to identify which banks will be saved in 
case of failure. 
5. The choice of banks to be saved should be based on specific factors 
relating to the financial condition of the bank so investors can make 
predictions long in advance of failure. 
In addition to Garten's conditions, Mantripragada (1992) puts forward two additional 
conditions that must exist for depositor discipline to work effectively. These are: 
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1. Some banks must be allowed to fail, resulting in losses to depositors. 
2. The banking industry must be financially healthy and enjoy depositor 
confidence. 
Baer and Brewer (1986) also put emphasis on the capacity and willingness of 
uninsured depositors to evaluate publicly available information on individual bank 
performance for effective depositor market discipline. However, Garten (1988) 
argues that since a significant portion of uninsured deposits are maintained for 
reasons that have little to do with the risk and return associated with investments in 
particular banks, the majority of uninsured depositors will not continuously monitor 
banks' risk. She emphasises that those uninsured depositors are unwilling to monitor 
bank risk, rather than being unable to do so. However, Macey and Garrett (1988) 
disagree and point out that it is not necessary that all depositors assess risks; it is 
sufficient for marginal depositors to do so. Garten (1988) also argues that the risk 
that is undertaken by banks will be constrained by market forces only if depositors 
can assess the relative degrees of risk assumed by individual banks and then set 
differential prices on the deposits that reflect their information about risk. 
Considering this latter condition, opponents of depositor market discipline question 
the ability of depositors to evaluate the quality of bank assets and therefore to assess 
the bank risk-taking (Simons and Cross, 1991). 
Benston (1993) evaluates and rejects the major arguments stated against the use of 
uninsured depositors to impose market discipline. The major arguments that he 
evaluates and his reasons for rejecting them are as follows: 
1. Uninsured depositors may be unable to monitor banks or to do so in a 
timely fashion. 
Benston disagrees and argues, firstly, that banks disclose a considerable 
amount of information and, secondly, that several private financial 
reporting services make comparisons among banks by providing financial 
ratios. Thirdly, he draws attention to the importance of examiners' 
reports, and suggests further disclosure of such reports. Finally, he argues 
that the financial statements of other corporations that regularly issue 
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debts are much more difficult to interpret than those of banks. 
Furthennore, the risk being borne by the uninsured depositors is greater 
than the risk of lending to non-bank corporations as banks operate with 
lower ratios of equity capital to assets than do other corporations, hence 
they should monitor their banks very closely. As a conclusion he states 
that depositors could assess the risks taken by their banks, and that they 
could make such assessments as effectively as can creditors generally. 
2. Even if depOSitors could evaluate bank pelformance, the additional 
interest rate they could charge would be insufficient to affect bank 
behaviour materially. 
He disagrees with the above statement. He cites the studies done by 
Cargill (1989), Hirschhom and Zervos (1990), Keeley (1990), and Ellis 
and Flannery (1992), which find that the interest rates on these largely 
uninsured deposits reflect the risks of the banks that issued them. In 
addition, Benston argues that although depositors may keep their funds in 
partiCUlar banks because these banks offer them service and convenience, 
they will demand rewards if they believe that their funds might be at risk. 
Therefore, he concludes that depositors and other bank creditors could 
charge banks an interest rate that reflected the risk to which they were 
exposed. He also adds that banks would take the charges imposed by 
uninsured creditors into account in detennining the levels of risk that they 
would assume. However, he fails to submit any evidence to support this 
argument. Gilbert (1983) emphasises this point and states that in order to 
defend the market discipline concept completely, there must be studies 
that test banks' responses to negative signals in major funding markets, 
such as lower stock prices, deposit outflows, or higher costs of funds. 
3. In any event, uninsured depositors are likely to withdraw their funds 
rapidly (run) rather than monitor banks, thereby causing costly 
disruptions to other banks and the economy. 
He argues that when bank runs could occur, it is likely that banks would 
increase their capital and diversify their risks and take steps to assure their 
depositors that their funds were safe, similar to the actions taken by non-
bank corporations. 
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The studies on depositor market discipline also suggest that uninsured depositors can 
be a source of market discipline. However, because of the existence of deposit 
insurance schemes that reduce the efficiency of depositor market discipline, insured 
depositors cannot be a source of market discipline, as they do not have incentives to 
monitor the risk-taking of their banks. 
Analysing the behaviour of depositors, Blum (2000) argues that insured depositors 
are indifferent about the risk-taking of banks that they invest their funds with and 
only depositors who are not fully protected by deposit insurance or by state 
guarantees have incentives to monitor their banks' behaviour and exert market 
discipline. According to Blum, the costs of insured deposits do not reflect the banks' 
risk-taking and therefore banks would not have an incentive to keep risks within 
reasonable limits. 
Demirgiiy-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) also argue that explicit deposit insurance 
may decrease bank stability by encouraging bank risk-taking and this harmful impact 
on bank stability tends to be stronger when, inter alia, the coverage offered to 
depositors is extensive. They claim, however, that the risk of moral hazard can be 
contained through effective prudential regulation and supervision of the banking 
system. The cross-country study by Demirgiiy-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) conducts 
market discipline tests for a number of developed and developing countries and then 
pools the bank and country specific data in order to test whether there is an impact of 
deposit insurance on market discipline. They found some evidence that the existence 
of deposit insurance lowers the responsiveness of deposit interest rates to changes in 
bank liquidity, an indication that market discipline is weakened. However, their 
study was not successful in finding significant market discipline effects in 
regressions explaining the growth of deposits. According to Billet et al. (! 998), 
explicit deposit insurance might soften the market discipline of banks, as the findings 
of their study indicate that when the market punishes banks for increased risk-taking, 
the latter shift towards insured deposits in order to avoid cost imposed by market. 
Gilbert (! 990) argues that deposit insurance creates an incentive for banks to assume 
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higher risk, and he describes risk in terms of the variance of a bank's return on assets 
expressed as a percentage of its capital. He states that, in the absence of deposit 
insurance, if banks have portfolios of assets with higher variances in their rates of 
return or lower ratios of capital to total assets, they have to pay higher deposit 
interest rates. 
On the other hand, a number of studies suggest that both uninsured and insured 
depositors can be a source of market discipline. Park and Peristiani (1998) tested for 
the presence of depositor market discipline by examining the effects of depository 
institutions' risk on the interest rate and quantity of uninsured deposits, using a risk 
measure derived from actual failure records. They found that both uninsured and 
insured depositors exert market discipline by requiring higher interest rates and by 
withdrawing their deposits from riskier institutions. The findings of Park and 
Peristiani are important from two points of view. Firstly, they show that depositors 
can effectively monitor depository institutions when incentives are increased. 
Secondly, because of the indirect and non-pecuniary costs that insured depositors 
might bear, such as time delay in deposit redemption, they can also have an incentive 
to monitor their banks activities and therefore be a source of market discipline. Park 
and Peristiani conclude that as depositors are potentially an effective source of 
monitoring for depository institutions, attempts to increase depositor market 
discipline may promote sounder banking practices. 
Barajas and Steiner (2000) state that even in countries that have explicit deposit 
insurance schemes, depositors act as their deposits are not insured. They explain the 
presence of depositor market discipline even in the explicit deposit insurance 
schemes by stating that, first, the moral hazard problem in depositor behaviour might 
not be very important because of the incredibility of deposit insurance as depositors 
do not trust the deposit guarantee fully; and second, deposit insurance might reduce 
but not totally eliminate market discipline. This statement is interesting as it is 
generally argued that even in the absence of explicit deposit insurance, depositors 
may often act as if their deposits were insured and expect a bailout if their bank were 
to face difficulties. 
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The study of Gropp and Vesala (2001) also point to this perspective on the impact of 
deposit insurance on risk-taking. Gropp and Vesala analysed the relationship 
between deposit insurance and risk-taking and found that the establishment of 
explicit deposit insurance schemes significantly reduces the risk-taking of European 
banks. Their finding also stands in contrast to the empirical findings of Billet et at. 
(1998), Demirgii9-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Demirgii9-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2000) and Blum (2000), who found that implementation of explicit deposit 
insurance schemes increases the risk-taking activities of banks. Gropp and Vesala 
explain this conflict by arguing that, previous to the establishment of explicit deposit 
insurance, European banking systems have been characterised by strong implicit 
deposit insurance and therefore the introduction of the explicit schemes implies a de 
facto decline in the range of the safety net. Gropp and Vesala also found that large 
banks did not change their risk-taking in response to the introduction of deposit 
insurance, which suggests that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance does not 
mitigate "too-big-to-fail" problems. However, the reason for large banks not 
changing their risk-taking behaviour could also be because of this policy as large 
banks might have already changed their behaviour before the introduction of explicit 
deposit insurance. 
As a matter of fact, there is a common point in a number of authors' views that the 
existence of the "too-big-to-fail" policy as well as the extended cover providing to all 
depositors after a bank failure reduce the effectiveness of market discipline. 
According to the "too-big-to-fail" policy, a bank that is too-big-to-fail is one whose 
failure would have a sufficiently significant impact on the financial system and the 
economy as a whole such that these failures would be intolerable to the authorities 
(Sous sa, 2000). Such disruptions would be costly as they would prevent the economy 
from benefiting from functions provided by the financial system, which include the 
efficient allocation of resources, the provision of the payment system, and the 
efficient pricing of financial risk (De Bandt and Hartmann, 1998). 
According to Blum (2000), as a bank loses its charter and incurs bankruptcy costs 
when it faces insolvency, it has self-interest to avoid umeasonably high risks. 
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However, existence of the "too-big-to-fail" policy which results III bail outs 
regardless of insolvency eliminates the incentive for banks to act in a prudent 
manner. 
In the context of depositor market discipline, it is argued that a "too-big-to-fail" 
policy as well as the extended cover provided to all depositors after a bank failure, 
implicitly insures those which are not explicitly insured by deposit insurance, thereby 
eliminating the uninsured depositors' incentive to monitor the bank (Sous sa, 2000). 
3.2.2 The Alternative Sources of Market Discipline 
In the previous sub-section, depositors who are the primary source of market 
discipline were examined. Besides depositors, debt holders and equity holders that 
are capable of providing market discipline are discussed in the next sub-sections. 
3.2.2.1 Debt Holders as a Source of Market Discipline 
Banks issue various types of debt securities such as certificate of deposits, 
commercial papers, medium-term notes and subordinated debt. Certificate of deposit 
holders were analysed under the heading of depositor discipline and subordinated 
debt issues have several characteristics, such as their junior status and long maturity 
that make them particularly attractive for providing increased market discipline and 
extensively studied in the literature. Therefore, in this section I particularly focus on 
subordinate debt holder market discipline. 
Subordinated debt7 is an uninsured liability that banks issue to raise funds. The term 
subordinated refers to the status of the creditors of a bank in bankruptcy as 
subordinated debt holders only receive payments once all depositors have been paid 
in full in the event of bank failure (Gilbert, 1990). 
Similar to depositors, if a bank increases its risk-taking, subordinated debt holders 
7 Dictionary of Banking Tenns (1997) defines subordinated debt as a kind of debt having a claim 
against the issuer's assets that is lower ranking, or junior to, other obligations, and is paid after the 
claims of the holders of senior securities are satisfied. 
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can exert market discipline either by requiring a risk premium for the debt 
instruments that the bank issues, or by selling the debt instruments that they hold as 
an investment. While the bank's expected cost of issuing the debt instrument 
increases in the former case, the secondary price of an existing debt instrument 
decreases in the latter. Therefore, in order for subordinated debt holders to be a 
source of market discipline, investors must gather and collect information about the 
banks' risk-taking and use this information to decide whether to buy or sell the 
banks' debt (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999). 
Subordinated debt has some characteristics that make it particularly attractive for 
providing market discipline. In the US, the typical subordinated instrument issued by 
a bank or, more commonly, its holding company, is a fixed rate, non-callable, ten 
year bond and the relative homogeneity of the subordinated debt market makes the 
comparison between the issuers straightforward. Besides, unlike equity, bond prices 
do not benefit if bank profits exceed expectations, and therefore both the issuance 
price and the secondary market prices are sensitive to the risks of a banking 
organization, making subordinated debt an especially strong instrument of market 
discipline. 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) summarises the 
advantages of subordinated debt over the other two sources of market discipline 
under three headings: 
1. Subordinated debt is uninsured and after equity is among the first to lose 
value in the event of a bank failure. Therefore, the issuance and secondary 
market prices of subordinated debts are particularly sensitive to bank risk. 
2. The incentives of bank depositors and debt holders might be different 
from the incentive of equity holders. Both sides are exposed to loss and 
therefore have to monitor bank risk. However, while depositors and debt 
holders do not benefit from any upside gains that accumulate from the 
excessive risk-taking of banks, equity holders could enjoy the gains and, 
accordingly, have a much stronger preference for risk-taking. 
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3. Finally, their relatively long maturity presents comparative advantage for 
the subordinated debt to provide effective market discipline, as 
subordinated debt investors are not able to run, possibly mitigating a 
systemic risk situation. 
Evanoff (1993) argues for increasing the percentage of subordinated debt in the 
capital structure of the bank in order to enhance market discipline, and sees the 
subordinated debt holders as the best source of market discipline. He draws attention 
to the limited liability of the shareholders, who enjoy all the benefits of riskier 
investments. He also sees the depositors' role in exerting market discipline as 
inferior, arguing that they may not have sufficient information and may not be 
capable of adequately monitoring the bank as well. He states that since subordinated 
debt holders could not demand repayment prior to the terms of the contract, they 
would continuously monitor bank behaviour and demand a higher interest rate from 
riskier banks. If banks relied more on subordinated debt in their capital structure, 
when approaching insolvency, market discipline would be applied in a slow 
methodical process during which maturing debt became ever more difficult to roll 
over. Therefore, instead of a sudden run on deposits, there might be a "soft landing" 
in the case of failure. In addition, depositors are less likely to withdraw deposits as 
debt holders serve as a buffer stock. 
Benston (1993) also mentions the important advantages of subordinated debt over 
deposits and equity capital. In addition to Evanoffs point, he states that when 
subordinated debt is publicly traded, the authorities are provided with an early 
warning signal in the form of the interest yield demanded on the debt as well as any 
difficulty a bank has in replacing maturing debt. 
However, according to Blum (2000), subordinated debt holders do not have any 
advantage over depositors in terms of exerting market discipline by withdrawing 
their investments. Blum suggests that, in contrast to deposits, as subordinated debts 
have longer terms, subordinated debt holders cannot withdraw their funds quickly 
once problems in a bank start to emerge. Therefore, depositors are in a better position 
as they can exert market discipline either by asking for higher interest rates or by 
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punishing banks by withdrawing their funds whenever they do not approve of the 
bank's behaviour. 
3.2.2.2 Stockholders as a Source of Market Discipline 
Benston (1993) points out that stockholders can act as an important source of market 
discipline. The major incentive for stockholders to monitor bank performance is the 
position of their claims' ranking in the case of failure. Stockholders' claims to the 
bank's assets rank lowest in priority in the case of failure. So the stockholders are the 
first to lose when the operations of an economically-insolvent bank cease. Therefore, 
it is expected that stockholders will pay attention to the risk-taking of banks. On the 
other hand, under the limited liability principle of the stockholder, they only incur 
losses to the extent of their investments in the bank while they gain benefit from a 
high degree of risk-taking. The limited downside and unlimited upside may provide 
stockholders with a bias towards risk assumption; however, stockholders can be 
expected to exercise a degree of market discipline. 
3.3 Empirical Studies Concerning Market Discipline 
In this section, I review the findings of empirical studies in order to conclude about 
the effectiveness of market discipline. Empirical studies concerning the effectiveness 
of market discipline of bank risk can be mainly classified into three groups. The first 
group of studies estimates the influence of measures of risk assumed by banks on the 
behaviour of deposits; the second group of studies estimates the influence of 
measures of risk assumed by banks on the yields paid on subordinated debt; and 
finally the third group of studies estimates the influence of measures of risk assumed 
by banks on the stock prices of banks. 
3.3.1 Depositor Behaviour 
The studies concerning depositor market discipline mainly analyse the impact of 
bank risk-taking, as captured by the balance sheet and by market measures of risk, on 
the yields and growth of deposits. Some measures of risk frequently used include the 
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capital ratio, the proportion of non-perfonning loans to total loans, the return on 
assets and the variance of stock returns. The majority of the existing published 
academic studies concerning depositor market discipline are based on the US 
banking system; there are only a few that examined other countries. 
The earlier studies that examined depositor behaviour in the US banking system are 
inconsistent with the effectiveness of market discipline. Both Crane (1976) and 
Herzig-Marx and Weaver (1979) analysed the relationship between CD interest rates 
and bank specific risk variables and while the results of Herzig-Marx and Weaver 
show that only the coefficient of the liquidity ratio is statistically significant, Crane 
did not find any significant relationship, leading him to conclude that risk measures 
were not important compared with customer relationships. 
On the other hand, the results of Baer and Brewer (1986), Hannan and Hanweck 
(1988), James (1989), Ellis and Flannery (1992), Park (1995), Park and Peristiani 
(1998) and Jordan (2000) support the presence of depositor market discipline in the 
US banking system. 
Baer and Brewer (1986) estimated CD rates as a function of the variables used by 
bank supervisors to reflect risk. They found that CD rates are strongly affected by 
accounting-based measures of bank risk -taking. The relationship between CD rates 
and bank risk-taking was also examined by Hannan and Hanweck (1988), James 
(1989) and Ellis and Flannery (1992). Hannan and Hanweck (1988) estimated the 
relationship between interest rates on CDs and bank risk for five different maturities 
and found strong evidence that uninsured depositors exacted a risk premium for risky 
banks. Estimating the interest cost on large CDs as a function of risk measures, 
James (1989) found that interest cost was positively related to the ratio of domestic 
loans to capital and the loan loss provision ratio. The negative relation between 
interest cost and the ratio of foreign loans to capital is interpreted as evidence of an 
implicit government guarantee of foreign loans. Furthennore, Ellis and Flannery 
(1992) constructed time series models of six large money-centred banks' CD rates, to 
detennine whether measured changes in bank risk influence the rate paid on 
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uninsured deposits. They found that the CD rates paid by large money centre banks 
include a significant risk premium. 
In the literature, depositor market discipline has generally been investigated to assess 
its impact either on the deposit interest rate or on the quantity of deposits. However, 
the studies of Park (1995) and Park and Peristiani (1998) have combined both of 
these bank approaches and examine market discipline by focusing on the relationship 
between bank risk and both the pricing of and growth in uninsured deposits. 
Park (1995) examined the impact of bank risk on the interest rate and the growth of 
deposits between 1985 and 1992 in the US banking system, measuring bank risk as 
an estimation of the probability of failure based on actual failure records. He found 
that riskier banks pay higher interest rates and experience slower growth of deposits 
and concludes that depositors exert market discipline. However, he was unable to 
find evidence supporting the "too-big-to-fail" hypothesis, as depositors did not prefer 
large banks. Using a similar methodology, Park and Peristiani (1998) analysed 
depositor market discipline in the US thrift industry during the 1980s by examining 
the effects of depository institutions' risk on the pricing and growth of deposits, 
using a risk measure derived from actual failure records and they found that as 
banks' activities became riskier, both uninsured and insured depositors exert market 
discipline by requiring higher interest rates and by withdrawing their deposits. 
Jordan's (2000) study is a more recent one that analysed the effectiveness of 
depositor discipline in the US. By focusing on whether failed banks faced depositor 
discipline as they become troubled, Jordan examined 65 banks that failed in New 
England in the early 1990s, focusing in particular on the two years data before the 
quarter in which banks fail. The results of Jordan indicate that uninsured depositors 
react to the weakening in bank strength. However, for New England banks, market 
discipline by depositors was not very effective as failing banks increased their use of 
insured deposits enough to offset much of the shortfall created by the decline in 
uninsured deposits. Therefore, he concludes that as the failing banks were able to 
substitute relatively cheaper insured funds for the expensive uninsured funds, 
changes in the pricing and supply of uninsured deposits had only a modest impact on 
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bank behaviour and the effectiveness of market discipline was diminished. However, 
in his study, Jordan also found that the interest rate spreads that many banks in the 
sample were paying over their competitors' rates were increasing as the sample 
banks approached their failure date. Failed banks increased their insured deposits by 
offering higher interest rates for insured deposits than those of competitors in order 
to attract depositors; they also faced higher search costs in obtaining new funds. The 
findings of Jordan highlight the importance of co-insurance. In the US, all deposits 
below USD 100,000 are fully insured and there is not any co-insurance. However, 
the results of Jordan show that although uninsured depositors withdraw their deposits 
from unhealthy banks, as these banks could fund themselves through insured 
deposits the effectiveness of market discipline was diminished. This suggests that in 
face of a co-insurance scheme, the banks would be unable to fund themselves and the 
depositors could exert market discipline effectively. 
Although there is extensive research analysing depositor behaviour in the US, there 
is limited evidence on whether depositors in other developed or, indeed, developing 
countries exert market discipline on banks, either by requiring higher interest rates or 
by withdrawing their deposits from riskier ones. 
Schumacher's (1996) research on Argentina, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler's (2001) 
study on Argentina, Chile and Mexico, Mondschean and Opiela's study (1999) on 
Poland, Barajas and Steiner's study (2000) on Columbia and Birchler and Maechler's 
study (2001) on the Swiss banking systems have provided evidence on depositor 
market discipline. 
Schumacher (1996) studied the Argentinean banking crisis during 1994-1995 and 
found evidence of market discipline. She used bank-level data and firstly estimated 
the probabilities of bank failure. Secondly, she examined whether these probabilities 
had an impact on deposit behaviour over the course of the 1995 Argentinean banking 
crisis. She found that the probability of failure is explained by the ratio of non-
perfonning loans, the return on assets, and a number of variables measuring liquidity. 
She also found that the probability of failure negatively affects the behaviour of 
depositors, especially during the peak of the crisis in March 1995. During 1994, 
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excluding December, she found that riskier banks paid higher interest rates on 
deposits. 
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) considered the banking systems of Argentina, 
Chile and Mexico, and their findings support the existence of market discipline in all 
three cases, as the growth of deposits was significantly related to bank fundamentals, 
once controlling for systemic and macroeconomic variables also affecting the 
demand for deposits. This result is also shown to hold even in the case of small, 
insured depositors. 
Mondschean and Opiela (1999) examined the behaviour of Polish depositors with 
time deposits from 1992 and 1996 by using a general least squares regression model. 
They also examined whether the ownership status of state-owned banks provided 
them with a competitive advantage over private banks, as well as the impact of the 
introduction of the explicit deposit insurance scheme. They found that depositors 
exert market discipline by requiring a price for risk-taking, the relationship between 
bank risk and deposit interest rates diminishing after the passage of a formal deposit 
insurance scheme; and state banks were also found to pay lower deposit interest rates 
than private banks. However, the model of Mondschean and Opiela excludes some 
variables, such as liquidity and earnings, which are commonly used in the analysis of 
depositor market discipline. 
By using panel data for the 1985-1999 period, Barajas and Steiner (2000) examined 
whether depositors in Columbia disciplined bank behaviour, where deposit insurance 
is compulsory, there is co-insurance by depositors and risk-weighted premiums, and 
with relatively small coverage declining continuously in real terms. Their estimations 
indicate that depositors prefer banks with stronger fundamentals and banks decrease 
their risk-taking after depositors punish them by withdrawing deposits and requiring 
higher interest rates. They conclude that market discipline exists in Colombia. 
However, they also express that the observed response of banks could also be a result 
of effective bank supervision rather than market discipline by itself. The findings of 
Barajas and Steiner differ from those of Demirgiiy-Kunt and Detragiache (1999), 
who find that the banking systems of the countries with explicit and relatively 
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extensive deposit insurance tend to be more fragile, which is consistent with the 
argument that deposit insurance leads to an increase in moral hazard and a 
breakdown in market discipline. 
While the majority of the above-mentioned studies focus on the interest rates paid by 
banks in order to test the existence of market discipline, some academics, such as 
Birchler and Maechler (2001), have concentrated on the level of deposits. They 
examine the presence of market discipline by examining whether depositors 
withdraw their deposits from riskier banks in the Swiss deposit market by using a 
panel of bank-specific data on 250 Swiss banks over the period 1987-1998. They 
found considerable evidence of depositor market discipline in the Swiss deposit 
market, as depositors are sensitive to bank-specific fundamentals, to institutional 
differences across bank groups and to institutional changes in the deposit insurance 
scheme. 
3.3.2 Debt Holders' Behaviour 
In the literature, several studies analysed whether subordinated debt holders exert 
market discipline by testing the relationship between debt spreads over the rate on 
Treasury securities, and ratings and accounting measures of risk specific to banking 
organizations derived from balance sheets and income statements. Similar to the 
empirical studies on depositor behaviour, the existing literature on subordinated debt 
mainly examined the US market. However, while most of the earlier empirical 
studies did not find significant statistical relationships between the risk premium 
demanded by investors and bank risk, the findings of more recent studies support the 
existence of market discipline in the subordinated debt market. 
One of the first studies that analysed whether subordinated debt holders could be a 
source of market discipline is the study of Beighley (1977), who examined the US 
market and found evidence of market discipline. In his study, Beighley tested the 
relationship between the premium rate, which is the spread between the interest rate 
on the subordinated debt and the interest rate of the US Treasury securities, and 
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measures of bank risk, including a loss ratio and a leverage ratio, and found that the 
coefficients on the loss and leverage ratios are positive and significant. 
On the other hand, the studies of Pettway (1976), Fraser and McCormack (1978), 
Herzig-Marx (l979), Avery et al. (1988), and Gorton and Santomero (1990) also 
examined the US market but their findings did not support the existence of market 
discipline. 
Pettway (l976) estimated the spread as a function of the capital ratio of banks and 
other independent variables. He found that the coefficients on the capital ratios were 
not significant and concludes that investors were not sensitive to the bank risk-
taking. Fraser and McCormack (1978) and Herzig-Marx (1979) also estimated the 
relationship between the spread and measures of bank risk and could not find any 
evidence supporting the existence of market discipline. 
Avery et at. (1988) analysed the risk premiums for the US bank holding companies' 
(BHC) subordinated debts for the year-ends of 1983 and 1984. They estimated the 
risk premium, that is the spread between the interest rate on the subordinated debt 
and the interest rate on US Treasury securities, as a function of various measures of 
risk derived from balance sheets, Moody's and Standard and Poor's bond ratings and 
an index proposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for the 
pricing of risk-based deposit insurance, and found that risk premiums are weakly 
related to ratings, whereas they are uncorrelated with the FDIC Index and balance 
sheet variables. 
Gorton and Santomero (1990) improved upon the methodology of earlier studies by 
demonstrating that the relationship between spreads on uninsured bank liabilities and 
risk cannot be assessed by using a linear function. Rather, they imputed the implied 
volatility of the bank's assets from a pricing model for subordinated debt derived 
from options pricing and correlated those volatilities to bank-specific measures of 
risk. They used a data sample that was used by Avery et at. (l988) and the findings 
indicate that there is little support for the argument that there was statistically 
significant market discipline in the banks' subordinated debt market. 
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While most of the earlier empirical studies found no or little statisticaIIy significant 
relationship between spreads and bank-specific risk measures, recent studies of 
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Morgan and Stiroh (1999) provided some evidence 
of market discipline in the US subordinated debt market. Moreover, the findings of 
Bruni and Paterno (1995) and Sironi (2000), who examined European banks, support 
the effectiveness of market discipline in the European subordinated debt market. 
Using a more widespread data set than earlier studies, F1annery and Sorescu (1996) 
analysed subordinated debt yields over the period 1983-1991 and found a significant 
relationship between spread and risk at the US BHCs after 1989 when bank 
regulators abandoned the "too-big-to-fail" policy that had protected large banks. 
According to their results, in the early years, bank-specific risk measures did not 
explain spreads as investors did not differentiate among banks' risk-taking because 
of the "too-big-to-fail" policy and they explained the lack of market discipline in the 
earlier studies by pointing to the implied government guarantees of the 1980s. 
The disciplinary role of investors in the US markets has also been investigated by 
Morgan and Stiroh (1999), who used spreads, ratings of Moody's and Standard and 
Poor's and asset portfolios in their analysis, for the 1993-1998 period. While their 
findings provide some evidence of market discipline of banks, they could not find a 
strong relationship between spreads and ratings and asset portfolios for large banks. 
Therefore, they conclude that implicit guarantees for large banks might prevent 
investors from exerting market discipline on those banks. 
While existing empirical studies concerning the risk sensitivity of subordinated debt 
are mostly based on the US banking system, the studies of Bruni and Paterno (1995) 
and Sironi (2000) analysed European banks, and their findings support the existence 
of market discipline. Bruni and Paterno (1995) examined market discipline in 
European subordinated debt markets for a limited sample of 28 observations and for 
a single day by testing the relationship between the spread on USD denominated 
bonds and Moody's ratings and bank-specific variables. Sironi (2000) also 
investigated whether investors in the European markets discriminate between bank 
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risk-taking by testing the risk sensitivity of the spreads of subordinated debts. The 
sample that Sironi used in his analysis consists of 290 observations based on 
subordinated debt issues of 65 banks from 13 European countries during the 1991-
2000 period. His findings could be summarised under three headings. First, investors 
discriminate between the different risk profiles of European banks. Second, while 
implicit guarantees, such as a "too-big-to-fail" policy, were present during the 1991-
1995 period, these guarantees weakened in the second half of the 1990s. Third, state 
banks benefit from an implicit government guarantee. He concludes that, in the light 
of his first two findings, investors in subordinated debts in the European markets 
could be a source of market discipline. 
3.3.3 Stockholders' Behaviour 
The studies concerning stockholders as a source of market discipline mainly examine 
market discipline by testing the hypothesis that bank stock prices are inversely 
related to the risk-taking of banks. The majority ofthe results ofthe studies that have 
examined the stockholders' behaviour support the effectiveness of market discipline. 
The studies of Beighley et al. (1975), Pettway (1976) and Brewer and Lee (1986) 
examined the impact of bank risk-taking on stock prices and found evidence of 
market discipline. 
Beighley et al. (1975) modelled bank stock prices as a function of bank-specific risk 
variables, such as the capital ratio, earnings, loan-loss rates and asset size, and found 
that those banks with higher capital ratios and lower loan loss rates have higher stock 
prices. Pettway (1976) modelled estimated betas8 of banks derived from weekly 
percentage changes in the banks' stock prices and the average weekly percentage 
change in the New York Stock Exchange index over a period of five previous years 
as a function of return variables, price/expected earnings (P/E) ratios and bank 
specific risk variables, including the ratio of total capital to risk assets, earnings 
growth and size of total deposits. Analysing the data of 38 large US banks for the 
1971-1974 period, Pettway found that while the betas were inversely related to the 
8 Beta is a measure of risk derived from past stock prices. 
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earnings growth for 1972 and to the capital ratio for 1974, the coefficients of the size 
variable were significantly positive for 1971 and 1973 and the coefficient of the PIE 
variable was significantly positive for 1974. A similar finding was documented by 
Shome et al., (1986), who estimated stock prices as a function of bank specific risk 
variables and found that only the coefficient of the capital ratio was positive, yet 
statistically significant for some years but insignificant for other years. 
Brewer and Lee (1986) also analysed the relationship between betas and bank-
specific risk variables and their findings, which were similar to those of Pettway as 
only the coefficients of some variables were found to be positive and significant, 
indicate that there is evidence of market discipline in the stock market. In particular, 
they found that, whereas an increase in loans and reliance on purchased funds and a 
decrease in the ratio of capital to total assets had an important impact on the bank 
equity, income statements and loan charge-off data provided little information on the 
risk sensitivity of bank equity. Brewer and Lee also found that there are regional 
differences in the market response to measures of risk, as New York-based BHCs 
exhibit more sensitivity to risk variables compared with other regional BHCs. 
While the above-mentioned studies examined the impact of bank risk-taking on stock 
prices, Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) and James (1989) 
have studied the impact of less developed country loans and announcements of loan 
loss provisions on bank stock prices. 
Cornell and Shapiro (1986) estimated returns to shareholders of 43 large banks as 
functions of the composition of their assets and liabilities in the years 1982-1983. 
They found that the percentage that Latin American loans represent of total assets 
had a significant, negative impact on returns in 1982. Energy loans had a negative 
impact in 1982-1983. Loans purchased from Penn Square Bank had a negative 
impact on returns in the month in which that bank failed. 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) looked for the changes in stock prices of large banks at 
the time of the announcement by Mexico in 1982 of its moratorium on debt 
payments as a function of the ratio of Mexican debt to equity capital at individual 
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banks. They found that the coefficient on the ratio of Mexican debt to equity capital 
is negative and significant. Banks were not required to disclose their Mexican debt at 
the time ofthe 1982 moratorium. 
James (1989) estimated the returns on holding the stock ofBHCs as a function of the 
change in the market value of the BHCs' loans to less developed countries and 
dummy variables for individual banks and individual time periods. He found that the 
change in the market value of loans to less-developed countries has a positive, 
significant coefficient that is not significantly different from unity. 
On the other hand, the results of the studies of Randall (1989) and Simons and Cross 
(1991) are inconsistent with the effectiveness of market discipline. By employing a 
case study approach, Randall (1989) examined the impact of the announcement of 
large losses on the stock prices for a sample consisting of 40 BHCs by comparing the 
stock prices before and after the losses were announced. His findings, which were 
based on a case study rather than an econometric model that analyses the 
determinants of stock prices, indicate that stockholders did not impose market 
discipline on banks as bank stocks were not sensitive to the risks assumed by banks 
until large losses were announced. 
The study of Simons and Cross (1991) provided similar results as their findings also 
indicate that bank stockholders could not be a source of market discipline. They 
analysed whether the market may have recognised problems in a bank's assets before 
the regulators became aware of them. They argue that in this case the monitoring 
undertaken by bank shareholders would help regulators to identify a problem bank 
earlier, rather than to rely extensively on bank examinations to identify problems in 
banks. In order to test whether the stock market anticipated the bank's downgrade 
status, they employed the residual analysis technique, which is commonly used in 
event studies, with a sample consisting of 22 US BHCs, and examined the stock 
prices of BHCs that were downgraded by examiners to a 4 or 5 CAMEL rating 
between 1981 and 1987. As they found that shareholders' returns failed to anticipate 
downgrades by examiners, their results could not provide any evidence that 
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stockholders could exert market discipline. Therefore, they conclude that the prices 
ofBHC stocks cannot be monitored to improve the supervision of commercial banks. 
3.4 Regulatory View on Market Discipline 
Following the review of the studies that have been undertaken concerning market 
discipline, regulators' views have also been assessed to help complete the framework 
for this research. The regulators' views in the UK, Turkey and the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision are evaluated respectively. The findings are used to develop 
research hypotheses. 
3.4.1 Regulators' Views in the UK 
The Deposit Protection Board (DPB) and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
were contacted to seek interviews on the regulators' views about the importance of 
the deposit protection scheme for the UK, the role of the "co-insurance" principle in 
the existing scheme and especially the importance of "depositor discipline". The aim 
of the researcher was to gain deeper understanding about how regulators think and 
feel about these topics of concern to the research. 
The DPB was unable to accede to the researcher's request, as their policy does not 
allow for the granting of an interview, and instead they provided written answers to 
the researcher's questions. The FSA sent two consultation papers on consumer 
compensation, which provided answers to most of the questions that had been 
addressed to them. In addition, Mr. Brennan, from the FSA's Compensation and 
Oversight Policy Department, contributed written answers. 
3.4.1.1 Some General Points on the New Compensation Arrangements 
The FSA assumed its powers and responsibilities under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 on I December 2001. The FSA have four statutory objectives, 
namely: maintaining market confidence; promoting public understanding of the 
financial system; securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers (whilst 
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recognizing their own responsibilities); and reducing the scope for financial crime 
(Hall, 2002). 
The Act requires the FSA to make rules establishing a scheme for compensating 
consumers when authorised firms are unable, or likely to be unable, to satisfy claims 
against them. The body established to operate and administer the compensation 
scheme is the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). By making rules 
that allow the FSCS to pay compensation to retail consumers and small business, 
focusing protection on those who need it most, the compensation scheme rules form 
an important part of the toolkit the FSA uses to meet its statutory objectives. 
The main compensation schemes that were replaced by the new scheme were the 
Deposit Protection Scheme, the Building Societies Investor Protection Scheme, the 
Investors Compensation Scheme, the Policyholders Protection Scheme, the Friendly 
Societies Protection Scheme and the FSA's scheme covering firms authorised under 
s43 of the Financial Services Act 1986. The basic single scheme structure is as 
follows. There are three sub-schemes. The first sub-scheme covers deposits taken by 
banks and building societies; the second sub-scheme covers insurance policies 
written by insurance companies and friendly societies; and the third sub-scheme 
covers all authorisable business not covered by one of the other two sub-schemes. 
The FSA describes the features of the new compensation scheme as follows: 
1. Transparent in their structure and operation and clear both to claimants 
and to the regulated firms which will provide the funding; 
2. Easily accessible to claimants and potential claimants; 
3. Fair in the application both to claimants and contributors; 
4. Efficient and responsive in operation; 
5. Simple and cost effective. 
New limits on compensation payable are as follows: 100 percent of the first GBP 
2,000 and 90 percent of the next GBP 33,000, which leads to a maximum payment of 
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GBP 31,700. Under the old scheme the maximum compensation was GBP 18,000, 
(90 percent of GBP 20,000). 
3.4.1.2 Financial Services Authority View 
The view of the FSA has been mainly gathered from the Consultation Papers 5 and 
24 issued by the FSA on December 1997 and June 1999 respectively, while 
additional information about the past research concerning the compensation 
arrangements was obtained from Mr. Brennan from the Compensation Oversight and 
Policy Department. 
The importance of deposit insurance to the integrity and soundness of the UK's 
financial system is described by the FSA as crucial: having a compensation scheme 
is very important, not only for protecting the investors but also for promoting 
confidence in financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. The reason 
for establishing compensation schemes is justified as a form of consumer protection 
for individuals who are not generally able to assess the risk of the institutions they 
deal with. The FSA also points out that compensation schemes help to reduce the 
systemic risk that a single failure of an entity may cause. 
While implementing deposit insurance, a number of countries give priority to the 
soundness and stability of their financial system rather than protecting small 
depositors. However, in the UK, protection of small depositors is of overriding 
importance, as it is argued that the soundness of the financial system is traditionally 
achieved instead by strong prudential supervision by the Bank of England (Kyei, 
1995)9. 
The FSA also puts particular emphasis on the importance of deposit insurance for the 
protection of small depositors who are unable to judge the financial condition of a 
bank for themselves. According to the FSA, one of the two fundamental objectives of 
the compensation schemes is that the compensation schemes must be available to 
9 The responsibility for banking supervision was transferred from the Bank of England to the FSA on 
1 June 1998. 
75 
consumers who are least able to sustain financial loss. The FSA points to the findings 
of "The Family Resources Survey 199611997", which suggested that 57 percent of 
families had less than GBP 1,500 of savings (excluding life assurance or funded 
provisions). The FSA argues that losing 10 percent of a deposit can hit these 
consumers very hard. On the other hand, when placing their money with a bank or 
building society, there is little they can do to insure themselves against this risk. 
Depositors who spread their risk by depositing small amounts with different banks or 
building societies may lose out in terms of the interest they can earn on their 
deposits. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the UK is one of the very few countries that 
adopted the co-insurance principle that leaves the depositor exposed to an element of 
risk on all deposits. According to the FSA, the element of co-insurance has been an 
important and highly supported principle in the structure of the existing 
compensation schemes in the UK. The existence of individual limits and an element 
of co-insurance within the existing schemes is thought to act as an incentive for 
consumers to take care about where they place their funds or whom they deal with 
and reflects the principle that consumers should take some responsibility for their 
own financial decisions. 
The primary considerations concerning the appropriate level of co-insurance has 
been widely debated and the FSA points out that there is a need to strike a balance 
between offering enhanced protection to certain consumers, who would be hit 
particularly hard by any approach which requires them to bear a share of any loss, 
and the desire to avoid providing a disincentive for consumers to make wise 
decisions about where to place their money or do business. 
The FSA undertook initial research about the public awareness about compensation 
arrangements. According to the findings of their initial research, consumers' general 
awareness of compensation arrangements was very low and it was not a factor to 
which they attached much significance when making savings or investment 
decisions, which might suggest that the incentive effect of the co-insurance element 
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in the existing schemes is limited. Besides, the low level of awareness undermines 
the stabilising potential of compensation arrangements. 
A number of points about the methodology of the FSA's research are worth noting. 
Several research agencies in the UK offer "omnibus" surveys as a means for their 
clients to obtain data speedily. This is achieved by inserting questions in consumer 
survey questionnaires, which are conducted on a regular basis, usually weekly or 
fortnightly. Basically, an 'omnibus' survey consists of a series of short 
questionnaires on behalf of different clients who share the costs of recruitment, 
interviewing, etc. The compensation research was carried out by using an omnibus 
survey of UK adults. The sample was designed to be representative of all adults in 
telephone-owning households. Interviewing took place between 27th and 29th 
November 1998 and a total of983 interviews were conducted. 
In order to create an effective incentive for consumers to take responsibility for their 
decisions under the new scheme, the FSA states that it is crucial to promote public 
awareness of the scheme and its provisions despite the complexity of the 
arrangements. They also point out that the UK regulators have already introduced 
requirements on firms to ensure compliance with the provisions in the Deposit 
Guarantee Directive which requires that consumers are made aware of the existence 
of deposit protection arrangements. On the other hand, Deposit Guarantee Directive 
(article 9-section 3) prohibits the use of the terms of the compensation arrangements 
for advertising purposes. 
It is also stated that the publicity surrounding a default and the fact that some of the 
consumers have suffered losses act as a warning to other consumers to be more 
careful. However, the FSA is aware of the arguments that it is not appropriate to 
expect some consumers, especially among the private individuals and small 
companies who are the focus of the compensation cover, to differentiate between 
authorised institutions and to understand why institutions operate with different 
levels of risk. On the other hand, the FSA states that they would like to encourage 
people to enter into transactions in financial services only after they have given 
proper consideration, to the best of their ability, to the balance of risk and reward. 
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In light of the above points it can be concluded that the FSA wishes to promote 
market discipline in the banking sector with the help of the co-insured depositor. 
However, the introduction of the single compensation scheme increased the overall 
level of protection available to personal depositors compared with the former 
schemes. The major change from the former schemes application was the exclusion 
oflarge firms, which were seen as financially sophisticated consumers who were less 
deserving of protection and whose existence as uninsured depositors would help to 
increase market discipline. 
3.4.2 Regulators' Views in Turkey 
The researcher contacted the Assistant General Manager and the Manager of the 
Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) and the Assistant General Manager of the 
Banking Department in the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) to get their points of view 
on the deposit insurance system in Turkey and its relevance to market discipline. 
Both the SDIF and the CBT officials explained their views on the subject. Moreover, 
the press releases of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) have 
been examined to fulfil the above-mentioned aim. 
The BRSA is the new agency that has been in charge of the financial sector since 
August 2000. The BRSA states its mission as being to safeguard the rights and 
benefits of depositors and to create the proper environment in which banks and 
financial institutions can operate with market discipline, in a healthy, efficient and 
globally competitive manner, thus contributing to the achievement of long-run 
economic growth and stability of the country. It is clear that the BRSA wants the 
financial institutions to be subject to market discipline as well as to its regulation. 
The main goals of the organisation are summarized below: 
To enhance banking sector efficiency and competitiveness: elimination of 
distortions created by the existence of state banks; strengthening of the banks' capital 
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base; reduction of the banks' intennediation costs; minimisation of group banking 
and non-financial activities. 
To maintain confidence in the banking sector: in accordance with market discipline 
and the "self responsibility" principle, to design the proper' regulation for public 
awareness; making adequate, understandable and accurate infonnation accessible to 
the markets in a timely manner; promoting international best standards in accounting 
and reporting systems; providing a transparent environment in which infonnation on 
risks is clear and accessible for all parties. 
To minimize the potelltial risks to the economy from the ballkillg sector: prevention 
of all kinds of transactions and practices that can jeopardize the smooth and safe 
operation of the banks; developing early warning and prompt correction systems to 
prevent individual problems from causing systemic risk. 
To ellhance the soulldness of the ball king sector: enhancing the flexibility of the 
sector against risks; giving importance to the improvement of corporate governance; 
developing internal control and risk management systems; taking market risk into 
account in the calculation of capital adequacy; improving the BRSA's capacity for 
risk-focused and consolidated supervision and control. 
To protect the rights of the depositors: establishing a balance between the adverse 
effects of deposit insurance, such as erosion of market discipline and increase in 
moral hazard, and the need to protect the rights of depositors. 
The SDIP, which was fonned in the CBT, was amalgamated with BRSA in August 
2000 and is responsible for managing the fund in line with BRSA's regulations. 
According to the SDIP, the awareness of the public concerning the deposit insurance 
was quite low till 1993. However, after Turkey experienced the banking crisis in the 
spring of 1994 when three banks failed, the pUblicity surrounding the defaults made 
people aware of the compensation arrangements. Since then the SDIP has been 
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receiving frequent inquiries from the public and also from Turkish workers who live 
abroad concerning the deposit insurance scheme. 
The SDIF regards the existence of 100 percent coverage for individuals as very 
important as a means of protecting small investors. However, the SDIF claimed that 
people who are aware of the 100 percent coverage do not pay attention to. the 
financial condition of the banks that they place their funds with and prefer banks 
which pay higher interest rates regardless of risk (the SDIF also puts emphasis on the 
tendency for risky banks to pay higher interest rates to attract deposits than the sound 
banks operating in the Turkish financial system). 
On the other hand, the institutional investors whose funds lack any protection are 
believed to pay attention when selecting their banks and to prefer to do business with 
sound banks. As an example, nearly all of the deposits at the three banks, which the 
SDIF took over in 1994, belonged to individuals. Institutional investors did not have 
deposits with those banks that failed. The SDIF argues that examining the structure 
of the deposit base of an institution gives a good idea of its financial condition. 
While sound banks could be able to borrow funds from the institutional investors, 
risky banks' deposit bases consist mainly of personal savings deposits. 
Currently, banks are paying premiums to the SDIF according to their capital ratios 
and the SDIF believes that it is a sensible approach to apply risk-related premiums 
based on capital ratios. However, the current premium structure is not effective as 
there is only a slight difference between normal rates (0.0025 percent for the banks 
that have all their ratios at targeted levels) and penalty rates (0.0026 percent for the 
banks that have ratios below target). 
Ceyla Pazarba~lOglu (2002), Vice President of the BRSA, stated that their key 
objective is to foster confidence in banks and contribute to the strengthening of the 
sector. She stressed that the BRSA attaches importance to market discipline and, in 
line with the improvements in the sector, a limit will eventually be re-introduced to 
the deposit insurance coverage. Besides, the BRSA is planning to provide 
information about its actions and the banking sector through comprehensive reports 
80 
that will be published. In addition to that, the Capital Markets Board is in the process 
of introducing additional disclosure requirements for publicly-traded banks. 
3.4.3 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision's View 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision gives special importance to promoting 
effective market discipline as the Committee views increased market discipline as an 
effective complement to supervisory efforts to maintain a sound banking system 
(BIS,2000). 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision'slo recent proposals to reform capital 
adequacy are based on three main "pillars". While the first two pillars focus on 
capital requirements and on the future role of national supervisors respectively, the 
third pillar is aimed at strengthening the role of market discipline through an 
improvement in banks' disclosure (BIS, 2001). The third piIIar recognises that 
market discipline has the potential to reinforce capital regulation and other 
supervisory efforts to promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems. 
The Basle Committee also argues that market discipline imposes strong incentives on 
banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner and, therefore, 
the Committee has a strong interest in facilitating effective market discipline as a 
lever to strengthen the safety and soundness of the banking system. 
However, the Committee also points out the importance of disclosure to provide 
effective market discipline by stating "In order for market forces to work effectively, 
thereby fostering a stable and efficient financial system, market participants need 
access to correct and timely information. Disclosure, therefore, is a complement to 
supervision." In order to improve the disclosure practices of banks, the Committee 
recommends that banks should publicly disclose six broad categories of information, 
namely financial performance, financial position (including capital, solvency and 
liquidity), risk management strategies and practices, risk exposures (including credit 
IQ The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking supervisory authorities 
which was established by the Central Bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It 
consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
81 
risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational, legal and other risks), accounting 
policies, and basic business, management and corporate governance information to 
support market discipline and strengthen financial stability by promoting the 
transparency of banks' activities and risk exposures. The Committee defines 
transparency as the "public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables 
users of that information to make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial 
condition and peiformance, business activities, risk profile and risk management 
practices" (BIS, 2000). 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision puts emphasis on the complementary 
interaction of prudential supervision and market discipline, which is critical in 
promoting the long-term stability of both individual institutions and banking systems. 
The Committee points out that bank supervisors are interested in bank transparency 
mainly for two reasons: firstly, they recognise that markets contain disciplinary 
mechanisms which, under appropriate conditions, reinforce supervisory efforts by 
rewarding banks that manage risk effectively and penalising those whose risk 
management is weak or ineffective. Secondly, effective banking supervision relies on 
the collection and analysis of information to assess the conditions of individual banks 
and banking systems as a whole. 
It is argued that a sound and well-managed bank should benefit when it provides 
comprehensive, accurate, relevant and timely information on its financial condition 
and performance, as well as information concerning its ability to manage and control 
risks, and should be able to access capital markets more efficiently than similar 
institutions that do not provide adequate disclosures. This is mainly because high 
quality public disclosure improves the capability of market participants to make 
informed decisions. Market discipline is founded on the observation that a sound and 
well-managed bank is able to achieve better terms and conditions in transactions with 
informed and rationally behaving market counterparties. 
Besides pncmg, market participants also provide disciplining incentives. For 
instance, they may decrease the volume or narrow the range of business undertaken 
with banks that have increased their risk profiles. Also, uninsured and partly insured 
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depositors have an incentive to withdraw their funds in the case of any problems 
regarding the safety of the bank. Finally, the market can totally refuse to enter a new 
business. 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision puts strong emphasis on the fact that 
market discipline based on adequate public disclosure can be an effective 
complement to supervisory efforts to encourage banks to maintain sound risk 
management systems and practices. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter the concept of market discipline was introduced, the literature was 
reviewed the regulatory view on this issue was discussed. Reviewing the literature on 
market discipline revealed that most of the studies on this subject have been 
undertaken in the US and that very few studies have been done on market discipline 
in developing countries. Evaluation of the views of the regulators in the UK and 
Turkey and the Base! Committee on Banking Supervision helped shaping the 
research questions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A SURVEY ON DEPOSITOR BEHAVIOUR 
IN THE UK AND TURKEY: 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of the methodology used 
for the survey on depositor behaviour in the UK and Turkey. Given the research 
objectives stated in the first chapter and the context in which the research was to be 
undertaken, it was decided that the most effective data collection method would 
involve a two-step quantitative process. From the theoretical discussion developed in 
the second and third chapters, a number of hypotheses have been stated. The initial 
stage of the empirical work was developed in the light of the theoretical work. It was 
deCided to undertake survey research, which is defined by Hutton (1990) as the 
method of collecting information by asking a set of preformulated questions in a 
predetermined sequence in a structured questionnaire to a sample of individuals 
drawn so as to be representative of a defined population. 
The second stage of the research involved employing econometric analysis to 
examine the existence of market discipline in the banking industries of the UK and 
Turkey during the 1990s. The focus is on the relationship between bank risk-taking 
and both the pricing of and growth in deposits, as discussed in the sixth chapter. 
4.2 Domain of the Study 
Every research starts with a problem. As was stated in the first chapter, the main 
research problem of this study is, "Can a bank depositor be an effective source of 
market discipline in the UK and Turkey?" To answer this question, the researcher 
84 
has to check whether the pre-conditions of market discipline exist in the environment 
where the depositors make their decisions. It is also essential to marshal as much 
relevant factual information about the characteristics, views and behaviour of 
depositors as possible. Those facts then need to be evaluated in an appropriate 
theoretical framework. 
Therefore, as one of the methodologies to be employed in this research, a sample 
survey was undertaken in order to collect the relevant depositor information so that it 
could be analysed in order to test the research hypotheses stated in Section 4.4.1 of 
this chapter. 
To sum up, the questionnaire is used to explore a number of hypotheses and to 
achieve a measure of understanding about peoples' perceptions about their banking 
activities, attitudes towards risk and their ability to be a source of market discipline. 
4.3 Data Collection 
Tull and Hawkins (1993) state that when deciding on a data collection method, the 
primary consideration is the choice of technique that is capable of generating 
appropriate information from the appropriate sample at the lowest cost. AIIison et al. 
(1996) define three survey tools to gather data; observations, questionnaires and 
interviews. For this study, observational methods were not thought practical due to 
time, access and cost considerations. On the other hand, the disadvantages of the 
interview method listed by Oppenheim (1992), such as high costs both in terms of 
time and money, precluded the use of interviews as the researcher had a very limited 
budget. Consequently a mail questionnaire was chosen to collect data. 
4.3.1 Sample 
The major objective of sampling theory is to provide accurate estimates of unknown 
values of the parameters from sample statistics that can be easily calculated. 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Churchill (1995) advises a six-step 
procedure to follow when selecting a sample of a popUlation (Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: Sample Population Selection Procedure 
Step I: 
Step 2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
Step 6: 
Deftn e Population 
Identify the Sampling Frame 
Select a Sampling Procedure 
Determine the Sample Size 
Select the Sample Elements 
Collect the Data from the 
Designated Elements 
The first step is about defining the population. To accurately estimate unknown 
parameters from known statistics, the population has to be defined in terms of (I) 
content, (2) extent, and (3) time (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). As the 
aim of the study is to examine depositor behaviour in the UK and Turkey in the 
context of market discipline, the population was defined as the head of households 
over 18 years of age who have savings accounts in those countries. The time was set 
differently for each country as the surveys took place in 1999 and 2000-2001, 
respectively. The UK survey was undertaken during the researcher's residence in the 
UK in 1999 and the Turkish survey was conducted in December 2000-January 2001, 
after the researcher returned to Turkey. 
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The second step was identifying the sampling frame. The sampling frame was the 
listing ofthe elements from which the actual sample will be drawn (Churchill, 1995). 
A high degree of correspondence between the sampling frame and the sampling 
population is a vital element as the accuracy of a sample depends on the sampling 
frame (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Following the identification of the 
sampling frame, the sampling procedure has to be determined. 
For the UK study, in order to identify a suitable sample, which would generate the 
results that would be applicable across the nation as a whole, London was selected 
and split geographically. As the population of the UK is spread across a number of 
cities, the sample was selected to reflect this national distribution. Although the 
initial intention was to use the house type classification, which is generally used in 
marketing research, this did not prove practical. Instead, the research area was split 
up geographically in a manner which replicated the distribution of population across 
the country. Respondents were then selected randomly from each part. In this way it 
was possible to construct a nationally random sample from one city. 
A sampling frame based on the list of a commercial mailing company was used. 
However, the problem of blank foreign elements arose. The problem of blank foreign 
element occurs when some sampling units in the sampling frame are not included in 
the research popUlation (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). In this case, it 
became clear that some households did not have any savings accounts. These cases 
had to be treated as blanks and omitted from the sample. In order to deal with this 
drawback, a slightly larger than normal sample was initially selected, as 
recommended by Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996). 
To start with, a list of 1,000 households in the London area was drawn up, falling 
into the appropriate geographically-distributed areas. The names of the individuals 
who declared themselves as the head of the family were obtained from the 
commercial mailing company, allowing the correspondence to be addressed to a 
named individual. According to Oppenheim (1992) this has an effect on getting a 
higher response rate as people find the inquiry more genuine when they see their 
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name on the envelope rather seeing only the address. The telephone number of the 
head of household was identified by using telephone directories. 
The sampling procedure that was used for the Turkish survey is provided in Section 
4.8. 
4.4 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire is a vital research instrument for the collection of data and its main 
function is measurement (Oppenheim, 1992). Questionnaire design needs continuous 
revision and attention in order to serve its goal of providing reliable and valid data in 
a usable form for the researcher (Cragg, 1991). Therefore, the stages suggested by 
ChurchiII (1995) for developing a questionnaire were applied in this study (Table 
4.1). 
Table 4.1: Stages for Developing a Questionnaire 
1. Specify the information that will be looked for 
2. Decide the type of questionnaire and method of administration 
3. Decide the content ofthe individual questions 
4. Decide the form of response to each question 
5. Decide the wording of each question 
6. Decide the sequence of the questions 
7. Decide the physical characteristics of the questionnaire 
8. Re-examine steps 1-7 and make any necessary changes 
9. Pre-test the questionnaire and make any necessary changes 
Source: Churchill (\995) 
4.4.1 Information Sought 
It is important to consider at the outset how the information collected by the 
questionnaire wiII be used. It has to be decided very carefully what information 
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should be collected from each respondent because the results can easily be distorted 
by inadequate information (Aaker et al., 1995). 
The evaluation of the theoretical discussions and the regulators' views were used to 
form the research questions and the research hypotheses, which are stated here 
below. Those hypotheses were tested by the results of the questionnaires that were 
done in the OK and Turkey respectively. 
Research Questions 
I. Do the pre-conditions for market discipline exist among depositors? 
2. What is the importance of risk for depositors when investing their funds? 
3. Are they able to get information about the financial condition oftheir banks? 
4. Are they able to use the information on the financial condition of their banks? 
5. Do people who know about the deposit protection scheme differ in their 
attitudes from those who do not know? 
6. Does publicity surrounding default and the fact that some depositors have 
incurred losses act as a warning to other consumers to be more careful? 
7. What are the attitudes of depositors towards the "too-big-to-fail" policy? 
8. Do depositors who know about the deposit protection scheme diversify their 
savings? 
9. How important IS it to make depositors aware of the deposit protection 
arrangements, and how will such awareness affect their behaviour? 
Research Hypotheses Tested for the UK and Turkey 
(1) Ho: There is no difference in the importance attached to the financial strength 
of the bank when opening an account among the British/Turkish 
depositors who have knowledge about compensation schemes and those 
who have not. 
Ht: There is a difference in the importance attached to the financial strength 
of the bank when opening an account among the British/Turkish 
depositors who have knowledge about compensation schemes and those 
who have not. 
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(2) Ho: There is no difference in the tendency to diversify savings among the 
British/Turkish depositors that have knowledge about compensation 
schemes and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the tendency to diversify savings among the 
British/Turkish depositors that have knowledge about compensation 
schemes and those who have not. 
(3) Ho: There is no difference in the tendency to monitor the financial condition 
of their bank among the British/Turkish depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the tendency to monitor the financial condition of 
their bank among the British/Turkish depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
(4) Ho: There is no difference in the propensity to 'run' among the 
British/Turkish depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and 
those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the propensity to 'run' among the British/Turkish 
depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who have 
not. 
(5) Ho: There is no difference III the propensity to 'run' among the 
British/Turkish depositors who have accounts with different types of 
institutions. 
HI: There is a difference in the propensity to 'run' among the British/Turkish 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
(6) Ho: There is no difference in the expectation of being bailed out of 
British/Turkish depositors who have accounts with different types of 
institutions. 
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HI: There is a difference in the expectation of being bailed out of 
British/Turkish depositors who have accounts with different types of 
institutions. 
(7) Ho: There is no difference in tenns of checking financial infonnation before 
investing among the British/Turkish depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in tenns of checking financial infonnation before 
investing among the British/Turkish depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
(8) Ho: The British/Turkish depositors who felt competent to assess the financial 
condition of their banks when they opened their account are equal in 
number to those who did not feel competent. 
HI: The British/Turkish depositors who felt competent to assess the financial 
condition of their banks when they opened their account are not equal in 
number to those who did not feel competent. 
(9) Ho: The British/Turkish depositors who have the infonnation related to the 
financial condition of their banks are equal in number to those who do 
not. 
HI: The British/Turkish depositors who have the infonnation related to the 
financial condition of their banks are not equal in number to those who do 
not. 
(10) Ho: The British/Turkish depositors who have the necessary skills to be able to 
monitor the financial condition of their banks are equal in number to the 
British/Turkish depositors who do not. 
HI: The British/Turkish depositors who have the necessary skills to be able to 
monitor the financial condition of their banks are not equal in number to 
the British/Turkish depositors who do not. 
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(11) Ho: British/Turkish depositors who are monitoring the financial condition of 
their banks are equal in number to the British/Turkish depositors who are 
not. 
HI: The British/Turkish depositors who are monitoring the financial condition 
of their banks are not equal in number to the British/Turkish depositors 
who are not. 
(12) Ho: All the factors are equally important in opening bank accounts. 
HI: All the factors are not equally important in opening bank accounts. 
Research Hypotheses Concerning the Comparison for the UK and Tnrkey 
(1) Ho: There is no difference in the importance attached to the financial strength 
of a bank when openmg an account among Turkish and British 
depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in the importance attached to the financial strength 
of the bank when opening an account among Turkish and British 
depositors. 
(2) Ho: There is no difference in the importance attached to the safety of principal 
between Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in the importance attached to the safety of principal 
between Turkish and British depositors. 
(3) Ho: There is no difference in tenus ofwiIIingness to take financial risk among 
Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in tenus of willingness to take financial risk among 
Turkish and British depositors. 
(4) Ho: There is no difference in tenus of being competent to assess the financial 
condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in tenus of being competent to assess the financial 
condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
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(5) Ho: There is no difference in having access to infonnation to monitor the 
financial condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in having access to infonnation to monitor the 
financial condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
(6) Ho: There is no difference in having skills to monitor the financial condition 
of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in having skills to monitor the financial condition of 
a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
(7) Ho: There is no difference in monitoring the financial condition of their banks 
between Turkish and British depositors 
HI: There is a difference in monitoring the financial condition of their banks 
between Turkish and British depositors. 
(8) Ho: There is no difference in tenns of knowledge about deposit protection 
schemes among Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in tenns of knowledge about deposit protection 
schemes among Turkish and British depositors. 
(9) Ho: There is no difference in tenns of knowledge about bank failures between 
Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in terms of knowledge about bank failures between 
Turkish and British depositors. 
(10) Ho: There is no difference in the expectation of being bailed out among 
Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in the expectation of being bailed out among Turkish 
and British depositors. 
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4.4.2 Type of Questionnaire and Method of Administration 
After determining the information sought, the type of the questionnaire and method 
of administration had to be specified. The structure and the degree of 'disguise' of 
the questionnaire are of vital importance and must be determined at this stage. While 
the term 'structure' relates to the degree of standardisation imposed on the 
questionnaire, 'disguise' is the amount of knowledge about the purpose of a study 
communicated to a respondent (Churchill, 1995). For this study, a structured and 
undisguised questionnaire was selected and, as in a typical structured-undisguised 
questionnaire, the responses as well as the questions are standardised. Churchill 
(1995) points out the efficient use of structured and undisguised questionnaires to 
collect data on attitudes, intentions, awareness, demographic/socio-economic 
characteristics and behaviour. As this study deals with respondents' attitudes, 
awareness and behaviour, a structured and undisguised questionnaire meets its needs. 
Three administrative methods may be used in surveys to collect data. They are mail 
questionnaires, personal interviews and telephone interviews. The personal interview 
is a face-to-face, interpersonal role situation in which an interviewer asks 
respondents questions designed to elicit answers pertinent to the research hypotheses. 
Telephone interviews are similar in essence, apart from taking place over the 
telephone (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Where (as in this case) mail 
questionnaires are used, the questionnaire is posted to the intended respondent, who 
is then expected to complete and return it by using a pre-paid envelope. 
The main reasons for this choice reflect the main advantages established for the use 
of mail questionnaires. These advantages, together with some reasons for rejecting 
the personal interviews, are as follows: 
1. It was intended to reach a large number of respondents who were 
geographically dispersed; so using a questionnaire was cost effective 
comparing to interviews (Sekaran, 2000; Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996; Mangione, 1995; Oppenheim, 1992). 
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2. Due to the time constraints on the study, conducting a questionnaire was 
quicker than trying to interview potential respondents. Interviews need 
extensive time to complete and subj ect to data processing. There is no 
doubt that interviews need much more time than questionnaires 
(Mangione, 1995). 
3. Potential biasing errors caused by the presence of interviewers are 
reduced by using a mail questionnaire (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996; Mangione, 1995). 
4. The researcher would like to give the respondents time to think about 
their answers and provide time to consult their own sources of 
information (Sekaran, 2000; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
5. Respondents are more likely to respond to sensitive questions when they 
do not have to face an interviewer (Churchill, 1995; Mangione, 1995). 
The advantages of the mail surveys and the reasons for selecting this approach in this 
study are clear. However, the approach is not without its drawbacks, which now need 
to be mentioned, together with the methods used to try to overcome them. 
If the required data are not provided, or not in a form sufficient to answer the 
question, dispatching a second questionnaire causes two problems: it costs time, and 
problems may be encountered getting in touch with respondents. A questionnaire's 
ability to collect supplementary information is limited by comparison with 
interviews. For these reasons, before embarking on the full-scale research, a pilot 
study was undertaken in order to confirm that the data being sought could be 
provided and that the questionn,aire contained sufficiently discriminating questions. 
The results of the pilot study were used to test the initial assumptions about the 
research project, and the results indicated whether additional information was 
required. 
In mail questionnaires, it is very important to make questions clear and 
unambiguous, as there is no interviewer to help the respondent. The questionnaire is 
designed carefully and pre-tested in order to overcome such problems. 
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One major drawback of the questionnaire is the likelihood of a low response rate. 
Besides, the problem of refusing to reply introduces an element of bias as 
respondents and non-respondents may differ from each other in terms of 
characteristics relevant to the research. In order to increase the response rate, the aim 
of the research was explained clearly in the cover letter, which asked for the 
respondents' contribution (cover letter is provided in Appendix 2). As respondents 
are generally more likely to respond if they feel that their answers are kept 
confidential (Mangione, 1995) they were promised confidentiality. A pre-paid 
envelope was provided to the respondents and follow-up reminder calls were 
conducted. 
4.4.3 Individual Question Content / Questionnaire Items 
Factual questions are used to obtain objective information from the respondents 
regarding their backgrounds, environments, habits, and the like. Although they are 
assumed to be easy to design, there are concerns regarding the accuracy of the 
responses. The respondents may not know the information or they may not recall the 
information or they may not understand the question and sometimes they are 
reluctant to cooperate (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Following the 
recommendation of Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996), several steps were 
taken to increase the accuracy, including asking more than one question about the 
matter. 
The respondents were also asked a number of questions where subjective experience 
was involved, such as matters relating to beliefs, attitudes, feelings and opinions. 
Attitudes can be described by their content, direction and intensity and the reason 
why the attitudes are investigated is because of the researcher's aim to account for 
the respondents' general understanding concerning the financial environment that 
they operate in. Attitudes cannot be measured by a single question and in order to 
determine both the strength of a respondent's attitude and the conditions under which 
their attitude may change, several attitude statements are used. Each section is briefly 
discussed below. 
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Section one of the questionnaire has seven questions; these questions are mainly 
concerned with the issues of identifying the nature of the bank or building society 
accounts that the respondents use and finding out their past behaviour towards risk-
taking. 
Section two of the questionnaire has 19 questions. Besides attitudes towards risk-
taking, the ability of the depositors to exert market discipline by means of fulfilling 
the pre-conditions of market discipline is explored in this section. In addition to those 
issues, a number of factual questions, which are designed to understand the 
depositors' awareness of the financial environment they operate in, are asked in this 
section. 
In the third section of the questionnaire, background information regarding the 
respondents was collected. This section is kept very brief on purpose and the details 
that are not planned for use in the analysis are not asked. 
The last section of the questionnaire is designed to allow for any additional comments 
that the respondents are willing to provide and a space is provided for writing the names 
and addresses of the respondents who would like to have feedback concerning the 
findings of the study. 
4.4.4 Form of Response 
Besides the content of the questions, the structure of the questions and the format of 
the response categories are of vital importance when constructing the questionnaire 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). There are two options for the form of 
response: closed-ended questions and open-ended questions (Mangione, 1995). In the 
closed-ended questions the respondents are asked to choose between the fixed 
response categories. On the other hand, open-ended questions provide freedom for 
the respondents to give any answer they wish (Hague, 1993). Open-ended questions 
can also be looked at under two sub-headings; those seeking short, specific answers 
and those seeking longer, narrative responses. In the questionnaire design both types 
of open-ended questions were used. Short, specific answer types were naturally 
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preferred for questions about basic characteristics, such as age. On the other hand, 
although the use of longer, narrative types of questions are often thought not to work 
very well in self-administered questionnaires, they were used to a limited extent in 
this survey in order to gain deeper understanding about respondents' attitudes 
towards risk and their ability to exert market discipline. Churchill (1995) states that 
open-ended questions are often used to begin a questionnaire, as this can be useful in 
providing a frame of reference for respondents and help prepare them for further 
questions. Following Churchill's recommendation, open-ended questions were duly 
used for the initial questions in this survey. 
Nevertheless, most of the questions in the survey were closed-ended. Alternative 
responses were presented to the respondent who was invited to choose the answer 
that best matched his or her situation. The main types of closed-ended question are 
multiple-choice questions, dichotomous questions and scales (Churchill, 1995). 
Dichotomous questions with two possible responses were used in the questionnaire, 
as were questions using Likert scales. These required the respondent to indicate a 
degree of agreement or disagreement with a statement along a scale extending from 
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" (Churchill, 1995; Sekaran, 2000). Following 
the discussion of Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmi!Ch (1997), the researcher also 
adopted the "pragmatic" view followed by most social researchers and treated those 
scales as if they were intervallic. 
The main advantages of the closed-ended questions are firstly that they are quick to 
answer and secondly they are straightforward to analyse (Sekaran, 2000; Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). On the other hand, Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias (1996) suggest that multiple choice questions may introduce bias by 
forcing the respondent to choose from given alternatives that might not have 
otherwise come to mind. However, Tull and Hawkins (1993) argue that multiple 
choice questions are necessary to persuade the respondents to fill in the 
questionnaires in self-administered surveys. The options provided in the response 
categories were derived from the theoretical literature and every effort was made to 
provide an exhaustive list. Also, a few contingency questions (which is a type of 
closed-ended question applicable to a subgroup of respondents) were included 
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(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). The subgroup was identified by a 
preceding filter question asked to all respondents, and those responding appropriately 
were directed to the contingency question. Finally, a matrix question, which is a 
method of organising a large set of rating questions that have the same answer 
categories, was used as the third question of the first section ofthe questionnaire. 
4.4.5 Question Wording 
The essential objective in formulating a question is to create one that provides a 
standardised stimulus to all respondents and provides a systematic way of recording 
their answers (Mangione, 1995). Several steps were taken to achieve this objective 
following the suggestions of Mangione (1995) and Churchill (1995). Firstly, in order 
to make people read the questions completely, the questions were worded simply and 
unambiguously and (reflecting the results of the pre-tests) a number of questions 
were split into their component parts to avoid confusion. Secondly, in order to ensure 
clarity the key terms were defined, and the usage of expert jargon was avoided, as the 
respondents would be in the main lay people who could not be expected to be 
familiar with such terminology. The researcher took care to avoid double negative 
constructions so as not to confuse respondents. Hypothetical questions are generally 
thought difficult to answer and in order to express what the question means, a 
detailed explanation is provided to the respondents. Every effort was made to avoid 
'double-barrelled questions' - that is to say, multiple questions in the form of a single 
question. Mutually exclusive response categories were employed to avoid any 
possibility of overlap in the alternative responses. In addition, the researcher 
refrained from using loaded questions, which might have forced respondents to 
answer in one way or another. Following the suggestion of Oppenheim (1992), an 
introductory sentence was used in one case to make respondents better aware of the 
nature of the question. 
4.4.6 Sequence of Questions 
Converse and Presser (1986) state that there are almost no experimentally-based 
general rules governing the ordering of questions and Oppenheim (1992) states that 
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the final approach and sequence must be decided by the researcher's own survey 
objectives and by the results of the pilot work. However, Mangione (1995) notes that 
in mail surveys respondents can read the entire questionnaire before they begin to 
reply so the answers are not necessarily influenced by the ordering of the questions. 
Two general approaches to question sequencing can be adopted (Sekaran, 2000; 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Churchill, 1995); they are the funnel 
sequence and the inverted funnel sequence. In the funnel sequence each successive 
question is related to the previous question and has a progressively narrower scope. 
By contrast, in the inverted funnel sequence, broader questions follow narrower ones. 
In this study, the order of the questions was mainly determined by the outcomes of 
the pre-tests, which lead to a funnel sequence. Besides, Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias (1996) and Churcill (1995) put emphasis on using simple and interesting 
questions at the outset to encourage respondents to cooperate. Finally, in view of the 
evidence that the position of an item in a list has a significant effect on its being 
chosen, the order of the items in the lists were randomised so as not to cause any 
systematic bias. 
4.4.7 Physical Characteristics of the Questionnaire 
After determining the sequence of the questions, the next step is shaping the physical 
characteristics of the questionnaire. In self-completion and mail questionnaires the 
layout, printing, choice of paper, spacing and answering directions are vital for 
improving the response rate (Oppenheim, 1992). Besides, the physical characteristics 
of the questionnaire can affect the accuracy of the replies that are obtained 
(Churchill, 1995). Following the suggestions of Mangione (1995), each page of the 
questionnaire gave a balanced appearance with all margins being equal, while the 
fonts and characters of the words were arranged so that they did not look squeezed to 
the respondents. A typestyle that was easily readable was chosen and a number of 
features, such as boldfacing and italicising, were carefully used. In order to help 
respondents move through the questionnaire efficiently each question was given a 
number. Shading was used to help the respondents' eye scan from one question to the 
other. Pages were printed back to back to avoid making the questionnaire look 
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unduly weighty and a booklet fonnat was used to achieve a professional look 
(Churchill (1996) advises such a fonnat when the questionnaire fits into multiple 
sheets stating that it reinforces an image of quality). Clear instructions were provided 
regarding where to go next in the questionnaire so that respondents could easily 
follow the intended sequence. 
The first envelope in the survey was addressed to the respondent personally to avoid 
looking like junk mail and increase the probability of being opened and read 
(Oppenheim, 1992). A pre-paid envelope, with the researcher's return address pre-
printed on it, was provided and the envelope was selected in line with the suggestion 
of Mangione (1995) so that the respondent should not have to fold the questionnaire 
in order to fit it into the envelope. 
Oppenheim (1995) recommended that in the open-ended questions where an "other 
please specify" category is used, it must always be followed by a space or some lines 
to accommodate the answer and must be piloted. This procedure was applied while 
shaping the "other please specify" category. 
A specific direction to circle a number in the answer category was provided for the 
respondents. Circling a code number is preferable because the code number can be 
easily transferred to a computerised storage device (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1996). 
4.5 Questionnaire Pre-testing and Piloting for the UK 
The final stage of the questionnaire development is the pre-test where mistakes can 
be detected before the final survey is implemented (Sekaran, 2000; Diamantopoulos 
et al., 1994). The crucial question is "Will the instrument provide data of sufficient 
quality and quantity to satisfy the objectives of the research project?" (Hunt et aI., 
1982). The three aspects that are aimed to be captured by the pre-test of the 
questionnaire are, firstly, the individual questions, secondly, the overall design and, 
finally, items about data analysis. Therefore, before piloting the questionnaire, pre-
testing was carried out. 
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4.5.1 Initial Pre-test for the UK 
With the help of the pre-test it is first possible to identify specific types of defective 
questions, including ambiguous questions, repetitious questions, loaded/leading 
questions, missing/lop-sided alternatives and questions containing 
difficult/inappropriate vocabulary. Secondly, aspects of the overall design of the 
questionnaire, such as the length, layout, and format for the questions used, the 
number of lines to leave for replies, and the sequencing of questions (Hunt et al., 
1982), can be tested. And finally, with regard to data analysis, the pre-test can allow 
coding and tabulating procedures to be piloted with dummy tables prepared to 
facilitate this process. The results of the open-ended questions may also be used to 
create new research hypotheses, as advised by Hunt et at. (1982). 
Although three methods of administering the pre-test are discussed in the literature 
(i.e. personal interviews, telephone interviews and mail self reports), the majority of 
authorities in this area suggest that the first series of pre-tests should be done by 
personal interviews without taking the final administration into account (Churchill, 
1995; Peterson, 1988). Two methods of conducting the pre-test are advised; 
protocols (respondents think out loud while answering each question) and debriefing 
(respondent evaluates the questionnaire after completion) (Hunt et al., 1982). 
Churchill (1995) argues that the amount of information that is gathered is greater 
when the protocol method is used. However, Diamantopoulos et al. (1994) argue that 
thinking a loud might influence the decision itself. Both types of methods for 
conducting the pre-tests were used in this study. 
Respondents for the pre-test sample may be constituted from two groups. Under the 
approach recommended by Churchill (1995), a pre-test sample that is similar to the 
overall survey population is selected. Under an alternative approach, colleagues of 
the researcher not directly involved with the design of the questionnaire can be 
invited to review it before the formal pilot study in order to spot technical errors. 
Green et al. (1988) and Hunt et al. (1982) advise that if the ultimate questionnaire is 
to be used with a very unsophisticated target population, it would require a larger 
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pre-test sample than would one intended for sophisticated audiences. In this research, 
as the target population is the ordinary household and the subject is technical, the 
researcher duly sought to ensure a high number of respondents for the pre-test. The 
questionnaire was first pre-tested within the Loughborough University Business 
School. Fifty questionnaires were distributed and 26 responses were received. In 
addition, a total of 14 people from other departments of the University, other 
research colleagues and people who are working for financial firms commented on 
the questionnaire. 
The following points were raised as a result of the pre-testing. 
I. The first question in section one, which sought information concerning 
the number of banks that the respondents use, was posed in order to find 
out the degree of diversification. However, it emerged that the question 
was also capturing information as to why the depositors use mUltiple 
banks. So the question was split up into two questions. 
2. In the second question of section one, the term "safety of bank" was 
thought vague by a number of respondents; therefore it was replaced with 
"financial condition of your bank". 
3. The seventh question in section one seeks details on the amount of the 
respondent's saving. This question initially had two answer categories 
with a wide gap reflecting the deposit insurance limit. However, the test 
respondents suggested that it would be better to narrow the gap so as not 
to intimidate the respondents. So the categories were increased to three, 
with narrower gaps between the amounts. 
4. Originally, it was planned to ask for ticks from respondents. However, 
the experts on the questionnaires recommended the circling of numbers. 
This not only makes coding the data in the necessary program easier, as 
noted above, but also helps the respondent as psychologically higher 
numbers indicate higher agreement and vice versa. So all the response 
categories (with the exception of the open-ended ones) were converted 
from boxes to numbers that could be circled. 
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5. The layout of the questionnaire was found to provide too much 
information on each page so it was changed and the number of the pages 
reduced to four resulting in the questions being easier to read. 
6. The open-ended question that asks the reason for having multiple 
accounts was changed to a closed-ended question as the pre-test 
suggested that this was capable of covering all the possible responses. 
This procedure was also followed in the question that asks the 
respondents why they did not check any financial information relating to 
their bank. The pre-test respondents' original responses were used to 
determine the response categories in the expectation that this would 
increase the response rate to these two questions. 
7. The sequence of the questions was also altered as a result of the pre-tests 
and the question that asks the name of the respondents' bank was asked 
earlier than originally planned. 
8. It was also discovered that the respondents had not been given enough 
space to write down their comments in the fourth section, so it was 
increased. 
4.5.2 Pilot Study for the UK 
After the results of the pre-test had been evaluated and the necessary changes made, 
the next step was the mail pilot of the study. While selecting the respondents for the 
pilot study, the following principles were followed. Firstly, in pilot studies the 
respondents should be as similar as possible to those intended for the main enquiry 
(Oppenheim, 1992). Secondly, the pilot sample size must depend on the 
sophistication of the target population. As the questionnaire is targeted at ordinary 
members of the public who have savings accounts, we assume they are not very 
sophisticated. Therefore, 100 respondents were chosen for the pilot study by 
systematic sampling from the selected sample. Systematic sampling involves 
selecting every kth element after a random start (Churchill, 1995). 
All the pilot respondents were sent the pack, including the cover letter, questionnaire 
and the return pre-paid envelope. All questionnaires were sent with a dated, 
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personalised cover letter printed on University headed paper and signed individually. 
The cover letter explained the nature of the research, the purpose of the research, the 
importance of the survey both to the respondents and the researcher, and also 
included guidance on the completion of the questionnaire (Churchill, 1995). In 
addition to those features, contact details were provided for respondents who might 
wish to get in touch with the researcher (Mangione, 1995). 
Nine completed questionnaires were returned in two weeks and three came back as 
undelivered. The effective response rate, i.e. RespondentslEligible to Respond, in 
this case was 9.3 percent. In order to increase the response rate, 15 randomly-
selected people were called by telephone for the follow-up. Six of these could not be 
contacted and two confirmed that they did not hold savings accounts. Seven 
respondents were found eligible; however, five of them said that they were too busy 
to fill in the questionnaire. Although one said he would respond, he did not do so. 
Therefore, only one additional questionnaire was received by the help of the follow-
up and the response rate rose to 10.3 percent (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2: Summary of Breakdown of Responses to the UK Pilot 
Usable - no follow-up 
9 
r 
Couldn't contact 
6 
1 
Pilot 
N= 100 
Telephone follow-up 
15 
Non-eligible 
2 
Usable 
11 
Too busy 
1 5 
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4.5.3 Efforts to Improve the Response Rate 
Dillman (1983) points out that techniques used for improving response rates from 
heterogeneous populations such as the general public are not very successful. The 
general public is regarded as the most difficult population. There have been vast 
numbers of studies into how to improve the response rate in mail surveys; however, 
the results of such research are not always consistent. 
Mangione (1995) suggests that the single most important technique to use to produce 
high response rates is to send out reminders. He advises mUltiple reminders over a 
total mailing period of about 8 to 9 weeks, which incurs additional cost. However, as 
this study was done on a limited budget, only a telephone follow-up could be used in 
order to increase the response rate. The telephone follow-up for the mail pilot was 
carried out two weeks after the initial mailing. 
4.6 Main UK Survey 
For the main study, 900 questionnaires were sent out (questionnaire for the UK is 
provided in Appendix 3). In two weeks time 108 completed questionnaires were 
returned and 36 questionnaires came back as undelivered. In addition to those, 15 
blank questionnaires were received stating that the households have no savings 
account. 
As in the pilot study, a telephone follow-up was used to increase the response rate. A 
follow-up of 150 people was randomly selected from the list of respondents. The 
respondents had been guaranteed confidentiality but not anonymity, so the 
questionnaires were initially coded. By the help of the coding, the researcher was 
able to keep track of the questionnaires that had been returned. This procedure 
enabled the researcher to identify non-respondents easily. It is argued that seeing 
numbers on the questionnaire may put off some respondents who are sensitive about 
being identified; however, the researcher could not afford to waste time or money in 
contacting people who had already replied to the questionnaire. Mangione (1995) 
also suggests that in anonymous surveys, sending reminders to a group of 
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respondents without knowing whether they have replied or not is a waste of postage, 
supplies, and resources; confuses respondents; and sometimes leads to respondents 
worrying that their survey got lost in the mail, so they fill out a second survey that 
the researcher does not want but is unable to identify. 
The telephone follow-up for the main study was carried out two weeks after the 
initial mailing and lasted for ten days. During this exercise 37 of the respondents 
could not be contacted and 18 confirmed that they do not hold savings accounts. Of 
the remainder, 95 were found to be eligible; however, 33 of them declared that they 
were too busy or not interested in filling the questionnaire. In the event, 43 of the 
respondents contacted did not return the questionnaire, while 18 completed 
questionnaires were received with the help of the follow-up and the total number of 
response duly rose to 126. Therefore, the effective response rate, i.e. 
Respondents/Eligible to respond, was 14.6 percent (Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3: Summary of Breakdown of Responses to the Main UK Study 
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Usable - no follow-up Undelivered 
108 36 
Telephone follow-up 
150 
r 
Couldn't contact Non-eligible Eligible 
37 18 95 
I 1 
Usable Too busy / Not returned 
18 Not interested 43 
34 
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'Item non-response' is where specific questions have not been answered or have 
obviously been answered incorrectly (Churchill, 1995). Mangione (1995) points out 
the importance of item non-response on the data analysis and argues that item non-
response occurs when the item is not relevant to the individual or confusing or when 
the respondents do not understand what is wanted from them. Other reasons for non-
response are respondents forgetting to answer or refusing to answer or being unable 
to remember the right answer (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 1997). 
For this study, respondents were given answers to select for the majority of questions 
and the level of item non-response was very low, which indicates that the questions 
were well understood and that enough categories were provided to allow respondents 
to feel that they could convey their positions effectively. 
4.7 Translating the Questionnaire for Use in Turkey 
In order to apply the questionnaire to the Turkish sample the questionnaire had to be 
translated into Turkish. When translating a survey instrument, the translation method 
has to be decided and the translation objective has to be stated explicitly (McKay et 
al., 1996). In order to achieve these objectives alternative translation methods and 
objectives were considered. 
Direct translation (one-way) and back-translation are the main methods oftranslating 
survey instruments. In direct translation, the source language instrument is translated 
into the target language by a bilingual person. Direct translation can also be handled 
by a group of bilingual individuals independently who discuss their results and 
finalise the target language document. On the other hand, back-translation is more 
complicated and has three main steps. First, the survey instrument is translated from 
the source language into the target language by a bilingual translator and then 
another bilingual translator translates the target language instrument into the source 
language. To conclude, both versions are evaluated and the target language 
instrument is modified accordingly (Sperber et al., 1994). 
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There are mainly three objectives that are sought while translating questionnaires. 
Those are literal translation, conceptual translation and culturally equivalent 
translation. While the dictionary equivalents of the terms are used in literal 
translation, conceptual translation depends on the use of terms or phrases in the 
target language that capture the implied associations or connotative meaning of the 
text used in the source language instrument. On the other hand, culturally equivalent 
translation extends the conceptual equivalence of words and phrases in the source 
instrument to use equivalent patterns of thought and behaviour in the social world of 
the target language speakers (McKay et al., 1996). 
In this study, the back-translation method was used and as the translation objective 
conceptual translation was adopted. Two bilingual people worked on the 
questionnaire. Firstly, the document was translated from English to Turkish, then the 
other person translated this version into English and the results were evaluated and 
agreed on in the final document. 
4.8 Sampling, Questionnaire Pre-testing and Piloting for Turkey 
The sample selection (size and location) had been arranged in line with the UK 
survey; the names, addresses and the telephone numbers of 900 respondents from the 
Ankara (capital of Turkey) area were obtained from telephone directories. Ankara 
was split up geographically into five local municipalities. Therefore, this 
discrimination was used to identify a suitable sample that would generate the results 
that would be applicable across Turkey as a whole. 180 respondents from each of 
these five groups were selected. 
Following the translation ofthe survey the pre-test was conducted. 
4.8.1 Initial Pre-test for Turkey 
The pre-test of the Turkish questionnaire was carried out in December 2000 among 
19 colleagues in the Central Bank of Turkey and 26 teaching staff in the Middle East 
Technical University. As the overall design and the data analysis had already been 
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pre-tested in the OK study, the emphasis now was mainly on testing the individual 
questions. 
The following points were raised as a result of the pre-testing: 
I. In the first question in section one, the tenn "savings account" was 
ambiguous for a number of respondents; therefore, an explanation was 
added stating that both call and time deposits were covered by the 
question. 
2. In the twelfth question in section two, the "failing bank" concept seemed 
vague to a number of respondents, therefore an explanation was added. 
3. In the part two of twelfth question in section two, the space available to 
respondents was increased, as there were many bank failures that they 
recalled. 
4. In question 29 of the third section, the employment groups were 
refonnulated in line with the Government Statistics Office categorisation. 
4.8.2 Pilot Study for Turkey 
The pilot study took place in December 2000 when 100 respondents were chosen for 
the pilot study by a systematic sampling method. All the pilot respondents were sent 
the pack including the cover letter, questionnaire and the return pre-paid envelope. 
Within two weeks 18 completed questionnaires were returned and one came back as 
undelivered. The effective response rate was 18.2 percent. After the telephone 
follow-up for 15 people who were randomly selected, two further completed 
questionnaires were received, which increased the response rate to 20.2 percent 
(Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4: Summary of Breakdowu of Respouses to the Turkish Pilot 
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4,9 Main Turkish Survey 
The main Turkish mail survey was carried out in January 2001. 800 questionnaire 
packs were prepared and sent out (questionnaire for Turkey is provided in 
Appendix 4). Within two weeks, 156 completed questionnaires were returned and 23 
questionnaires came back as undelivered. In addition to those, 10 blank 
questionnaires were received stating that the recipients had no savings account. To 
improve the response rate, 150 people were randomly selected to be called and 
reminded about the questionnaire. However, 44 of these could not be contacted, 
while 21 declared that they had no savings account. Out of 85 respondents who were 
eligible to respond, 19 declared that they were either not interested or too busy to 
reply to the questionnaire. As a result of the telephone follow-up, a further 29 
completed questionnaires were returned. The total number of responses rose to 185. 
The effective response rate, i.e. Respondents/Eligible to respond was, therefore, 24.1 
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percent (Figure 4.5). As with the OK study the "item non-response rate" for the 
Turkish study was reassuringly low. 
Figure 4.5: Summary of Breakdown of Responses to the Main Turkish Study 
Main study 
N=800 
Usable - no follow-up Undelivered 
156 23 
Telephone follow-up 
150 
r 
Couldn't contact Non-eligible Eligible 
44 21 85 
I 
Usable Too busy / Not returned 
29 Not interested 37 
19 
4.10 Reliability and Validity of the Questionnaire 
In order to reach meaningful results, the instrument that is used to measure attitudes 
and behaviour must be reliable and valid. While research reliability is concerned with 
the reproducibility of the questionnaire, validity is about how well the survey item 
measures what it sets out to measure (Litwin, 1995). 
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4.10.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the extent to which a measuring instrument has variable errors, 
i.e. errors that appear inconsistently from observation to observation during anyone 
measurement attempt or that vary each time a given unit is measured by the same 
instrument (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
There are two major ways to check reliability; stability and equivalence. Checking 
the relationship between two applications of the measure at different times to assess 
its stability is known as the test-retest method. Higher correlation indicates greater 
reliability. 
Assessment of equivalence checks of reliability is done by exammmg the 
relationship between the items. Multiple-item scale measures are assessed to 
establish whether the items are highly correlated and whether the overall measure is 
therefore reliable (Litwin, 1995). 
4.10.2 Reliability Test 
Internal consistency reliability is an indicator of how well the different items 
measure the same issue. It is applied to a group of items that are thought to measure 
different aspects of the same concept and is measured by calculating a statistic 
known as Cronbach' s coefficient alpha. It is a statistical device that reflects the 
homogeneity of the scale, which means that it is a reflection of how well the different 
items complement each other in their measurement of different aspects of the same 
variable or quality (Sekaran, 2000; Litwin, 1995). 
Cronbach's Alpha was run on the data in the study and the results are shown in Table 
4.2. The descriptions of the questions in Table 4.2 are abbreviated from those 
contained in the questionnaire (refer to Appendix 3 for the full questions). 
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Table 4.2: Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Tests 
ABILITY TO EXERT MARKET DISCIPLINE 
Questionnaire Question Numbers: 8/9/10/11112 
Question No. Analysis oflndividual Scale Items Alpha If Item Deleted 
8 Competent to assess financial condition 0.84 
9 Having information to monitor 0.83 
10 Skill to monitor 0.83 
11 Actively monitoring 0.83 
12 Shopping for the best terms 0.89 
Reliability Coefficients 
Number of Cases Alpha Number of Items 
306 0.8738 5 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS RISK-TAKING 
Questionnaire Question Numbers: 19/20/21124125/26 
Question No. Analysis oflndividual Scale Items Alpha Ifltem Deleted 
19 Willing to take financial risk .73 
20 Split savings .72 
21 Importance of safety of principal .67 
24 Take action .69 
25 Reduce savings .70 
26 Close the account .72 
Reliability Coefficients 
Number of Cases Alpha Number of Items 
306 0.7421 6 
The results ofthe Cronbach's Alpha tests indicate that the measures used in the study 
and the individual questions were reliable. Nunnally (1978) suggests a value of 0.70 
as a lower boundary for alpha; however, scales published with lower alphas are not 
unusual. DeVellis (1991) argues that values below 0.60 are unacceptable, those 
between 0.70 and 0.80 are respectable, while those between 0.80 and 0.90 are very 
good. Most of the results generated here are above 0.70 and were, therefore, found 
reliable and used in the analysis. 
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4.10.3 Validity 
Reliability assessments are necessary, but they are not sufficient when examining the 
psychometric properties of a survey instrument (Litwin, 1995). After testing the 
reliability of the questionnaire, the next stage is to examine its validity. Validity 
indicates whether the question, item or scale measures what it is supposed to 
measure. 
Content validity is a SUbjective measure of how appropriate the items seem to a set of 
reviewers who have some knowledge ofthe subject matter. It is a matter of judgment 
and checked during the course of the research (Litwin, 1995). 
Thoroughness or comprehensiveness of the measurement device is the major concept 
of content validity. In this regard representativeness is vital. In this research a c1ose-
ended questionnaire was used as a survey tool. The aim was to test a number of 
hypotheses that have been identified in a theoretical framework. The content of the 
questionnaire has been derived from the theoretical discussion and hypotheses 
generated from that discussion. 
Building the questionnaire around the factors in this way strengthens content 
validity. The relationship between individual questions and the factors they seek to 
describe or capture is examined below. 
Ability to Exert Market Discipline 
Question 8: I felt competent to assess the financial condition of my bank when I 
opened my account. 
Respondents that feel themselves able to assess the financial condition 
of banks when they open their account are highly likely to pay attention 
to financial condition when selecting their banks and are therefore 
probably a source of market discipline. 
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Question 9: I am confident that I have the information necessary to monitor the 
financial condition of my bank. 
In order for depositors to exert market discipline it is vital that they 
have access to such infonnation. Therefore, respondents who have 
access to the information about the financial condition of their banks 
are likely to use this infonnation to monitor their banks' financial 
standing. 
Question 10: I am confident that I have the skills needed to monitor the 
financial condition of my bank. 
Financial matters are said to be complex for a lot of people. Therefore, 
feeling confident is an important indicator that respondents have some 
understanding about financial issues and suggests that they probably 
will have an interest in paying attention to their banks' financial 
standing. 
Questiou 11: I monitor the finaucial condition of my bank. 
This question relates very directly to the depositor's ability to exert 
market discipline. 
Question 12: I shop for the best terms before opening accounts. 
Respondents that shop for the best terms are highly likely to pay 
attention to the security of their institutions as well as the rate of 
return on offer. 
Attitudes Towards Risk-taking 
Question 19: I am willing to take financial risks. 
This question relates very directly to the depositor's attitude towards 
risk-taking. 
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Question 20: It is a good idea to split my savings among different banks to 
reduce the risk of losing all my deposits if a bank collapsed. 
Respondents who are risk-averse are highly likely to diversify their 
savings and probably have multiple accounts in order to be protected 
against the risk oflosing all or some of their savings depending on the 
deposit protection available in the event of a bank failure. 
Question 21: It is very important for me to be confident that my savings are not 
at risk. 
This question deals with the depositors' attitude towards risk-taking. It 
is assumed that depositors who have concerns about the risk-taking of 
the institutions play an important role in market discipline. 
The following questions were also asked to learn about attitudes towards risk. As 
discussed in the literature, runs and system-wide panics represent the extreme form 
of market discipline. 
Question 24: I would take action if I were concerned about the financial 
conditiou of the bank where I hold my savings. 
It is expected that respondents who are risk-averse will take action 
when they become aware of any financial news that calls into 
question the health of their financial institutions. 
Question 25: I would decrease the amount of savings if I suspected any. 
deterioration in the financial condition of my bank. 
Respondents who have any suspicion about the safety of their 
depository institution are likely to decrease the amount of their 
savings. This question accordingly seeks to identify their ability to 
exert market discipline. 
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Question 26: I would close my account immediately on a rumour about my bank 
being in financial difficulty. 
Respondents who are very risk -averse are expected to act even on 
rumours. 
4.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided detailed infonnation on the methodology employed to 
undertake the survey analysis. A mail survey was undertaken and a questionnaire 
developed based on the literature. This was then carefully pre-tested and piloted. 
Following the administration of the UK mail survey, the Turkish survey was 
conducted. The study sizes were 1,000 and 900 households respectively, and 
response rates were 14.6 percent and 24.1 percent respectively. As a result, 126 and 
185 usable questionnaires were available for further analysis, the findings of which 
are presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEYS ON 
DEPOSITOR BEHAVIOUR IN THE UK AND TURKEY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the analytical techniques used and the findings of the surveys, 
firstly for the UK then for Turkey, and lastly draws comparison between the UK and 
Turkish survey results. For both the UK and Turkish surveys, a descriptive analysis 
is conducted and hypothesis-testing procedures are followed. Then, the conclusions 
are drawn for both country studies. In the final analysis, the hypothesis-testing for 
country comparisons is conducted and the main conclusions are drawn. 
The selection of testing techniques needs to reflect both the hypotheses being 
addressed and the nature of the data collected. It is important that the techniques of 
analysis have been identified before the questionnaires are actually sent out. In this 
way, the researcher could ensure that the data collected is appropriate for the 
statistical techniques to be used in the analysis and that the infonnation generated 
through these tests is capable of addressing the hypotheses. 
Having examined the data for reliability and validity, an approach was then devised 
to structure the investigation ofthat data. This approach involves two distinct phases; 
descriptive analysis and statistical significance testing. 
Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1997) suggest that data description must be 
done before starting hypothesis-testing. They also point out that descriptive analysis 
provides preliminary insights regarding the responses obtained and provides 
summary measures of typical or average responses as well as the extent of variation 
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in responses for a given variable. Besides, they argue that descriptive analysis 
provides an early opportunity for checking whether the distributional assumptions of 
subsequent statistical test are likely to be satisfied. Therefore, descriptive analysis 
was carried out for both the UK and Turkish surveys. 
The second step was to use statistical significance testing to identify if the observed 
patterns in the data were statistically significant. To undertake this objective a 
number of analyses were used. An important consideration in determining whether a 
parametric or a nonparametric method is appropriate is the scale of measurement 
used to generate data. All data are generated by one of four scales of measurement: 
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio and parametric methods require the use of 
interval or ratio-scaled data (Anderson et al. 1999). The level of measurement in this 
study could not go beyond the ordinal level in many cases so the analysis was 
selected from among non-parametric techniques. 
5.2 Descriptive Analysis of the UK Survey 
All the frequencies and cross-tab results could not to be reproduced here because of 
the considerable amount of size. However, these results were examined and the 
potentially important relationships within them highlighted. The descriptive analysis 
provided an initial analysis of the data on which the statistical significance testing 
then builds. Selected frequencies were reproduced here to generate the frame of the 
data collected. 
The respondents were asked how many accounts they held in order to find out if they 
were using multiple accounts and the incentives behind this. The researcher was 
mainly interested to see if they were diversifying their funds because of risk-related 
concerns. According to Garten (1988), a crucial prerequisite that needs to be met in 
order for depositor discipline to work effectively is the existence of a group of 
depositors for whom risk is a primary concern in choosing a depository. Therefore, 
depositors' risk perceptions were evaluated from different angles. 
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It was found that 41.3 percent of the sample were holding their savings in one bank 
whereas 32.5 percent, 9.5 percent, 7.9 percent, 4.8 percent, 2.4 percent, and 1.6 
percent ofthe sample held their savings in two, three, four, five, six and seven banks, 
respectively (Graph 5.1). 
~ 0 
Graph 5.1: How many banks or building soeities do 
you currently hold your savings? (UK) 
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Reasons behind having multiple accounts were investigated for the 74 respondents 
who had multiple accounts and it was found that convenience was the major reason 
(34.7 percent), followed by interest rate (26.7 percent). Spreading risk was only third 
(21.3 percent) in front of the different product offer (17.3 percent) (Graph 5.2). 
Therefore, the desire to spread risk was not the major reason for having multiple 
accounts and, only a concem for a limited number of respondents. 
Graph 5.2: Reasons For Having Multiple Accounts (UK) 
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30 
"t- 20 .. 
10 
O+-~~--~~~~~~~-r~~~ 
different product interest rate convenience spreading risk 
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In order to explore the difference between the attitudes of respondents who had their 
main savings in different banks by hypothesis-testing, institutions were divided into 
three categories, namely (i) the banks belonging to the Major British Banking Group 
(MBBG) (ii) other banks and (iii) building societies (Graph 5.3). The respondents 
were asked to answer the questions for their main account where they held most of 
their savings. In the sample, 70 percent of the respondents were MBBG depositors, 
20 percent were building society depositors and 10 percent were the depositors of 
other banks. According to the British Bankers Association data for December 2001, 
61 percent of the population had an account with MBBG, 21 percent had an account 
with building societies, 7 percent had an account with other banks and 11 percent had 
their savings in National Savings (BBA, 2001). Therefore, I conclude that the UK 
sample is representative. 
Graph 5.3: Type ofInstitution (UK) 
Building 
Socities 
20%. ___ .,..., __ 
Other banks 
10% 
70% 
Another important aspect of the questionnaire was to understand the depositors' 
perceptions of the institutions to which they were entrusting their money. They were 
asked if they checked any information regarding the financial condition of their bank 
where they hold most of their savings. According to the findings, 91.3 percent of the 
respondents said they did not check, while only 8.7 percent claimed that they did. To 
bring the discussion one step further, the researcher looked for the reasons behind not 
attempting to check any information while making such a decision. For this question 
the response categories were derived from the pilot study where the same question 
was asked as an open-ended question. Lending their savings to a well-known name 
was the major reason for not checking any information (30.4 percent). 28.6 percent 
of the respondents claimed that being an existing customer of a bank was the reason 
for not further checking information. Faith in UK regulation was the reason given by 
122 
11.6 percent. The percentage of the respondents that relied on big banks being safe 
was 10.7 percent, while 8.9 percent said that their bank's good reputation was their 
reason. 4.8 percent of the respondents were attracted by high interest-paying banks 
and 4.0 percent of the respondents admitted that they do not know how to check the 
financial condition of a bank (Graph 5.4). 
Graph 5.4: Reason for not checking any information about banks (UK) 
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Consumers are advised by the FSA (and also by the former Deposit Protection 
Board) to check for the authorisation of the banks and building societies before they 
invest their money. However, only 9.8 percent claimed they did so whereas 90.2 
percent of the depositors said that they did not check the authorisation of their banks 
and building societies before opening the account. 
Respondents were divided into three groups according to the amount of funds that 
they hold in their account. 59 percent is holding less than £9,999, while 18 percent 
were holding between GBP 10,000 - GBP 19,999 and only 23 percent were holding 
above GBP 20,000 (Graph 5.5). 
Graph 5.5: How much do you hold in that account? 
Above 
£20,000 
23% 
(UK) 
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123 
According to the results, the majority of the respondents had accounts within the 
insurance limits. This finding is in line with the 199611997 Family Resources Survey 
that indicates that 57 percent offamilies have less than GBP 1,500 of savings. 
Respondents' awareness about compensation arrangements and bank failures has 
vital importance for the study and was evaluated as follows. 64.5 percent of the 
respondents stated that they had heard or read about banks that had failed in the UK. 
On the other hand, only 19 percent of the respondents claimed that they had heard or 
read about the Deposit Protection Scheme in the UK and only 10.3 percent knew the 
insurance limit correctly. Besides, the percentage of respondents who knew about the 
element of co-insurance within the compensation arrangements was only 4 percent, 
and the tem1S of the insurance offered only influenced 3.2 percent of the sample. 
Another attempt to find out the respondents' attitude to financial risk was to ask 
directly if they were willing to take financial risk and the results were presented in 
Graph 5.6. According to the results, 22.5 percent of respondents were in favour of 
taking financial risk while 51.6 percent were against it and 25.8 percent said that they 
felt neutral about the subject. Although half of the respondents were against taking 
financial risk, the 22.5 percent were willing to take financial risk and the 25.8 percent 
being neutral about the subject raises questions about the ability of depositors to be a 
source of market discipline. 
Graph 5.6: I am willing to take financial risk (UK) 
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Only 6.4 percent of the respondents claimed that safety of the principal was not 
important for them. On the other hand, 45.2 percent agreed that it is a good idea to 
split savings among different banks to reduce the risk of losing all or some of their 
deposits if a bank collapsed. 
The following Graphs 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show that the respondents had a clear 
tendency to run in the case of any disturbance in the financial markets. 
Graph 5.7: I would take action ifI were 
concerned about financial condition of my 
bank (UK) 
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Graph 5.8: I would decrease the amount of my 
savings if I suspect any deterioration in the 
financial condition of my bank (UK) 
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Graph 5.9: I would close the account immediately 
on a rumour about my bank being in financial 
difficulty (UK) 
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In order to explore the respondents' attitude towards being bailed out, they were 
asked what would they expect if their bank failed. Graph 5.10 shows that 26.2 
percent expected to be bailed out partially, 32.5 percent expected to receive just their 
legal entitlement and 40.8 percent expected to be bailed out in full. 
Graph 5.10: Expectancy towards to be bailed out 
(VK) 
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A number of demographic issues have been looked at in order to classify the 
respondents. According to the results, 47.6 percent of the respondents were male and 
52.4 percent were female. 20.6 percent of the respondents' had professional 
qualifications. 9.5 percent had postgraduate qualifications, 25.4 percent had first 
degree and 19.8 percent had A level or equivalent. On the other hand, 15.9 percent 
had 0 level or equivalent degree. 7.9 percent had no qualification. The ages of the 
respondents varied from 23 to 81, where the mean is 45.8. 43.8 percent of the 
respondents were full-time employed, 14.3 percent ofthe respondents were part-time 
employed, 4.8 percent are not in paid employment and 12.7 percent were retired. 
5.3 Hypothesis-Testing in the UK Survey 
The Maun-Whitney-Wilcoxou Test (MWW) is a non-parametric test for 
identifying the differences between two populations based ou the analysis of two 
independent samples. This test was used mainly because it does not require any 
assumptions about the form of the probability distribution from which the 
measurements come and it can be used with nominal data. However, when I reject 
the hypothesis that the populations are identical by using the MWW test, I cannot 
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state how they differ. The value of the standardised test statistic z provides the basis 
for deciding whether to reject the null hypothesis. At 0.05 level of significance, to 
reject the null hypothesis, z must be less than -1.96 or greater than + 1.96 (Anderson 
et al. 1999). 
The MWW test is used to test the below-mentioned hypotheses: 
(1) Ho: There is no difference in the importance attached to the financial 
strength of the bank when opening an account among the British 
depositors who have knowledge about compensation schemes and 
those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the importance attached to the financial 
strength of the bank when opening an account among the British 
depositors who have knowledge about compensation schemes and 
those who have not. 
It can be seen from Table 5.1 that z=-2.431, therefore I reject the null hypothesis that 
the importance of financial strength of a bank when opening an account is the same 
for both groups. Mean ranks indicate that knowledge about the compensation 
arrangements had an adverse effect by means of depositors attaching less importance 
to their institutions' financial condition. 
Table 5.1: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 1 (UK) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Importance Know about 
of deposit insurance 46.39 23 
Financial Do not know about -2.431 0.015 
Strength deposit insurance 65.59 100 
(2) Ho: There is no difference in the tendency to diversify savings among the 
British depositors that have knowledge about compensation schemes 
and those who have not. 
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HI: There is a difference in the tendency to diversify savings among the 
British depositors that have knowledge about compensation schemes 
and those who have not. 
It can be seen from the Table 5.2 that z=-2.073; I can therefore reject the null 
hypothesis that the tendency to diversify savings among the British depositors who 
have knowledge about compensation schemes and those who have not are the same. 
The findings indicate that British depositors who know about compensation 
arrangements diversify their savings. 
Table 5.2: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 2 (UK) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Tendency Know about 
to deposit insurance 76.77 24 
Diversify Do not know about -2.073 0.038 
deposit insurance 60.38 102 
(3) Ho: There is no difference in the tendency to monitor the financial 
condition of their bank among the British depositors who have 
knowledge about bank failures and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the tendency to monitor the financial 
condition of their bank among the British depositors who have 
knowledge about bank failures and those who have not. 
Since z=-0.646, I can not reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in 
tenus of monitoring the financial condition of their banks among the British 
depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who have not (Table 
5.3). 
Table 5.3: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 3 (UK) 
Mean Rank N z Significance 
Monitoring Know about bank 
financial failures 63.97 80 
condition Do not know about -0.646 0.518 
bank failures 59.82 44 
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(4) Ho: There is no difference in the propensity to 'run' among the British 
depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who 
have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the propensity to 'run' among the British 
depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who 
have no. 
This hypothesis was tested by using question numbers 24, 25, 26 and 13. As can be 
seen from Table SA, the value of standardised test statistic z are -0.691, -00405 and 
-1.027, respectively, therefore I cannot reject the null hypothesis that British 
depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and who have not are the same 
in terms of propensity to run. 
Table 5.4: The MWW Tests of Hypothesis 4 (UK) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Know about bank 
Take failures 63.96 80 
Action Do not know about -0.691 00489 
bank failures 59.84 44 
Know about bank 
Decrease failures 63.39 80 
Savings Do not know about -00405 0.686 
bank failures 60.89 44 
Know about bank 
Close failures 60.16 80 
the Do not know about -1.027 0.305 
Account bank failures 66.76 44 
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The Kruskal-WaIlis test was used to compare an ordinal variable across three or 
more independent groups. This test does not require the assumptions of normality 
and equal variances that are required by the parametric analysis of variance 
procedure. According to this test, under the null hypothesis in which the populations 
are identical, the sampling distribution of W can be approximated by a chi -square 
distribution with k-I degrees of freedom. This approximation is generally acceptable 
if each sample size is greater than or equal to five. 
The following two hypotheses were tested using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
(5) Ho: There is no difference in the propensity to 'run' among the British 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
HI: There is a difference in the propensity to 'run' among the British 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
This hypothesis was tested by three consecutive tests using the responses from 
questions 24, 25, 26 and 2. The classification of the institutions is as follows: Major 
British Banking Group banks, other banks and building societies. 
The statistical tests that are produced in Table 5.5 (X'=3.051, df=2, p=0.217), in 
Table 5.6 (X '=3.424, df=2, p=O.l81) and in Table 5.7 (X '=1.314, df=2, p=0.518) 
show that the results are not significant at the 5 percent level. The chi-square 
distribution table shows that with k-l=2 degrees of freedom and u=0.05 in the upper 
tail of the distribution, the critical chi-square value is X' =5.99147. Since the X' of 
the tests are smaller than the critical chi-square value, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in terms of propensity to run among the British 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
Table 5.5: The Kruskal-Wallis Test of Hypothesis 5-a (UK) 
Type of institution Mean Ranks Cases 
MBBG 62.74 85 
Other banks 70.63 12 
Building Society 52.92 25 
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Table 5.6: The Kruskal-Wallis of Test Hypothesis 5-b (UK) 
Type of institution Mean Ranks Cases 
MBBG 64.86 85 
Other banks 49.00 12 
Building Society 56.06 25 
Table 5.7: The Kruskal-Wallis Test of Hypothesis 5-c (UK) 
Type of institution Mean Ranks Cases 
MBBG 63.12 85 
Other banks 64.33 12 
Building Society 54.64 25 
(6) Ho: There is no difference in the expectation of being bailed out of British 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
HI: There is a difference in the expectation of being bailed out of British 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
The results are highly significant (X 2 =14.679, df=2, p=O.OOl) and I can therefore 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the expectation of being 
bailing out between British depositors who have accounts with different types of 
institutions. Indeed, looking at the mean ranks, MBBG depositors most expect to be 
bailed out; the other bank depositors expect this least; the rankings of building 
society depositors are in between (Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8: The Kruskal-WaIlis Test of Hypothesis 6 (UK) 
Type of institution Mean Ranks Cases 
MBBG 68.14 85 
Other banks 35.71 12 
Building Society 48.38 24 
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In order to compare two groups on a variable, which is measured on a nominal scale, 
the two-sample chi-square test was used. The null hypothesis tested by the two-
sample chi-square test is that no difference exists between the two groups with 
respect to the relative frequency with which group members fall into the various 
categories of the variable of interest. The observed frequencies have to depart 
significantly from the expected frequencies to conclude that the two groups differ 
along the variable of interest (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 1997). As this test 
requires an expected frequency of 5 for each category, this condition was checked 
and when it is violated the Fisher's exact test was applied. 
(7) Ho: There is no difference in terms of checking financial information 
before investing among the British depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in terms of checking financial information 
before investing among the British depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
The Pearson chi-square statistics comes to 1.916, with an observed probability of 
0.166. Since the latter is not smaller than 10 percent (p<O.IO), 5 percent (p<O.OS), or 
1 percent (p<O.OI), which are the conventional cut-off points for rejecting the null 
hypothesis, I can therefore conclude that there is no statistically significant difference 
between British depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who 
have not, in terms of their attitude towards checking financial information before 
investing. However, as the requirement associated with minimum expected 
frequencies is violated for one cell, the Fisher's exact test was applied and the results 
are still found to be not significant (p=O.l95). 
In order to test the hypothesis concerning a population proportion, the z-test for a 
proportion was used. This test was applied because each group has more than 30 
cases and the test uses the normal approximation to the binomial to calculate a 
probability value. The following hypotheses were tested using the z-test for a 
proportion. In order to apply the test, firstly three adjacent categories (namely; 
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strongly disagree, disagree, neutral) and then two categories (namely: agree and 
strongly agree) were combined. 
(8) Ho: British depositors who felt competent to assess the financial condition 
of their banks when they opened their account are equal in number 
to those who did not feel competent. 
HI: British depositors who felt competent to assess the financial condition 
of their banks when they opened their account are not equal in 
number to those who did not feel competent. 
According to the findings, I can reject the null hypothesis that 1t=0.50 as the test is 
significant (p=O.OOI). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude that the 
British depositors who did not feel competent to assess the financial condition of 
their bank when they opened their account are greater than those who did feel 
competent (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9: Z Test for a Proportion of Hypothesis 8 (UK) 
Observed Prop. N 
Competent to Assess the Group 1 0.66 83 
Financial Condition Group 2 0.34 43 
(9) Ho: British depositors who have the information related to the financial 
condition of their banks are equal in number to those who do not. 
HI: British depositors who have the information related to the financial 
condition of their banks are not equal in number to those who do not. 
According to the findings, I can reject the null hypothesis that 1t=0.50 as the test is 
highly significant (p=O.OOO). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude 
that the British depositors who do not have the information related to the financial 
condition oftheir banks are greater than the British depositors who are (Table 5.10). 
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Table 5.10: Z Test for a Proportion of Hypothesis 9 (UK) 
Observed Prop. N 
Having Information Group 1 0.73 92 
to Monitor Group 2 0.27 34 
(l0) Ho: British depositors who have the necessary skills to be able to monitor 
the financial condition of their banks are equal in number to British 
depositors who do not. 
HI: British depositors who have the necessary skills to be able to monitor 
the fiuancial condition of their banks are not equal in number to 
British depositors who do not. 
According to the findings, I can reject the null hypothesis that 11=0.50 as the test is 
significant (p=O.OOl). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude that the 
British depositors who do not have the necessary skills to be able to monitor the 
financial condition of their banks are greater than the British depositors who have 
(Table 5.11). 
Table 5.11: Z Test for a Proportion of Hypothesis 10 (UK) 
Observed Prop. N 
Having Skills to be Group 1 0.66 83 
Able to Monitor Group 2 0.34 43 
(11) Ho: British depositors who are monitoring the financial condition of their 
banks are equal in number to British depositors who are not. 
HI: British depositors who are monitoring the financial condition of their 
banks are not equal in number to British depositors who are not. 
According to the findings, I can reject the null hypothesis that 11=0.50 as the test is 
highly significant (p=O.OOO). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude 
that the British depositors who are not monitoring the financial condition of their 
banks are greater than the British depositors who are (Table 5.12). 
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Table 5.12: Z Test for a Proportion of Hypothesis 11 (UK) 
Observed Prop. N 
Monitoring the Group 1 0.84 106 
Financial Condition Group 2 0.16 20 
The above four hypotheses tested the information aspect of market discipline and 
lead to the conclusion that the majority of British depositors felt inadequate by means 
of reaching and evaluating information and did not monitor their banks' financial 
condition. 
In order to compare the score of three or more related samples, the Friedman two-
way analysis of variance test was applied. This test ranks the scores for each of the 
cases and then calculates the mean rank score for each sample. If there are no 
differences between the samples, their mean ranks should be similar. The following 
hypothesis ·was tested with the Friedman two-way analysis of variance test. 
(12) Ho: All the factors are equally important in opening bank or building 
society accounts. 
HI: All the factors are not equally important in opening bank or building 
society accounts. 
The factors that were studied in the test were based on question 3. The test results 
indicate that the result is highly significant (X 2 =85.412, df=6, p=O.OOO) therefore I 
reject the null hypothesis that all the factors are equally important in opening a bank 
or building society account. Upon examining the mean ranks, it was found that the 
convenience factor dominated households' choices. This was followed by interest 
rate, availability of other services, good reputation, financial strength, wen known 
name and existing relationship. It is expected that risk averse depositors pay attention 
to the financial strength of a bank when opening an account. However, this result 
indicates that financial strength was not a primary concern in choosing a depository, 
and many depositors had other priorities when choosing banks and building societies. 
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Table 5.13: The Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test of 
Hypothesis 12 (UK) 
Mean Rank 
Convenience 4.94 
Interest rate 4.32 
Variability of other services 4.26 
Good reputation 4.06 
Financial strength 3.86 
Well known name 3.61 
Existing relationship 2.95 
5.4 Implications of the Main Results of the Hypothesis-Testing Concerning the 
UKSurvey 
The findings of the hypothesis-testing concerning the UK Survey are discussed 
according to the order of the hypothesis-testing. 
It was found that depositors who have knowledge about compensation arrangements 
attach less importance to the financial strength of a bank when opening an account 
than those who have no such knowledge. Although the co-insurance principle has 
been widely used in the compensation arrangements available in the UK, it does not 
have the desired impact on the depositors' attitudes by means of urging them to pay 
attention to whom they are dealing with. However, this may be the result of lack of 
knowledge concerning the co-insurance principle in the compensation arrangements. 
According to the results of the descriptive analysis, it was found that only 19 percent 
of the respondents know about the existence of the Deposit Protection Scheme in the 
UK and only 10.3 percent addressed the insurance limit correctly. In addition, the 
percentage of respondents who knew about the element of co-insurance within the 
compensation arrangements was limited to just 4 percent. This result highlights the 
fact that it is very important to promote knowledge of the terrus of the compensation 
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an·angements in order to achieve the desired effect on people's behaviour 
(Hypothesis 1). 
On the other hand, it was found that depositors who have knowledge about 
compensation arrangements have a greater tendency to diversify their savings. This 
finding indicates that the terms of the compensation arrangements urged a number of 
respondents to diversify their savings. It is possible that depositors find it less costly 
to diversify their savings than to pay attention to the financial strength of their 
institutions (Hypothesis 2). 
The researcher could not find supportive evidence that knowledge about bank 
failures has an effect on either monitoring the financial condition of their bank 
(Hypothesis 3) or checking financial information before investing (Hypothesis 7). 
The results of testing the third and seventh hypotheses suggest that publicity 
surrounding default and the fact that some depositors have incurred losses does not 
act as a warning to other consumers to be more carefuL This outcome could be 
explained by low frequency of bank failures in the UK, leading to few retail 
depositors being exposed to losses. 
The results of the testing of the fourth hypothesis meant that I could not find a 
significant difference in terms of propensity to run among depositors who have and 
those who do not have knowledge about bank failures (Hypothesis 4). 
Upon examining the results of the testing of the fifth hypothesis, it was found that 
there is no difference in terms of propensity to run among MBBG, building society 
and other bank depositors (Hypothesis 5). On the other hand, it was found that 
MBBG depositors have a higher expectation of being bailed out in case of a bank 
failure than the depositors of building societies and the other banks (Hypothesis 6). 
This finding implies that the depositors believe that there is a "too-big-to-fail" 
doctrine in place. The existence of such a belief among depositors reduces their 
incentive to monitor their banks and therefore reduces the effect of market discipline. 
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As Baer and Brewer (1986) argue, the success of market discipline depends on the 
capacity and willingness of depositors to evaluate publicly-available information on 
individual bank performance. Therefore, I checked whether this important 
prerequisite of market discipline is fulfilled by British depositors. The results of the 
analysis regarding accessing the relevant information and having the necessary 
sophistication to monitor effectively are as follows; 
1. The majority of depositors did not feel competent to assess the financial 
condition oftheir bank when they opened their account (Hypothesis 8). 
2. The majority of depositors did not have information relating to the 
financial condition oftheir bank (Hypothesis 9). 
3. The majority of depositors did not have the skills to assess the banks' 
financial conditions (Hypothesis 10). 
4. The majority of depositors did not monitor their banks (Hypothesis 11). 
These findings indicate that the majority of UK depositors lack the knowledge, skill 
and interest to monitor banks and, under these circumstances, their ability to be an 
effective source of market discipline is highly implausible. 
Another important finding for the market discipline aspect is that financial strength 
was not the main concern when making decisions concerning opening accounts for 
UK depositors. The result that follows from this analysis is in line with Garten's 
(1988) earlier findings. According to Garten "a significant portion of uninsured 
deposits are maintained for reasons that have little to do with risk and return". This 
finding indicates that if they do not feel themselves at risk, they will not engage in 
monitoring activities and therefore could not be a source of market discipline 
(Hypothesis 12). 
In the light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that British depositors do not 
operate in an environment that fulfils the prerequisites of effective market discipline. 
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5.5 TheMail Survey in Turkey 
The same procedures that were adopted in the UK survey were used to analyse the 
Turkish mail survey. The descriptive analysis is followed by the hypothesis-testing 
section and, finally conclusions are drawn for Turkey. 
5.6 Descriptive Analysis of the Turkish Survey 
The respondents were asked how many accounts they held their savings in to find out 
if they were using multiple accounts and the incentives behind this. The researcher 
was mainly interested to see if they were diversifying their funds because of risk-
related concerns. It was found that 50.8 percent of the sample were holding their 
savings in one bank and 29.7 percent, 15.7 percent, 2.2 percent, and 1.6 percent of 
the sample held their savings in two, three, four and five banks, respectively (Graph 
5.11). 
Graph S.lI:How many banks do you 
currently hold your savings? (Turkey) 
50 ... . 
40 ... . 
i! 30 
20 
10 
o +-~~~~~~~LL~-c==~~==~ 
2 J 4 5 
The reasons behind having multiple accounts were investigated for the 91 
respondents who had multiple accounts. It was found that convenience was the major 
reason (57.1 percent), followed by interest rate (20.9 percent). Different product offer 
was the third most popular reason (15.4 percent) and spreading risk was the least 
popular reason (6.6 percent) (Graph 5.12). Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
desire to spread risk was not the major reason for having multiple accounts, and was 
only a concern for a limited number of respondents. However, a crucial fact that has 
to be taken into consideration is that 76.7 percent of the multiple account holders 
have their main accounts with state-owned banks and banks that are covered by the 
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Savings Deposit Insurance Fund which reduces the need for diversifying for 
spreading risk purposes. 
Graph 5.12:Reasons for having multiple accounts 
(Turkey) 
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In order to explore the difference between the attitudes of depositors who had their 
main savings in different banks by hypothesis-testing, institutions were classified 
under two sub-headings. Firstly, banks were grouped into two categories according 
to their asset size. And the first ten banks were addressed as the Major Banking 
Group (MBG) with the remaining banks being addressed as the other banks. 
Secondly, banks were grouped according to their ownership, i.e. state-owned banks, 
private banks, and banks operating under the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF 
banks). According to the replies of the respondents, it was found that 95.1 percent of 
the respondents were MBG depositors. 73.5 percent of the respondents had accounts 
with state-owned banks, 23.2 percent were private bank depositors and 3.2 percent 
were depositors ofSmF banks (Graphs 5.13 and 5.14). 
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According to the Turkish Banks Association Survey results for 2000, 55 percent of 
the population has an account with state-owned banks, 34 percent has an account 
with private banks and 11 percent are depositors of SDIF banks (Banks Association 
of Turkey, 2001). Therefore, I conclude that the Turkish sample is representative. 
In order to explore the depositors' perceptions of the institutions with which they 
were entrusting their money, they were asked if they checked any information 
regarding the financial conditions of their banks where they hold most of their 
savings. According to the findings, 30.3 percent of the respondents said they check 
whereas, 69.7 percent of the respondents claimed that they did not. The major source 
that the Turkish depositors used for this purpose was found to be the financial press 
(63 percent). 
In line with the OK study, the reasons for not attempting to check such information 
was investigated for 129 respondents and, according to the findings, being an 
existing depositor was given as the major reason for not checking on such 
information (29.4 percent). On the other hand, 28.6 percent of the respondents 
claimed that the perception that big banks are safe kept them from checking such 
information. Investing their money with a well-known name was the reason for 23.8 
percent of the respondents not checking. 10.3 percent of the respondents said a good 
reputation was the reason, while 4.8 percent said being paid a high interest rate was 
the reason. The respondents who said they did not know how to check and who had 
faith in Turkish banking regulation were both 1.6 percent of the total sample (Graph 
5.15). 
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Respondents were divided into three groups according the amount of funds that they 
held in their accounts. The majority of the respondents (83.7 percent) were holding 
less than GBP 10.00011 , while 14.1 percent were holding between GBP 10.000-
50.000, and only 2.2 percent were holding above GBP 50.000 (Graph 5.16). 
Graph 5.16: How much do you hold in that account? 
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As the Turkish banking system has been experiencing frequent banking crises that 
have led to a number of bank collapses, the awareness of bank failures was quite 
high. 97.8 percent of the respondents stated that they had heard or read about banks 
that had failed in Turkey. In addition to that, 85.4 percent of the respondents claimed 
that they had knowledge about the Deposit Protection Scheme and 68.6 percent of all 
the respondents addressed the insurance limit correctly. 
The influence of the tenus of insurance on decision-making while opemng an 
account was asked to the respondents; 50 percent said they did take into 
consideration the tenus of insurance while the other 50 percent said that they did not. 
In order to learn more about the respondents' attitudes to financial risk, they were 
asked directly if they were willing to take financial risk and the results are presented 
in Graph 5.17. According to the results, 14.2 percent of respondents were in favour 
of taking financial risk while 77.6 percent were against it and 8.2 percent said that 
11 Converted from Turkish lira to British pound by using year-end exchange rate of 2000, which is 
993.&78 TRL = 1 GBP. 
142 
they felt neutral about the subject. This result indicates that there is a strong 
opposition to taking financial risk among Turkish depositors. 
Graph 5.17: I am willing to take financial risk (Turkey) 
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90.3 percent ofthe respondents claimed that the safety of principal was important for 
them. In addition to that, 72.9 percent agreed that it was a good idea to split savings 
among different banks to reduce the risk of losing all or some of their deposits in 
case of a bank collapse. On the other hand, 18.5 percent of the respondents said they 
actually split their funds in order to be safer. The percentage of the respondents who 
actually split their funds might seem a bit lower than expected. However, the low 
rate of average savings (the average amount of funds in a savings account is GBP 
369 as at the end of 2000) is the most probable reason for not splitting the savings 
among banks. 
From Graphs 5. I 8, 5.19 and 5.20, it can be inferred that the Turkish respondents had 
a cleal tendency to run in case of any disturbance in the financial markets, which is 
very similar to UK. respondents' attitudes. 
Graph 5.18: I would take action if I were concerned 
about financial condition of my bank (Turkey) 
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Graph 5.19: I would decrease the amount of my 
savings if I suspect any deterioration in the 
financial condition of my bank (Turkey) 
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In order to explore the respondents' attitudes towards being bailed out, they were 
asked what they would expect if their bank failed. Graph 5.21 shows that 3.2 percent 
expected to be bailed out partially, 19.5 percent expected to receive only the legal 
entitlement and 77.3 percent expected to be bailed out in full. As 97.7 percent of the 
respondents were holding funds below the insurance limit and 97.8 percent of the 
respondents knew about deposit insurance, it is highly likely that they expect to be 
protected by the SDIF. The Turkish depositors enjoyed blanket coverage for a long 
period since 1994, which may shape their expectations as well. 
It can also be argued that depositors were influenced by the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Board's (BRSA) failure resolution policy. Since 1997, almost one third 
of Turkish commercial banks' operations were considered to be risky for the security 
and stability of the financial system and the rights of depositors were transferred to 
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the SnIP by a decision of the BRSA, and those banks were not allowed to default on 
their obligations to depositors. 
Graph 5.21: Expectancy towards to be bailed out (Turkey) 
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A number of demographic issues were also looked at in order to classify the 
respondents. According to the results, 54.6 percent of the respondents were male 
while 45.4 percent were female. 76.8 percent of the respondents had university 
degrees, 21.1 percent were high school graduates, and 2.15 percent had fulfilled the 
minimum education requirements. The ages of the respondents varied from 17 to 65, 
whit a mean of 36.7. 88.1 percent of the respondents were full-time employed, 7 
percent were self-employed, 1.1 percent were an unpaid house-worker and 3.8 
percent were retired, 
5.7 Hypothesis-Testing in the Turkish Survey 
Hypothesis-testing of the Turkish Survey was done in line with the hypothesis-
testing of the UK Survey, as presented in Section 5.3 of this chapter. The hypotheses 
were tested using the same tests; therefore the information about the tests are 
generally not repeated below. 
The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test (MWW) test was used to test the below-
mentioned hypothesis. This test is evaluated at 0.05 level of significance. At this 
level of significance to reject the null hypothesis, z must be less than -1.96 or greater 
than +1.96. 
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(1) Ho: There is no difference in the importance attached to the financial 
strength of the bank when opening an account among the Turkish 
depositors who have knowledge about compensation schemes and 
those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the importance attached to the financial 
strength of the bank when opening an account among the Turkish 
depositors who have knowledge about compensation schemes and 
those who have not. 
It can be seen from Table 5.14 that z=-1.588; therefore, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the importance of financial strength of a bank when opening an 
account is the same for both groups. 
Table 5.14: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 1 (Turkey) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Importance Know about 
of deposit insurance 93.32 154 
Financial Do not know about -1.588 0.112 
Strength deposit insurance 77.76 27 
Mean ranks indicate that knowledge about deposit insurance does not reduce the 
importance that the depositor attached to the financial strength of their institution. It 
can be concluded that the existence of deposit insurance does not create moral hazard 
in Turkey. 
(2) Ho: There is no difference in the tendency to diversify savings among the 
Turkish depositors that have knowledge about compensation schemes 
and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the tendency to diversify savings among the 
Turkish depositors that have knowledge about compensation schemes 
and those who have not. 
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It can be seen from Table 5.15 that, z~-2.039; therefore, I can reject the null 
hypothesis that the tendency to diversify savings among the Turkish depositors who 
have knowledge about compensation schemes and those who have not are the same. 
Depositors who know about deposit insurance have a greater tendency to diversify 
their savings among banks. 
Table 5.15: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 2 (Turkey) 
Tendency 
to 
Know about 
deposit insurance 
Diversify Do not know about 
deposit insurance 
Meau Rauk N 
95.59 157 
74.54 27 
z Significance 
-2.039 0.041 
(3) Ho: There is no difference in the tendency to monitor the financial 
condition of their banks among the Turkish depositors who have 
knowledge about bank failures and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the tendency to monitor tlie financial 
condition of their bank among the Turkish depositors who have 
knowledge about bank failures and those who have not. 
Since z=-0.815, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in terms 
of monitoring the financial condition of their banks among the Turkish depositors 
who have knowledge about bank failures and those who have not. However, looking 
to the mean ranks, it can be concluded that, regardless of the knowledge of bank 
failures, depositors are very keen on monitoring the financial condition of their bank 
(Table 5.16). 
Table 5.16: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 3 (Turkey) 
Mean Rank N z Significance 
Monitoring Know about bank 
financial failures 91.05 178 
condition Do not know about -0.815 0.415 
bank failures llU8 4 
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(4) Ho: There is no difference in the propensity to run among the Turkish 
depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who 
have not. 
HI: There is a difference in the propensity to run among the Turkish 
depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who 
have not. 
This hypothesis was tested using question numbers 22, 23, 24 and 12 of the Turkish 
survey. As can be seen from Table 5.17, the z scores are -3.637, -3.456 and -3.384 
respectively, and I can therefore reject the null hypothesis that Turkish depositors 
who have knowledge about bank failures and who have not are the same in terms of 
propensity to run. The findings indicate that depositors who have knowledge about 
bank failures are more likely to run. This finding also indicates that some of the 
people bearing losses act as a warning to others in Turkey. The existence of frequent 
bank failures in the country leads depositors to have a tendency to run in the case of 
disturbances in the financial markets. 
Table 5.17: The MWW Tests of Hypothesis 4 (Turkey) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Know about bank 
Take failures 95.14 180 
Action Do not know about -3.637 0.000 
bank failures 15.90 5 
Know about bank 
Decrease failures 94.56 179 
Savings Do not know about -3.456 0.001 
bank failures 18.70 5 
Know about bank 
Close failures 94.65 179 
the Do not know about -3.384 0.001 
Account bank failures 15.70 5 
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(5) Ho: There is no difference in the propensity to run among the Turkish 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
HI: There is a difference in the propensity to run among the Turkish 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
This hypothesis was tested by three consecutive tests using the responses from 
questions 22, 23, 24 and 2. For the sake of the analysis, the institutions were divided 
into two groups namely, "Major Banking Group" (MBG) banks and "other" banks, 
according to their asset size. The statistical tests are produced in Table 5.18 and the 
results are not significant. This indicates that I could not reject the hypothesis that 
there is no difference in terms of propensity to run among the Turkish depositors 
who have accounts with different types of institutions. Looking at the mean ranks, it 
can be concluded that all depositors are prone to run. 
Table 5.18: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 5 (Turkey) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Take MBG 94.07 176 
Action Other banks 72.06 9 ·1.346 0.178 
Decrease MBG 93.63 175 
Savings Other banks 70.56 9 -1.400 0.162 
Close the MBG 93.24 175 
Account Other banks 78.06 9 -0.865 0.387 
The following hypotheses were tested using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
(6) Ho: There is no difference in the expectation of being bailed out of 
Turkish depositors who have accounts with different types of 
institutions. 
HI: There is a difference in the expectation of being bailed out of Turkish 
depositors who have accounts with different types of institutions. 
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For the sake of the analysis, the institutions were divided into three groups according 
to their ownership; state-owned banks, privately-owned banks and SDIF banks. The 
results are highly significant (X 2~13.870, df~2, p~O.OOI) and therefore I can reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference in tenus of expectancy about bailing 
out between Turkish depositors who have accounts with different types of 
institutions. Indeed looking at the mean ranks, depositors who have accounts with 
state-owned banks most expect to be bailed out (Table 5.19). 
Table 5.19: The Kruskal-WalIis Test of Hypothesis 6 (Turkey) 
Type of institution Meau Ranks Cases 
State-owned banks 99.32 136 
Privately-owned banks 76.73 43 
SDIF banks 66.25 6 
In order to compare two groups on a variable, which is measured on a nominal scale, 
the two-sample chi-square test was used. As this test requires an expected 
frequency of 5 for each category, this condition is checked and when it was violated 
the Fisher's exact test was applied. 
(7) Ho: There is no difference in terms of checking financial information 
before iuvestiug among the Turkish depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
HI: There is a difference in terms of checking financial information 
before investing among the Turkish depositors who have knowledge 
about bank failures and those who have not. 
The Pearson chi-square statistics comes to 0.739, with an observed probability of 
0.390. Since the latter is not smaller than 10 percent (p<O. 1 0), 5 percent (p<0.05), or 
1 percent (p<O.OI) which are the conventional cut-off points for rejecting the null 
hypothesis, therefore I can conclude that there is no statistically significant difference 
between Turkish depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who 
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have not, in tenns of their attitude towards checking financial infonnation before 
investing. However, as the requirement associated with minimum expected 
frequencies was violated for two cells, the Fisher's exact test was applied and the 
results are still found to be not significant (p=0.586). 
In order to test the hypothesis concerning a population proportion the z-test for a 
proportion was used. This test was applied because each group has more than 30 
cases and the test uses the nonnal approximation to the binomial to calculate a 
probability value. The following hypotheses were tested using the z-test for a 
proportion. In order to apply the test, firstly three adjacent categories, namely 
"strongly disagree", "disagree", "neutral" and then two categories, namely "agree" 
and "strongly agree" were combined. 
(8) Ho: Turkish depositors who felt competent to assess the financial 
condition of their banks when they opened their accounts are equal in 
number to those who did not feel competent. 
HI: Turkish depositors who felt competent to assess the financial 
condition of their banks when they opened their accounts are not 
equal in number to tbose wbo did not feel competent. 
According to the findings, I can reject the nuIl hypothesis that n=0.50 as the test is 
significant (p=O.OOI). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude that the 
Turkish depositors who feel competent to assess the financial condition of their bank 
when they open their account is greater than those who do not feel to do so (Table 
5.20). 
Table 5.20: Z Test for a Proportion for Hypothesis 8 (Turkey) 
Observed Prop. N 
Competent to Assess the Group 1 0.38 69 
Financial Condition Group 2 0.63 115 
151 
9) Ho: Turkish depositors who have the iuformation related to the financial 
condition of their banks are equal in number to those who do not. 
HI: Turkish depositors who have the information related to the financial 
condition of their banks are not equal in number to those who do not. 
According to the findings, I can reject the null hypothesis that rc=0.50 as the test is 
highly significant (p=O.OOI). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude 
that the Turkish depositors who feel that they have the information related to the 
financial condition of their banks are greater than the Turkish depositors who do not 
feel the same way (Table 5.21). 
Table 5.21: Z Test for a Proportion for Hypothesis 9 (Turkey) 
Observed Prop. N 
Having Information Group 1 0.38 69 
to Monitor Group 2 0.63 115 
(10) Ho: Turkish depositors who have the necessary skills to be able to 
monitor the financial condition of their banks are equal in number to 
Turkish depositors who do not. 
HI: Turkish depositors who have the necessary skills to be able to 
monitor the financial condition of their banks are not equal in 
number to Turkish depositors who do not. 
According to the findings, I can reject the null hypothesis that rc=0.50 as the test is 
highly significant (p=O.OOO). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude 
that the Turkish depositors who have the necessary skills to be able to monitor the 
financial condition of their banks are greater than the Turkish depositors who have 
not (Table 5.22). 
Table 5.22: Z Test for a Proportion for Hypothesis 10 (Turkey) 
Observed Prop. N 
Having Skills to be Group 1 0.32 59 
Able to Monitor Group 2 0.68 123 
152 
(11) Ho: Turkish depositors who are monitoring the financial condition of 
their banks are equal in number to the Turkish depositors who are 
not. 
HI: Turkish depositors who are monitoring the financial condition of 
their banks are not equal in number to the Turkish depositors who 
are not. 
According to the findings, I can reject the null hypothesis that 11=0.50 as the test is 
highly significant (p=O.OOO). Looking to the observed proportions, I can conclude 
that the Turkish depositors who are monitoring the financial condition of their banks 
are greater than the Turkish depositors who are not (Table 5.23). 
Table 5.23: Z Test for a Proportion for Hypothesis 11 (Turkey) 
Observed Prop. N 
Monitoring the Group 1 0.30 55 
Financial Condition Group 2 0.70 128 
The following hypothesis is tested with the Friedman two-way analysis of variance 
test. 
(12) Ho: All the factors are equally important when opening bank accounts. 
HI: All the factors are not equally important when opening bank 
accounts. 
The factors that are studied in the test are based on the third question. The test results 
indicate that the result is highly significant (X 2 =116.710, df=6, p=O.OOO). 
Therefore, I can reject the hypothesis that all the factors are equally important when 
opening bank accounts. Upon examining the mean ranks, it is clear that the 
importance of convenience is paramount, followed by availability of other services, 
financial strength, existing relationship, interest rate, good reputation, and well 
known name. It is expected that risk averse depositors pay attention to the financial 
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strength of a bank when opening an account. The results indicate that financial 
strength is not a primary concern in choosing a depository, with many depositors 
having other priorities when opening a bank account (Table 5.24). 
Table 5.24: The Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance Test for 
Hypothesis 12 (Tnrkey) 
Mean Rank 
Convenience 4.63 
Variability of other services 4.58 
Financial strength 4.49 
Existing relationship 3.77 
Interest rate 3.63 
Good reputation 3.61 
Well known name 3.29 
5.8 Main Implications of the Hypothesis-Testing of the Turkish Snrvey 
The results indicate that know ledge about compensation arrangements does not 
reduce the attention that the depositors pay to the financial strength of their 
institution (Hypothesis I). 
The results of the testing also verify that depositors who have knowledge about 
compensation arrangements have a greater tendency to diversify their savings. This 
indicates that the depositors who are aware of the compensation arrangements are 
aware of the indirect costs that occur in the case of bank failures and try to minimise 
their risks (Hypothesis 2). 
Depositors who have knowledge about bank failures do not act differently than 
depositors who do not know about bank failures in terms of checking financial 
information before investing and monitoring their banks. This finding raises the issue 
of the effects of frequent bank failures. It shows that depositors who are operating in 
an unstable financial environment develop a defence mechanism and make an effort 
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to guard their savings by monitoring the financial condition of their bank 
(Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 3). 
On the other hand, depositors who have knowledge about bank failures have a 
greater tendency to run in the case of turmoil in the market (Hypothesis 4). This 
finding indicates that, despite the existence of deposit insurance, people bearing 
losses as a consequence of resolution techniques that take a long time to conclude act 
as a warning to others in Turkey. The existence of frequent bank failures in the 
country leads depositors to have a tendency to run in the case of disturbances in 
financial markets. 
There is no statistically significant difference between MBG depositors and the rest 
in terms of a tendency to run in the case of anxiety in the financial markets. 
However, it is found that both groups are prone to run (Hypothesis 5). 
On the other hand, state-owned bank depositors have a higher expectation of being 
bailed out in the case of failure than the depositors of private banks (Hypothesis 6). 
The existence of state-owned banks creates an environment where the "too-big-to-
fail" principle is in place. At this point, it is also hereby necessary to reemphasise the 
fact that a perception of "too-big-to-fail" was held by 28.6 percent of the depositors 
who do not check about the financial condition of their banks. Depositors who have 
accounts with the state-owned banks expect to enj oy full compensation from the state 
in the case of failure. 
An important condition for an effective system of depositor-imposed market 
discipline is the availability of relevant information to depositors on a timely basis 
(Mantripragada, 1992). Moreover, the capacity and the willingness of depositors to 
evaluate publicly available information on individual bank performance is essential 
for depositor market discipline. The results of the tests demonstrate the following: 
I. The majority of depositors felt competent to assess the financial 
condition of their bank when they opened their account (Hypothesis 8). 
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2. The majority of depositors had access to infonnation related to the 
financial condition of their bank (Hypothesis 9). 
3. The majority of depositors claimed that they had the skills to assess the 
banks' financial conditions (Hypothesis 10). 
4. The majority of depositors monitored their banks (Hypothesis 11). 
The findings of the hypotheses-testing 8-11 are very important as they show that 
Turkish depositors fulfil the infonnation prerequisites of market discipline. They 
claimed that they are competent to assess financial information and have access to 
the infonnation that is necessary. They also stated that they have the skill to do this 
and they continuously monitor their financial institutions' positions. Therefore, it is 
concluded that an important pre-requisite of an effective source of market discipline 
is fulfilled. 
Besides, it is found that financial strength is one of the main concerns in the decision 
making process while opening accounts (Hypothesis 12). 
Therefore, I reach the conclusion that the prerequisites of market discipline are 
fulfilled by the Turkish depositors. 
5.9 Comparisons Concerning the UK and Turkish Survey Results Arising 
from the Hypothesis-Testing 
After analysing the data for the two countries individually, the hypotheses 
concerning the comparison ofthe two countries are tested in this section. 
The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon Test (MWW) was used to test the below-mentioned 
hypotheses. 
(1) Ho: There is no difference in the importance attached to the financial 
strength of a bank when opening an account among Turkish and 
British depositors. 
156 
Ht: There is a difference in the importance attached to the financial 
strength of the bank when opening an acconnt among Turkish and 
British depositors. 
Since z=-6.593, I reject the null hypothesis that the importance of financial strength 
of a bank when opening an account is the same for both groups. Findings indicate 
that when opening an account, Turkish depositors attach more importance to the 
financial strength of a bank than do British depositors (Table 5.25). 
Table 5.25: The MWW Test of Hypothesis t (Comparison of the UK and 
Turkish Surveys) 
Mean Rauk N Z Significance 
Importance of Turkey 178.25 181 
Financial Strength UK 114.60 123 -6.593 0.000 
(2) Ho: There is no difference in the importance attached to the safety of 
principal between Turkish and British depositors. 
Ht: There is a difference in the importance attached to the safety of 
principal between Turkish and British depositors. 
It can be seen from Table 5.26 that the z=-4.051, and therefore I reject the null 
hypothesis that the importance of safety is the same for both groups. Findings 
indicate that Turkish depositors attach more importance to the safety of principal 
than British depositors. 
Table 5.26: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 2 (Comparison of the UK and 
Turkish Surveys) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Importance of Safety of Turkey 170.64 185 
Principal UK 131.67 124 -4.051 0.000 
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(3) Ho: There is no difference in terms of willingness to take financial risk 
among Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in terms of willingness to take financial risk 
among Turkish and British depositors. 
Since z=-3.994, I reject the null hypothesis that both groups have the same attitudes 
towards taking financial risk. Findings indicate that Turkish depositors are less 
willing to take financial risk (Table 5.27). 
Table 5.27: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 3 (Comparison of the UK and 
Turkish Surveys) 
Willing to Take 
Financial Risks 
Turkey 
UK 
Mean Rank 
170.32 
131.03 
N z Significance 
184 
124 -3.994 0.000 
(4) Ho: There is no difference in terms of being competent to assess the 
financial condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in terms of being competent to assess the 
financial condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
Since z=-3.917, I reject the null hypothesis that both groups have the same 
competency to assess the financial condition of a bank. Findings indicate that 
Turkish depositors feel more competent in this subject (Table 5.28). 
Table 5.28: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 4 (Comparison of the UK and 
Turkish Surveys) 
Mean Rank N z Significance 
Competent to Assess Turkey 171.45 184 
r-~~~--~~---+--__ ~ 
the Financial Condition UK 132.21 126 -3.917 0.000 
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(5) Ho: There is no difference in having access to information to monitor the 
financial condition of a bank between Tnrkish and British depositors. 
Ht: There is a difference in having access to information to monitor the 
financial condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
Since z=-6.040, I reject the null hypothesis that both groups are confident about 
having access to sufficient information to allow them to monitor the financial 
condition of a bank. Findings indicate that Turkish depositors can reach more 
information that enable them to monitor the financial condition of their banks (Table 
5.29). 
Table 5.29: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 5 (Comparison of the UK and 
Turkish Surveys) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Having Access to Turkey 180.13 184 
Information to Monitor 
the Financial Condition UK 119.54 126 -6.040 0.000 
ofa Bank 
(6) Ho: There is no difference in having skills to monitor the financial 
condition of a bank between Tnrkish and British depositors. 
Ht: There is a difference in having skills to monitor the financial 
condition of a bank between Turkish and British depositors. 
Since z=-5.382, I reject the null hypothesis that both groups have the same skills to 
monitor the financial condition of a bank. Turkish depositors declare that they have 
the necessary skills to monitor the financial condition of a bank (Table 5.30). 
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Table 5.30: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 6 (Comparison of the UK and 
Turkish Surveys) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Having Skill to Turkey 176.45 182 
Monitor the Financial OK 122.80 126 -5.382 0.000 
Condition of a Bank 
(7) Ho: There is no difference in monitoring the financial condition of their 
banks between Turkish and British depositors 
HI: There is a difference in monitoring the financial condition of their 
banks between Turkish and British depositors. 
Since z=-8.795, I reject the null hypothesis that both groups are monitoring the 
financial condition of their banks equally. Findings indicate that Turkish depositors 
are more keen on monitoring their banks' financial conditions (Table 5.3 I). 
Table 5.31: The MWW Test of Hypothesis 7 (Comparison of the UK and 
Turkish Surveys) 
Mean Rank N Z Significance 
Monitoring the Turkey 190.96 183 
Financial Condition of UK 102.78 126 -8.795 0.000 
Their Banks 
In order to compare two groups on a variable, which is measured on a nominal scale, 
the two-sample chi-square test was used. The null hypothesis tested by the two-
sample chi-square test is that no difference exists between the two groups with 
respect to the relative frequency with which group members fall into the various 
categories of the variable of interest. The observed frequencies have to depart 
significantly from the expected frequencies to conclude that the two groups differ 
along the variable of interest (Diamantopoulos and SchIegelmilch, 1997). This test 
requires an expected frequency of 5 for each category; this condition was checked 
and when this requirement was violated, the Fisher's exact test was applied. 
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(8) Ho: There is no difference in terms of knowledge about deposit protection 
schemes among Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in terms of knowledge about deposit protection 
schemes among Turkish and British depositors. 
The Pearson chi-square statistic comes to 135.964, with an observed probability of 
0.000; therefore I can conclude that there is a statistically significant difference 
between Turkish and British depositors' knowledge about deposit protection 
schemes. 85.4 percent of Turkish depositors know about the details of deposit 
protection scheme while only 19.0 percent of British depositors know about the 
details of their scheme. 
(9) Ho: There is no difference in terms of knowledge about bank failures 
between Turkish and British depositors. 
HI: There is a difference in terms of knowledge about bank failures 
between Turkish and British depositors. 
The Pearson chi-square statistic comes to 67.478, with an observed probability of 
0.000. However, as the requirements associated with minimum expected frequencies 
are violated, the Fisher's exact test was applied but the results were still found to be 
highly significant (p=O.OOO). Findings indicate that British depositors are less aware 
of bank failures in the UK than Turkish depositors are of Turkish bank failures. 
(10) Ho: There is no difference in the expectation of being bailed out among 
Turkish and British depositors. 
Ht: There is a difference in the expectatiou of being bailed out among 
Turkish and British depositors. 
The Pearson chi-square statistic comes to 53.019, with an observed probability of 
0.000, and I can therefore conclude that there is a statistically significant difference 
between Turkish and British depositors' expectations of being bailed out; Turkish 
depositors have a greater expectation of being bailed out. 
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5.10 Main Findings of the Comparison Concerning the UK and Turkish Survey 
Results Resulting from Hypotheses-Testing 
The findings of the two-country comparison have an important role to play in this 
study as they enable the researcher to evaluate the consequences of different 
compensation arrangements and financial environments on depositors' ability to 
exert market discipline. 
According to market discipline theory, risk must be a primary concern for depositors 
in choosing a depository for market discipline to work effectively. Therefore, the 
first leg of the comparison concerns the risk perceptions of the depositors of the two 
countries. The findings of the study indicate that Turkish depositors attach more 
importance to the financial strength of a bank when opening an account than do 
British depositors (Hypothesis 1); and the safety of principal is more important for 
them than for the British depositors (Hypothesis 2). In addition to this, it was found 
that Turkish depositors are less willing to take financial risk than British depositors. 
The second step of the comparison concerns the idea that depositors having a 
capacity and willingness to evaluate publicly-available information is essential if 
they are to be a source of market discipline. The results of the hypothesis-testing 
suggest that Turkish depositors feel more competent in assessing the financial 
condition of a bank (Hypothesis 4), and they confirm that they also receive more 
information than their UK counterparts, allowing them to monitor the financial 
conditions of their banks more easily (Hypothesis 5). In addition to this, Turkish 
depositors declare that they have the necessary skills to monitor the financial 
condition of a bank, while British depositors are very reluctant in this respect 
(Hypothesis 6). Finally, the last hypothesis on this subject verifies that Turkish 
depositors are more keen on monitoring their banks' financial condition than British 
depositors (Hypothesis 7). 
The impact of the compensation arrangements on depositors' behaviour was another 
aspect that was studied; their awareness about compensation arrangements and bank 
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failures were both examined. The results demonstrate that there is a statistically 
significant difference between Turkish and British depositors' knowledge about 
deposit protection schemes. Turkish depositors had greater knowledge about 
compensation arrangements operating in their country (Hypothesis 8). British 
depositors were also shown to be less aware of the bank failures in their country than 
Turkish depositors (Hypothesis 9). Finally, Turkish depositors had higher 
expectations of being bailed out in case of bank failure than their UK. counterparts 
(Hypothesis 10). 
5.11 Conclusions 
The descriptive analysis and statistical significance testing for the UK and Turkish 
surveys were incorporated in this chapter. Firstly, the main conditions necessary for 
depositors to exert market discipline were checked for their existence in the UK. and 
Turkey. The conditions that were evaluated were as follows: 
i) There must be a group of depositors whose primary concern is risk when 
investing, 
ii) Depositors must be able to access information about the financial 
conditions of their banks, 
iii) Depositors must be able to assess the information available about the 
financial conditions of their banks, 
iv) Depositors must monitor the financial conditions of their banks. 
Upon testing the data for the UK. and Turkish depositors, it was found that while 
Turkish depositors were fulfilling those conditions, the British depositors' ability to 
exert market discipline was seen as being very limited. 
Secondly, I examined whether the extent of market discipline is related to the 
different regulatory environments and whether certain types of deposit insurance 
schemes undermine market discipline. According to the results of the analysis, a 
number of important results emerged. 
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The findings of the survey analysis reveal the importance of promoting knowledge 
about the terms and conditions of the available compensation arrangements amongst 
the public in order to achieve the desired impacts. The co-insurance principle has 
been a widely-used element of compensation arrangements in the UK since 1982 and 
the regulators put special emphasis on its disciplinary effect. However, the UK 
depositors' lack of knowledge of it is an obstacle to reaching the aim of exerting 
market discipline in the UK and to serving the wider aims of deposit protection. 
On the other hand, the pre-conditions for market discipline observed in the results of 
the survey of Turkish depositors, regardless of the existence of full explicit 
insurance, could be explained by the lack of credibility of the guarantees and by the 
delays and other costs entailed in recovering funds from the guarantor. The provision 
of 100 percent coverage of deposits does not insulate depositors from all possible 
losses so does not make them indifferent to the risk-taking of their banks' activities. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
EXISTENCE OF DEPOSITOR MARKET DISCIPLINE 
IN THE UK AND TURKISH BANKING SECTORS 
6.1 Introduction 
The results of the surveys, from which the ability of depositors to exert market 
discipline in the UK and Turkish deposit markets were analysed, were presented in 
the previous chapter. The results demonstrate that while Turkish depositors are likely 
to exert market discipline, British depositors' ability seems very limited as the 
prerequisites necessary for depositors to exert market discipline do not exist. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the evidence of depositor market discipline in 
the UK and Turkish banking industries by applying panel datal2 analysis. In 
particular, the presence of market discipline is tested by studying whether depositors 
monitor their banks and punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits, is tested. 
Using bank panel data for the UK and Turkish banks for the periods 1989-2000 and 
1989-2001 respectively, the relationship between the growth rate of banks' deposits 
and bank specific risk variables is modelled. Furthermore, it is investigated whether 
depositors require riskier Turkish banks to pay higher interest rates. This latter 
analysis is only applied for the Turkish banking sector for the 1992-2001 period 
because of the lack of available data for the UK. 
The mam result that emerges from this empirical analysis is that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between bank risk-taking and deposit growth in 
the UK. However, for the Turkish banking sector, the empirical findings indicate that 
12 The term panel data refers to the pooling of observations on cross-sectional units, i.e. banks in this 
study, over a specific time period. 
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Turkish depositors exert market discipline by withdrawing deposits and by requiring 
higher interest rates from riskier banks. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the background of the 
study. Section 6.3 presents the empirical study by describing how the model is 
structured. Research hypotheses, methodology, variables and data are explained in 
this section. Section 6.4 reports the empirical results. The main findings are 
summarised in the concluding section. 
6.2 Background of the Study 
Because of the increase in the number of bank failures during the 1980s, academics 
and regulators have questioned the system of bank supervision and regulation and 
discussed whether market discipline could improve the safety and soundness of 
banking systems (A very et al., 1988). The discussion on market discipline has also 
gathered considerable attention as the activities of banks have become increasingly 
complex and therefore the task of controlling their risk behaviour has become more 
difficult (Sironi, 2000). Furthermore, the issue of market discipline has gained more 
importance since the publication of proposals for a new Basle Capital Accord, which 
recognises the role of market discipline by stating that more transparency and 
disclosure by banks have the potential to reinforce capital regulation and other 
supervisory efforts to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system (BIS, 
2000). 
Because of the increasing importance of market discipline, academics attempted to 
evaluate the potential of market players, comprising depositors, debt holders and 
stockholders, to impose discipline on banks. However, while the importance of 
market discipline in banking is widely recognised, there is much less consensus 
among academics about its actual presence (Birchler and Maechler, 2001). Besides, 
existing published academic studies concerning market discipline are mostly based 
on the US banking system and there is not much literature for other countries. In 
addition, depositors are found to be the least studied source in the literature. 
Therefore, the most important contribution of this study is to fill a gap in the 
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literature by employing an econometric model and testing the existence of market 
discipline in the UK and Turkey, as little is known regarding the degree of market 
discipline exercised by depositors in either ofthese countries. 
Although there are other potential market participants, such as stockholders and debt 
holders, that could exert market discipline, the behaviour of depositors in the UK and 
Turkey are analysed for two reasons. First, there is no debt market for banks in 
Turkey and only a few banks' stocks trade on the stock exchange. Therefore, 
depositors are the only possible source of market discipline in Turkey. Second, both 
British and Turkish regulators put strong emphasis on the importance of depositors in 
disciplining bank activities. As a result, in this part of the study, the existence of 
depositor market discipline in the UK and Turkish banking systems is empirically 
investigated. In principle, depositors can discipline banks that engage in excessive 
risk-taking by two routes; first, by demanding higher interest rates, and second by 
withdrawing their deposits (DemirgUy-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). In this analysis, 
both of these issues are addressed. 
Because the two countries have adopted very different deposit insurance scheme 
features, this study is even more interesting. Besides, while the Turkish banking 
sector has suffered frequent banking failures in recent years, the financial sector in 
the UK is fundamentally strong and, overall, the UK banks are sufficiently profitable 
and well-capitalised to be able to absorb the effects of likely macroeconomic shocks 
without systemic distress (IMF, 2003). 
The Turkish banking sector is a very special case because of a number of 
developments that took place in the 1990s. After experiencing a serious financial 
crisis in early 1994, the Turkish authorities applied 100 percent coverage for deposit 
accounts, both in Turkish lira and in foreign currency, aiming to prevent a deposit 
run that could adversely affect the banking system that had already suffered from 
financial crisis. However, Turkey has continued to experience frequent banking 
problems because of poor governance and excessive risk-taking by banks, abuse by 
owners and weak regulatory and supervisory frameworks for banking (OEeD, 2002). 
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Because of these problems, since 1997,20 private banks!3 have been the subject of 
official intervention and have been transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund 
(SDIF), of which 17 were transferred after December 1999. In view of the large 
number of banks transferred to the SDIF, the full coverage deposit protection scheme 
has been much criticised for creating the moral hazard whereby depositors pay less 
care when selecting their depository institution and have no real incentive to exercise 
market discipline. 
It is argued that uninsured depositors, who are not protected by a deposit insurance 
scheme, which might be implicit or explicit, have an incentive to monitor banks' 
activities as they face default risk and therefore should penalise excessive risk-taking 
by requiring higher interest rates and/or by withdrawing their deposits (Jordan, 
2000). On the other hand, as discussed in the third chapter, because of the non-
pecuniary costs that insured depositors might bear, such as waiting for deposit 
redemption, they can also be a source of market discipline (Park and Peristiani, 
1998). Therefore, it is especially relevant to analyse market discipline in Turkey, 
despite the existence offull coverage. 
6.3 Empirical Study 
In the literature, there are two main approaches to test the existence of depositor 
market discipline. First, the price-based approach, where the dependent variable is 
the deposit interest rate spread; and, second the quantity-based approach, where the 
dependent variable is the quantity or the growth rate of deposits. There are also a 
number of studies such as those by Park (1995) and Park and Peristiani (1998) that 
use a combined approach and examine market discipline by focusing on the 
relationships between pricing, as well as growth of deposits, and bank risk-taking. 
In the price-based approach, which is also called the yield-based approach, market 
discipline is tested by analysing whether depositors demand a higher interest rate 
from riskier banks, which indicates a positive relationship between the deposit 
13 As of year-end 2002, there were 54 banks operating in Turkey. 
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interest rate and the degree of bank risk-taking. Rather than just considering the 
nominal interest rate, the studies that have followed the price-based approach 
generally use yield spreads, which are calculated as the difference between the 
deposit interest rate and a risk free rate such as a government bill or bond yield. On 
the other hand, a number of studies use an interest rate spread, which is calculated as 
the deposit interest rate paid by banks less the median 14 deposit interest rate paid by 
banks (Jordan, 2000). The majority of the existing studies employed this approach to 
analyse depositor market discipline. 
On the other hand, in the quantity-based approach, market discipline is tested by 
analysing whether depositors effectively monitor the financial condition of their 
banks and withdraw their savings when their bank is involved in risky activities. This 
approach requires a negative relationship between the amount or growth rate of 
deposits and the degree of bank risk-taking. 
In this section, the first model expresses the growth rate of deposits and the second 
model expresses the interest rate spread as functions of the bank size and a set of 
publicly available measures of individual bank risk. These models are estimated by 
employing pooled least squares regressions. The price-based approach is limited to 
Turkish banks because of the lack of implicit and explicit interest rate data for the 
UKbanks. 
This section is divided into four sub-sections. The first sub-section presents the 
research hypotheses. The second sub-section discusses the research methodology. 
The models that are used to examine depositor market discipline in the UK and 
Turkey are presented in this sub-section. The dependent and independent variables 
are described in the third sub-section. Finally, the fourth sub-section explains the 
data that are used in the estimations. 
14 The median is the central item in a group of observations when they are displayed in either an 
ascending or a descending order. 
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6.3.1 Research Hypotheses 
There are two main hypotheses underlying this study. Firstly, I examined whether 
depositors exert market discipline by withdrawing their deposits when the 
fundamentals of their banks are no longer satisfactory. This was done by testing the 
statistical relationship between the percentage change in the customers' deposit level 
and measures of bank risk, as weH as some other bank characteristics and control 
variables. Control variables are included in the model as there might be some other 
factors in the economy that could affect deposit growth. Secondly, I examined 
whether depositors exert market discipline by requiring higher interest rates when 
their banks become riskier, by testing the statistical relationship between the interest 
rate spread and independent risk and bank specific variables. 
This leads to two hypotheses: 
(1) HI: There is a negative relationship between deposit growth and bank 
risk-taking, and 
(2) HI: There is a positive relationship between bank deposit interest rates 
and risk-taking. 
Besides these two mam hypotheses, in order to investigate depositor market 
discipline in the UK and Turkey in depth, the foHowing hypotheses'5 were also 
tested: 
(3) HI: Large banks enJoy the "too-big-to-fail" policy, as there is a 
relationship between size and deposit growth and deposit interest rates. 
(4) HI: The introduction of 100 percent deposit insurance in Turkey has an 
impact on banks' deposit levels and deposit interest rates. 
(5) HI: Depositors withdraw deposits and require higher interest rates from 
failing banks before they have been transferred to the SDIF in Turkey. 
15 While the second, fourth and fifth hypotheses were tested only for the Turkish banking sector, the 
first and third hypotheses (excluding deposit interest rates) were tested for both countries. 
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6.3.2 Research Methodology 
In this section, I present the empirical methodology used to test the existence of 
market discipline in the UK and Turkish banking sectors. Firstly, a single 
multivariate equation model is developed to analyse the relationship between the 
percentage growth of customer deposits and bank risk, as well as some bank specific 
variables. Secondly, another single multivariate equation model is developed to 
investigate the relationship between bank risk-taking and bank deposit interest rates. 
Both models are estimated by pooled least squares regression analysis. This analysis 
provides a rich environment for the development of estimations techniques and 
theoretical results that could not be studied in either cross-sectional or time series 
settings (Greene, 1997). 
In order to analyse the behaviour of depositors, I model the relationship between the 
percentage growth of customer deposits and bank risk as well as some bank specific 
variables as: 
(1) 
such that} = I, ... ,J and t = I, ... ,T. 
J is the number of banks and T is the number of observations. As the number of 
observations varies across time, the panel is unbalanced. GROWTH j " represents the 
percentage change ofthe bank j' s customer deposit level between time period t-1 and 
t, the vector RiSKj,'_1 contains risk variables derived from CAMEL16 ratings that 
measure the bank j's risk exposure in time period t-1, and the vector of BANKj " 
represents variables that are included in the model in order to control bank and time 
specific effects, The vector of BANKj " is common for time specific effects, i,e. do 
not change across banks, and the vector of RiSK j,t-! is included with a lag 
16 The acronym CAMEL comes from the first letter assigned for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings and Liquidity, 
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considering the fact that bank balance sheet and income statement information is 
available to the public with a certain delay. 
By testing the significance of a, in equation (I), the existence of market discipline is 
analysed through the quantity-based approach. If depositors withdraw deposits from 
riskier banks, a, should be negative and significant, which indicates the existence of 
depositor market discipline as depositors punish risky banks by withdrawing their 
deposits. 
However, besides the quantity-based approach, depositor market discipline can also 
be tested through the price-based approach, as shown in equation (2): 
(2) 
such that} = I, ... ,J and t = I, ... ,T. 
SPREADj " represents the spread between bankj's actual 3-month deposit interest 
rate in time period t and the weighted average of3-month deposit interest rates of the 
Turkish banks in time period t, In equation (2), if depositors demand higher interest 
rates from riskier banks, then y, should be positive and significant in order for it to 
be concluded that depositors exert market discipline by requiring higher interest 
rates. 
Both models are based on the assumption that depositors withdraw their funds and/or 
require higher deposit interest rates after bank risk-taking becomes apparent. By 
taking into account the above clarification, the single multivariate equations are 
structured below: 
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a) The single multivariate equation to be estimated for testing the British depositor 
behaviour is; 
GROWTHj,t = ao + a1SIZEj,t + a2CAPITALj,t-l + a,LOANj,t-l + a.PROVTAj,t_l 
+ asOPERj,t_l + a6ROEj,t-l + a7LIQDEPOj,t-l + agBANKj,t + Ej,t (3) 
b) The single multivariate equations to be estimated for testing the Turkish depositor 
behaviour is; 
GROWTHj,t =bo +b1SIZEj,t +b2CAPITALj,t-l +b,LOANj,t-l +b4PROVTAj,t-l 
+ bsOPERj,t-l + b6 ROEj,t-l + b7LIQDEPOj,t_l + bgFULLj,t 
+b,FAILj,t +bIOCRISISj,t + Ej,t 
and 
SPREADj,t = Co + c1SIZEj,t + c2CAPITALj,t_l + c,LOANj,t_l + c.PROVTAj,t_l 
+csOPERj,t_l +c6ROEj,t_l +c7LIQDEPOj,t_l +cgFULLj,t 
+c,FAILj,t +cIOCRISISj,t + Ej,t 
where; 
GROWTH: Percentage change in the level of customer deposits 
(4) 
(5) 
SPREAD: Spread between bank interest rate and weighted average of sector's 
interest rate 
SIZE: Logarithm of total assets 
CAPITAL: Ratio of equity to total assets 
LOAN: Ratio of total loans to total assets 
PROVTA: Ratio of provisions to total loans 
OPER: Ratio of operational cost to total assets 
LIQDEPO: Ratio ofliquid assets to customer deposits 
ROE: 
BANK: 
Return on equity (ratio of net income to equity) 
Dummy variable indicating whether an institution is a bank or building 
society (1 if the institution is a bank and 0 ifit is a building society) 
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FULL: 
FAIL: 
CRISIS: 
Dummy variable indicating whether there is partial or full deposit 
insurance coverage (l if there is full coverage and 0 if there is partial 
coverage) 
Dummy variable indicating whether a bank is transferred to SDIF or not 
(l if the bank is transferred to SDIF and 0 ifit is not) 
Dummy variable indicating whether there is a crisis or not (l ifthere is 
crisis and 0 ifthere is not) 
The variables are explained in the following sub-section. 
6.3.3 Specification of Variables 
This sub-section describes the dependent and independent variables that have been 
used in the models and explains the hypothesised signs of independent variables. 
6.3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
In equations (3) and (4), the dependent variable GROWTH represents the percentage 
change in the level of customer deposits during the period t-1 and t, for bank j. 
Customer deposits are defined as demand and other deposits, excluding deposits by 
banks. By examining the growth of deposits, I can observe whether depositors exert 
market discipline on banks by withdrawing their deposits from riskier banks. 
In equation (5), the dependent variable SPREAD represents the difference between 
banks' actual 3-month deposit interest rates and the weighted average of 3-month 
deposit interest rates of the Turkish banking sector. The maturity structure of the 
Turkish deposit market (Table 6.2) formed the basis for using the 3-month deposit 
interest rate in calculating the SPREAD. The main argument of the price-based 
approach is that differences in deposit interest rates across banks should reflect 
differences in bank-specific solvency risk if market discipline is effectively enforced. 
Therefore, by examining the deposit rates that banks pay, I can observe whether 
depositors exert market discipline on banks in the sense that riskier banks are forced 
to pay a risk premium to attract depositors. 
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6.3.3.2 Independent Variables 
The vector RISK j,H contains risk variables that measure the banks' risk exposure, 
While some studies employ a probability of default variable as a proxy for the bank-
risk-taking, in this study several risk variables are used to test the depositor market 
discipline, Park and Peristiani (1998) employ a probability of default variable and 
estimate this probability using a logit model17 as a function of bank performance 
fundamentals and using the estimated probability directly as an explanatory variable 
in the model. However, Barajas and Steiner (2000) argue that, it may not always be 
possible to estimate the probability of default, especially in a period when there are 
not many actual observations of bank failures, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) 
also point out that by including the probability of default directly, it is not possible to 
determine which of the bank indicators may be providing the strongest signals to 
depositors that banks are in fact taking on high risks. Therefore, following Barajas 
and Steiner (2000) and Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001), the bank fundamentals 
themselves are included as explanatory variables in the models to test market 
discipline, 
In the models, following Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001), Birchler & Maechler 
(2001) and Barajas and Steiner (2000), the vector RISKj,t_l is included with a lag to 
account for the fact that balance sheet and income statement information is available 
to the public only after a certain delay, Therefore, as depositors have access to year-
end financial statements of year t-1 in year t, explanatory variables are financial 
characteristics derived from year-end financial statements ofthe previous year. 
Following Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) and Birchler and Maechler (2001), 
the risk variables are derived from the CAMEL rating system of banks as CAMEL 
ratings are commonly viewed as summary measures of banks' overall financial 
condition, and all the categories are measured by some proxy ratios. 
17 The logit model is a dummy variable regression model, where the dependent variable is quantitative 
and taking a value of 1 or O. 
175 
The variables that are included in the models to measure bank risk are presented 
below (all the variables are ratios, in percent). 
Capital Adequacy: The ratio of equity to total assets (CAPITAL) is used as an 
indicator of capital adequacy. Equity includes shareholders funds (including 
preference share capital) and minority interests in subsidiaries. In the literature, 
capital ratios are often considered both as an index of bank risk-taking and as the 
most natural instrument for controlling bank risk exposures (Bruni & Paterno, 1995). 
As a sound capital base should strengthen depositors' confidence, I expect a positive 
relationship between the ratio of equity to total assets and the percentage change in 
the customer deposit level (GROWTH); and the interest rate spread (SPREAD) is 
expected to be inversely related to CAPITAL. 
Asset Quality: In order to measure the quality of assets and loans, two variables are 
included in the model: first, the ratio of total loans to total assets (LOAN); and 
second, the ratio of loan loss provisions 18 to total assets (PROVTA). Credit risk-
taking plays an important role in analysing the determinants of bank failure and bank 
loans are generally viewed as risky assets. A large share of loans to assets can be 
assumed to increase the credit risk of a bank; therefore, a positive relationship 
between SPREAD and LOAN and a negative relationship between GROWTH and 
LOAN are expected. On the other hand, provisions for loan losses indicate a measure 
of loan quality and rising provisions indicate weakening loan quality. Therefore, I 
expect a positive relationship between PROVTA and SPREAD and a negative 
relationship between PROVTA and GROWTH. 
Management: Although there is no objective basis that allows me to rate the 
management, I have included the ratio of operational cost to total assets (OPER) as a 
proxy for operational efficiency. However, there is not a specific expected sign for 
this variable (Demirgiiy-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). OPER would enter the 
regression, where dependent variable is GROWTH, negatively considering that a 
high ratio might represent an inefficient management. However, considering that 
1% Loan loss provisions are bad debt provisions charged to the profit and loss account. 
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banks with high operational costs offer high quality services, it could also be possible 
to see a positive relationship between OPER and GROWTH. On the other hand, if 
operational costs reflect bank inefficiency, I would expect to see a positive 
relationship between OPER and SPREAD and a negative relationship between these 
variables if increase in operational costs result in high quality of services and lower 
interest rates. 
Earnings: In order to account for a bank's earnings profile, return on equity (ROE), 
which is the ratio of net income to equity, is included in the models. Depositors are 
expected to react positively to increases in the return on equity, as a high profit rate 
should strengthen depositors' confidence. Park (1995) argues that a bank's earnings 
profile is important as current profitability may be a good indicator of a bank's future 
performance. Therefore, a positive relationship between ROE and GROWTH and a 
negative relationship between ROE and SPREAD are expected. 
Liquidity: Following most of the empirical literature, higher liquidity is considered 
as an indicator of Iow risk-taking. In order to account for the degree of liquidity, I 
include the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits (LIQDEPO). As a relatively 
liquid bank might be less vulnerable to a bank run and larger holdings of liquid assets 
may enable banks to manage financial problems more flexibly, a positive 
relationship between LIQDEPO and GROWTH, and a negative relationship between 
LIQDEPO and SPREAD are expected. 
The vector of BANK. t represents some variables that are included in the model in j. 
order to control for bank and time-specific effects. For the UK analysis, there are two 
variables that I include into the model for this purpose, namely SIZE and BANK. For 
the Turkish analysis, besides SIZE, three dummy variables are used, namely FAIL, 
FULL and CRISIS. 
SIZE is measured by the logarithm of total assets. This variable is included in the 
model to test the "too-big-to-fail" hypothesis. The literature has exhibited some 
evidence of a 'size effect': rates paid on the deposits of large banks have often been 
lower than for smaller banks of the same riskiness; and large banks attract more 
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deposits, for a given deposit rate, as depositors respond to a "too-big-to-fail" effect. 
The "too-big-to-fail" doctrine indicates that the public perceives that the banking 
authorities might bailout the large banks in financial difficulties as liquidation of the 
large banks might adversely affect the financial system as a whole and cause deposit 
runs in other banks 19. Besides, larger banks might be distinguished from smaller 
banks as they might diversify their asset portfolio better, leading to lower risk, and 
they might also have a better reputation making it relatively effortless to attract new 
funds. Therefore, as depositors' belief in the "too-big-to-fail" doctrine would exempt 
large banks from market discipline and result in an implicit insurance subsidy (Park 
1995), it is crucial to understand the behaviour of depositors concerning this issue. If 
depositors have some degree of certainty of a bailout by the government when large 
banks become insolvent, they will not consider themselves at risk and therefore will 
not monitor large banks. As a result, by including the variable SIZE, the effect of the 
asset size of banks on deposit growth and interest rates are controlled for and it is 
examined whether large banks benefit from the "too-big-to-fail" policy. 
The dummy variable BANK takes the value of 1 if an institution in the UK sample is 
a bank, 0 otherwise. In the UK sample, I included data for the building societies that 
were converted into banks during 1997. Therefore, for the years between 1989 to 
1996, the UK sample is a combination of banks and building societies. However, in 
order to separate them, a dummy variable is included into the model. 
In order to differentiate the banks that have been transferred to the SDIF in Turkey, a 
dummy variable, FAIL, is introduced to capture risk and other factors that may have 
been particular to the institutions that failed. It is expected that depositors require 
higher interest rates or withdraw their deposits if they realise that these banks are 
riskier. Following Jordan (2000), FAIL takes the value of 1 for the banks transferred 
to the SD IF in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
For the analysis of the Turkish banking sector, two other dummy variables are 
included in the model, namely FULL and CRISIS, to control for time specific events. 
19 The large banks are very likely to hold large amounts of deposits and this might also make it 
difficult to liquidate large banks as, in such a case, the loss of the insurance fund will be larger. 
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As explained earlier in this study, prior to 1994 there was only partial deposit 
insurance coverage available to Turkish depositors and because of the 1994 financial 
crisis, a new decree came into effect and the insurance limit was extended to cover 
the whole amount of customers' savings accounts. However, as this full coverage 
could increase the potential for moral hazard, in order to control for this effect, a 
dummy variable, FULL, is included in the model to flag the change in the insurance 
coverage. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 for observations with 100 
percent deposit insurance protection and 0 for observations with partial coverage. 
In order to control for time-specific events, the variable CRISIS is also included. 
During the 1990s, Turkey experienced financial crisis in the years 1994, 2000 and 
2001. Therefore, in order to control for the impact of these crises, a CRISIS dummy 
variable included in the model, taking the value of 1 for the years that Turkey 
experienced a financial crisis and 0 otherwise. 
6.3.4 Data 
The statistical relationships between the percentage change in the customer deposit 
level and the measures of bank risk, as well as some bank specific variables, were 
tested by using pooled cross-sectional data20 for the UK and Turkish banks. 
Because of data limitations, the UK sample has been kept relatively small. The UK 
sample comprises the Major British Banking Groups (MBBG), as defined by the 
British Bankers' Association (BBA). There are 11 banking groups that are 
categorised as MBBG and they account for around 75 percent of deposits held at UK 
banks (BBA, 2000). The UK sample includes year-end data for 12 years from 198921 
to 2000, with the exception of Lloyds TSB, for which there are only six years data. 
The banks that constitute the UK sample and data period for each bank are shown in 
Appendix 5. 
20 Pooled cross-sectional data is based on observations taken on entities each observed at several 
faints in time. This data combine time series and cross sections. 
I The starting years 1989 for the UK and 1988 for Turkey are chosen due to the unavailability of data 
in earlier years. 
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Data for the UK banks was obtained from two sources, namely the Annual Abstract 
of Banking Statistics, which is published by the British Bankers Association (BBA) 
and the BankStat database. As a third source, bank annual reports for the year-end 
1999 and 2000 were also used for a number of banks in order to check the accuracy 
of the other sources. All of the data sources that I used obtained their data from bank 
annual reports, which are formed from consolidated accounts and therefore include 
subsidiary companies. However, this is not seen as an obstacle as the objective of the 
study is to investigate the behaviour of depositors, who are also expected to use the 
annual reports to evaluate a bank's financial condition. On the other hand, using 
annual reports has one particular disadvantage, as not all the year ends in the sample 
are the same. While the majority of the banks' financial years end on the 31 st of 
December, there are some exceptions, such as: 
The financial year-end for the Bank of Scotland is 28 th129th of February, 
The financial year-end for the Royal Bank of Scotland is 30th of September prior 
to 2000 and 31 SI of December in 2000, and 
Prior to 1996, the financial year-end for Halifax was 31 st ofJanuary. 
The UK data comes from the year-end accounts, irrespective of the year-end date. 
For example, for 2000 year-end data, I used the data of 30 September 2000 for Royal 
Bank of Scotland, 28 February 2001 for Bank of Scotland and 31 December 2000 for 
the other banks. The Royal Bank of Scotland and National Westminster's 2000 
figures exclude the results of the acquisition of the latter by the former on 6th of 
March 2000. 
The BBA presents two figures for total assets starting from 1992. Following the 
introduction of Financial Reporting Standard 2 (FRS2) in December 1992, banks are 
required to show the liabilities/assets of their long-term assurance funds in their 
accounts. In this study, total asset figures excluding long-term assurance funds are 
used in order to be consistent with 1989-91 data. In 2000, FRSI5 and FRSI6 were 
adopted. FRS 15 has changed the method of valuation and depreciation of freehold 
and long leasehold properties. FRS 16 has changed the reporting of taxes not payable 
completely by the banking groups (BBA, 2001). Because of these changes, earlier 
years' data have been restated by the BBA and, in this study, the restated data have 
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been used. However, it should also be noted that the impact of these changes on the 
figures was only minor. 
The data set for Turkey represents a carefully constructed information base of a wide 
range of banks during a period of significant uncertainty in financial markets. The 
Turkish sample consists of 45 banks22, representing almost 90 percent of total assets 
and 96 percent of total deposits in the Turkish banking sector as of year-end 2001. 
While the sample includes state-owned and privately-owned banks, foreign banks are 
excluded from the sample, as their share in total deposits is insignificant. Investment 
banks are also excluded from the sample, as they are not allowed to collect deposits 
from the public. The share of customer deposits of state, private, SDIF and foreign 
banks in total customer deposits are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Share in Deposits (%) 
Year State Private SDIF Foreign 
Banks Banks Banks Banks 
1988 42,4 53,8 
-
3,8 
1989 46,1 51,0 - 3,0 
1990 47,4 50,2 
-
2,4 
1991 44,0 54,0 
-
2,0 
1992 47,4 50,9 
-
1,7 
1993 43,5 54,9 - 1,6 
1994 43,8 54,3 
-
1,9 
1995 43,3 54,0 
-
2,7 
1996 44,1 53,4 
-
2,5 
1997 39,9 54,2 2,5 3,4 
1998 40,7 52,4 4,3 2,7 
1999 39,8 46,4 11,1 2,7 
2000 40,3 43,5 12,9 3,2 
2001 29,6 53,8 12,5 4,1 
Source: Banks AssocIatIOn of Turkey, (1989-2002). 
The banks that were transferred to the SDIF in year t are considered as failed banks 
and excluded from the sample. After these eliminations, the Turkish banks' sample is 
comprised of 45 banks, of which 4 are state-owned, 21 are privately-owned and 20 
are failed banks. The banks that constitute the Turkish sample and the data period for 
each bank are shown in Appendix 6. 
22 The number of banks in the sample changes due to bank entry and exit. 
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The data for the Turkish banks was obtained mainly from the publication entitled 
"Banks in Turkey", which is an annual financial data report published by the Banks 
Association of Turkey. All data sets for the Turkish banks include end-December 
balance sheet and income statement data, and in the calculation of the log of total 
assets of Turkish banks (SIZE variable), Turkish lira was converted to USD by using 
the year-end exchange rates. 
As mentioned in Section 6.3.2, the study for the Turkish banking sector and market 
discipline is also examined by focusing on the relationship between pricing and bank 
risk-taking, from 1992 through to 2001 23• In order to measure the pricing of deposits, 
the spread between actual deposit rates of individual banks' 3-month deposit interest 
rates and the weighted average of the banking system's 3-month interest rates is 
calculated. 3-month deposit interest rates are chosen as in 12 years out of 14, 3-
month deposits appear to have the highest percentage share in total deposits. The 
maturity structure of deposits in Turkey is presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Maturity Structure of Deposits in Turkey (%) 
Year Demand Total Time TimeD. TimeD. TimeD. TimeD. 
Deposit Deposit IMonth 3Month 6Month 1 Year+ 
1988 37,9 62,1 7,5 14,4 10,8 29,5 
1989 34,9 65,1 10,3 19,6 12,7 22,5 
1990 35,4 64,6 10,2 20,0 14,0 20,5 
1991 29,4 70,6 10,0 31,9 11,3 17,5 
1992 29,8 70,2 10,5 33,4 10,9 15,4 
1993 29,5 70,5 18,0 28,2 11,4 12,8 
1994 27,0 73,0 12,0 35,8 12,4 12,8 
1995 25,2 74,8 17,2 31,5 14,9 11,2 
1996 26,3 73,7 16,9 30,2 15,7 10,9 
1997 21,3 78,7 21,2 32,8 15,5 9,2 
1998 18,8 81,2 24,1 34,2 14,3 8,6 
1999 16,9 83,1 22,3 32,6 17,0 11,3 
2000 18,5 81,5 33,6 32,8 9,3 5,8 
2001 15,3 84,7 39,4 33,7 5,4 6,2 
Source: Banks Assoclalton of Turkey, (1989-2002). 
23 The starting year 1992 is chosen due to the unavailability of interest rate data in earlier years. 
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The data for the actual 3-month deposit interest rates of individual banks and the 
weighted average interest rate of 3-month deposits represents year-end interest rates 
and were obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey. The UK banks' interest rate 
data cannot be found in publicly available sources and is therefore unobservable. As 
a matter of fact, many studies on depositor market discipline do not use actual 
interest rates but calculate the interest rate on deposits as the total interest expense of 
deposits in a period divided by the average outstanding value of deposits during the 
period (some examples of these studies are: Baer and Brewer, 1986; James, 1987; 
CargilI, 1989; Park, 1995). However, for the UK banks the implicit interest rate 
cannot be calculated because of the lack of data on the interest expense of deposits. 
6.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, the empirical findings of the econometric analysis are presented. 
Based on the analytical framework discussed in Section 6.2, whether depositors react 
to changes in bank fundamentals is tested by running regressions using year-end data 
for the UK and Turkish banking systems based on individual bank balance sheet and 
income statements. The models presented in equations (3), (4) and (5) are estimated 
by pooled least squares regressions. Empirical results are reported in Tables 6.3, 6.4 
and 6.5. For the evaluation of statistical significance, the level of significance for 
each coefficient is reported in the tables. In order to assess the adequacy of the 
specification of the models, F tests were performed and reported at the bottom of the 
tables. Adjusted R2 are also reported at the bottom of the tables24• 
The following sub-sections present the findings from the estimation of the models 
that test for the existence of market discipline in the UK and Turkish banking sectors. 
24 The multiple coefficient of determination, which is denoted by R', denotes how well the model fits 
the population. The adjusted R' attempts to correct R' to more closely reflect the goodness of fit of the 
model in the population as the model usually does not fit the population as well as it fits the sample 
from which it is derived. 
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6.4.1 Depositor Market Discipline in the UK 
The pooled least squares estimates ofthe equation (3) are shown in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Pooled Least Sqnares Estimates of 
Depositor Market Discipline in the UK 
(Dependent Variable: GROWTH: percentage change of cnstomer deposits) 
Equation (3) 
Regressor Coefficient I-statistic 
SIZE (log of total assets) 7.491 0.596 
CAPITAL (~uity / total assets) 1.635 0.790 
LOAN (total loans / total assets) 1.118 2.683*** 
PROVTA (provisions / total assets) -5.547 -0.730 
OPER (operational cost / total assets) -0.979 -0.208 
ROE (net income / equity) 0.393 1.163 
LlQDEPO (liquid assets / customer deposits) 1.315 2.759*** 
BANK (bank dummy) -12.761 -2.479** 
F statistic 12.634*** 
AdjustedR' 0.380 
Number of observations 116 
Observation Period 1990-2000 
Number of banks 11 
Note: The I-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefticients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% (*), 5% (*') and 1 % e*') levels. 
The F statistic indicates that the hypothesis that the coefficients on the independent 
variables are not jointly significantly different from zero is rejected at the I percent 
significance leveL 
The empirical analysis could not provide strong support for the first hypothesis, that 
deposit growth is related to bank performance fundamentals in the UK.. Although the 
coefficients on the ratio of equity to total assets (CAPITAL) and the net income to 
equity (ROE) have the expected positive and the ratio of provisions to total assets 
(PROVTA) have the expected negative signs, they are not significant. Regarding 
management, the ratio of operational costs to total assets (OPER) has also an 
insignificant coefficient, which is negative. The coefficient on the ratio of total loans 
to total assets (LOAN) is statistically significant but does not have the expected sign, 
which is inconsistent with the analysis. A possible explanation for this result might 
be the perception of depositors that banks increase their profit by increasing their 
loan portfolio. 
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The only evidence of depositor market discipline in the UK comes from the ratio of 
liquid assets to customer deposits (LIQDEPO), which is found to be positive and to 
have a highly significant impact on deposit growth. A higher level of liquidity that is 
associated in a statistically significant manner with an increase in the customer 
deposit level indicates the positive effect arising from a better ability to survive from 
unpredicted deposit withdrawal. 
Regarding the "too-big-to-fail" hypothesis, the empirical analysis shows a positive 
coefficient, which is not statistically significant for the UK banks. On the other hand, 
the coefficient on the BANK variable is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that conversion from a building society to a bank appears to affect the 
decision of depositors. 
As a result, the findings do not strongly support the presence of depositor market 
discipline in the UK, as the majority of bank specific fundamentals do not 
demonstrate significant relationships with the dependent variable. The only variable 
that has statistically significant relationship with the growth rate of deposits was 
found to be the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits. 
The absence of depositor market discipline in the UK may be the result of effective 
regulatory oversight as regulators take necessary measures before the reaction of 
market forces and banks adjust their fundamentals in order to comply with the 
regulators. On the other hand, depositors' lack of sufficient knowledge and 
information to judge their banks' risk-taking behaviour might also had an impact on 
the results. 
6.4.2 Depositor Market Discipline in Turkey 
The results of the deposit growth equation (equation 4) for Turkish banks are shown 
in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Depositor Market Discipline in Turkey 
(Dependent Variable: GROWTH: percentage change of customer deposits) 
Equation (4) 
Re2ressor Coefficient t-statistic 
SIZE (la.! of total assets) 115.641 3.972*'* 
CAPITAL (equitY; total assetS) 0.995 0.879 
LOAN (total loans; total assets) 0.701 0.805 
PROVT A !nrovisions ; total assets) 10.182 3.493*** 
OPER(operational cost; total assets) 53.928 11.879*** 
ROE (net income; equity) 
-0.037 -0.479 
LIQDEPO (UaUid assets; customer deposits)· 0.675 1.558 
FULL(IOO% deposit insurance dummy) 45.901 2.357*' 
FAIL (SDIF bank dummy) -92.624 -2.385** 
CRISIS (crisis dummY) -53.324 -2.727** 
F statistic 3 I. 720 
AdiustedR- 0.344 
Number of observations 442 
Observation Period 1990-2001 
Number of banks 45 
Note: The I-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% (*), 5% (*» and 1 % (**.) levels. 
The F statistic indicates that the hypothesis that the coefficients on the independent 
variables are not jointly significantly different from zero is rejected at the I percent 
significance level. 
Regarding bank performance fundamentals, the variables PROVTA and OPER are 
found to be significant. However, the variable PROVTA has an unexpected sign, as 
an increase in the ratio of provisions to total assets has a significant positive impact 
on the growth rate of customer deposits. The positive and significant coefficient (at 
the 10 percent significance level) on the variable PROVTA might indicate that 
Turkish depositors reward those banks deemed to be trying to resolve bad debts by 
increasing provisions. 
Although the coefficients on CAPITAL and LIQDEPO have expected positive signs, 
these variables are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient on 
LOAN has an unexpected positive sign and the coefficient on ROE an unexpected 
negative sign but these variables are statistically insignificant. 
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Concerning the impact of the ratio of operational costs to total assets on deposit 
growth, the coefficient on OPER is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent significance level, which might be caused by Turkish banks increasing their 
operational costs in order to offer high quality services and attract more deposits. 
The coefficient on SIZE is found to have a statistically significant impact on the 
growth rate of deposits at the 1 percent significance level, which indicates that 
Turkish depositors view larger banks as being safer and believe that the government 
would not allow larger banks to fail, as a result of the "too-big-to-fail" policy. 
With respect to bank and time specific events, the results indicate that the 
introduction of the 1 00 percent deposit protection scheme affected deposit growth 
positively and significantly, while the growth rate of deposits decreased significantly 
during the years of financial turmoil. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the dummy variable FAIL appears with a 
negative coefficient, in line with the existence of the market discipline hypothesis, 
which indicates that depositors withdraw their deposits from banks that are going to 
fail. Therefore, the findings of equation (4) provide strong evidence of depositor 
market discipline. 
The findings for equation (5) also support the existence of depositor market 
discipline in the Turkish banking sector as failing banks offer higher interest rates on 
deposits prior to their failure (Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5: Pooled Least Squares Estimates of 
Depositor Market Discipline in Turkey 
(Dependent Variable: SPREAD: interest rate spread) 
Equation (5) 
Re!!ressor Coefficient t-statistic 
SIZE (jOg of total assetS) 1.661 0.535 
CAPITAL (equity / total assets) 0.052 0.421 
LOAN (total loans / total assets) -0.118 -1.219 
PROVTA (nfovisions / total assetS) 0.316 1.056 
OPER (ooerational cost I total assets) 0.312 0.660 
ROE (net income / equity) 0.013 1.649 
LIQDEPolliOuid assets / customer deoositSl -0.011 -0.237 
FULL (100% deposit insurance dummy) 4.322 1.906* 
FAILISDIF bank dummy) 9.495 2.403** 
CRISIS (crisis dumm-;;l 
-3.679 -1.865* 
F statistic 10.450'** 
Adiusted R- 0.096 
Number of observations 380 
Observation Period 1992-2001 
Number of banks 45 
Note: The t-statistics that are starred emphasise that the coefficients are significantly 
different from 0 at the 10% (*1, 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
The F statistic indicates that the hypothesis that the coefficients on the independent 
variables are not jointly significantly different from zero is rejected at the 1 percent 
significance level. 
The findings that are presented in Table 6.5 show that SIZE has a positive impact on 
the deposit interest rate spread; however, the coefficient on this variable is not 
statistically significant. 
While deposit interest rate spreads are not found to respond significantly to changes 
in bank specific risk variables and bank size, the banks that failed and were 
transferred to SDIF are found (at the 5 percent significance level) to have paid higher 
interest rates. As banks that failed are found to have paid a premium over other 
banks, this evidence indicates the existence of depositor market discipline in Turkey. 
On the other hand, concerning the bank specific risk variables, the findings do not 
appear to provide statistically significant results. Besides, the coefficients on 
CAPITAL, LOAN and ROE have unexpected signs. The coefficient on OPER is 
positive but statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the variable PROVTA has 
expected positive sign but statistically insignificant as well. Although the coefficient 
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on the variable LIQDEPO has the expected negative sign, indicating that depositors 
require lower interest rates from more liquid banks, it is also not statistically 
significant. 
With respect to time-specific events, the results indicate that the deposit interest rate 
spread increases significantly with the introduction of the blanket coverage, while the 
spread decreases significantly during financial turmoil years. The finding concerning 
the increase in the spreads after 1994 when the coverage increased to 100 percent is 
interesting and creates a conflict with the moral hazard argument. This finding might 
be caused by the collapse of three Turkish banks25 during 1994 that resulted in huge 
losses on depositors and therefore changed the behaviour of depositors with respect 
to market discipline. The finding concerning the decrease in the spread during 
financial crisis years is also interesting and might be caused by the increase in 
interest rates (which resulted in tightened deposit interest rate spreads) and decrease 
of all banks in order to survive the impact of the crisis. 
The findings that are presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 are interesting in several 
respects. First, depositors are found to be significantly affected by the "too-big-to-
fail" doctrine, as large banks attract more deposits. Second the only bank specific 
risk variables that have significant impact on deposit growth are found to be the ratio 
of provisions to total assets and the ratio of operational costs to total assets. Third, 
while banks increase their deposits by increasing their operational costs, an increase 
in operational costs does not have a significant impact on deposit interest rate 
spreads. Lastly, and more importantly, the estimation results provide support for the 
presence of market discipline by Turkish depositors, as riskier banks, i.e. failed 
banks, in the Turkish banking system are found to have experienced slower growth 
in deposits and to paid higher interest rates. 
As a result, Turkish depositors are found to exert some market discipline, as they 
require higher interest rates from failing banks as well as withdrawing their deposits 
from those banks prior to their failure. On the other hand, the majority of bank 
25 During 1994, three Turkish banks, namely TYT Bank, IMPEX Bank and Mannar. Bank were 
collapsed. 
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specific fundamentals do not demonstrate significant relationships with the 
dependent variables. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In the literature, depositor market discipline has been general1y investigated to assess 
its impact either on the deposit interest rate or on the quantity of deposits. In this 
chapter, in order to apply these two approaches to examine depositor market 
discipline, panel data models that investigate the relationship between depositor 
behaviour and bank specific risk variables derived from balance sheets and income 
statements were employed. 
The principal findings of the empirical analysis that were presented in this chapter 
are especial1y interesting from two points of view. First, the empirical results do not 
suggest that depositors are very sensitive to bank specific risk variables. Among bank 
specific risk variables, liquidity seems to be an issue that depositors take into 
consideration in the UK. 
Second, depositors in the Turkish banking system were found to be exerting market 
discipline. By examining the deposit growth of Turkish banks and deposit interest 
rates that Turkish banks pay, it was observed that Turkish depositors exert market 
discipline on banks in the sense that depositors withdrew their funds from failing 
banks (that were eventual1y transferred to the SDIF) and these banks were forced to 
pay a risk premium for funds. 
As a conclusion, the empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that depositors in the 
Turkish banking system exert market discipline while depositors in the UK banking 
system do not, suggesting that depositors in a more fragile system are more risk-
sensitive. The results also create a conflict with the argument that a ful1 deposit 
guarantee promotes moral hazard behaviour as the existence of depositor market 
discipline in Turkey suggests that, despite enjoying ful1 protection under an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme, insured depositors in Turkey still fear the liquidity costs 
that bank failures can impose. 
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7.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS 
OF THE RESEARCH 
Although banks are among the most heavily regulated industries, several developed 
and developing countries have experienced banking crises. In line with the increase 
in the number of banking crises, the importance that is attached to market discipline 
has accelerated. The apparent need for more effective market discipline on banks has 
continued to receive attention, especially after the publication of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision's consultative paper on capital adequacy in 
1999, which specifies market discipline as one of the three pillars, along with 
improved capital standards and risk-based supervision, of bank capital regulation. It 
is stressed that markets contain disciplinary mechanisms that reinforce regulatory 
efforts by rewarding those banks which manage risk effectively and penalising those 
whose risk management is insufficient. 
The literature review of market discipline illustrates that there are three possible 
sources of market discipline, which are depositors, debt holders and equity holders. 
Depositors are an obvious example of the existence of market discipline in a banking 
sector where they penalise riskier banks by requiring higher deposit interest rates or 
by withdrawing their deposits. 
In this research, the question of whether depositors can be an effective source of 
market discipline was examined for the banking sectors of the UK and Turkey, 
where the design characteristics of deposit insurance schemes are different. Although 
both countries have an explicit deposit insurance scheme, the main differences are 
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that the UK scheme is less generous and adopts a co-insurance policy where the 
depositor bears some losses if institutions fail. On the other hand, Turkey has 
adopted blanket coverage. 
This subject is worth studying as policy-makers have started to encourage more 
market discipline to fill the gap in bank regulation. Regulators in the UK and Turkey 
have emphasised the importance of depositor market discipline for their countries. 
However, for policy purposes, before relying on depositor market discipline to 
complement bank regulation and supervision, the extent of market discipline has to 
be ascertained. Therefore, it is very important to investigate the actual presence of 
depositor discipline in these countries. Furthermore, although market discipline has 
been investigated in the literature extensively for the US, the empirical results are 
mixed and there is no evidence of depositor market discipline for the UK and 
Turkey. This research also contributes to the literature as it combines two approaches 
to investigate depositor market discipline; as well as the econometric analysis, a 
survey instrument was applied to find out depositors' ability to exert market 
discipline. 
The objective of this final chapter is to explain the strategic conclusions of the 
research. The second section highlights the key findings of the research. The policy 
implications of the research are presented in the third section. The last section 
provides directions for further research. 
7.2 Key Findings of the Research 
In this research, a multi-dimensional approach was adopted to examine the existence 
of market discipline in the UK and Turkey. Regulatory views that were obtained 
from British and Turkish policy-makers indicate that market discipline is considered 
crucial and depositors are seen as a source of market discipline in these countries. 
There are a number of conditions that must be fulfilled by depositors to effectively 
discipline banks. The main conditions that must be fulfilled by depositors are: risk 
should be a primary concern for depositors: they should have sufficient information 
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and ability to process that infonnation; and finally, depositors should not expect to be 
bailed out. 
The survey analysis that was undertaken aims to examine the ability of depositors to 
be a source of market discipline in the UK and Turkey. Therefore, in the light of the 
theoretical discussions that highlight the necessary conditions for depositors to be 
able to discipline banks, the survey instrument was designed and applied. The main 
conclusion of the survey analysis for the UK and Turkey is that, while Turkish 
depositors are likely to exert market discipline, despite the existence of full coverage, 
British depositors' ability to exert market discipline is found to be very limited. The 
following conclusions were also reached as a result of the descriptive analysis and 
hypotheses-testing. 
a) The evaluation of preconditions necessary for being a source of market 
discipline: 
It is stated that depositors have to feel themselves at risk in order to feel the necessity 
to pay attention to where they entrust their funds. Accordingly, I evaluate depositors' 
risk perceptions from different dimensions. The findings show that risk is not a major 
concern for UK depositors. It was found that the priority is given to convenience 
while opening accounts, and the majority of UK depositors did not feel obliged to 
check any infonnation regarding where they entrust their funds. Lending their 
savings to well-known names and being an existing customer comes up as the major 
reasons for not checking any infonnation before investing. Although there were 
infrequent bank failures and a stable financial system in the UK, surprisingly not 
many depositors expressed their faith in UK banking regulation, which may suggest 
their lack of awareness concerning the framework of regulation applied in the 
country. Besides, it was found that although it is advised by regulators to check for 
the authorisation of the banks and building societies before investing, which is 
essential for being under the umbrella of deposit insurance in the case of any failure, 
very few depositors took that advice. 
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Another important condition for an effective system of depositor-imposed market 
discipline is the availability of relevant information to depositors on a timely basis. 
There are two kinds of information essential for depositors. Firstly, information to 
estimate the probability of a depository's insolvency and secondly, information 
necessary to estimate the losses to themselves in case of an insolvency. The 
availability of both types of information and its timeliness has great significance, 
along with the depositors having the necessary sophistication to use that information. 
The hypothesis-testing regarding the information aspect of depositor discipline leads 
to the result that British depositors did not able to obtain and evaluate information 
and did not monitor their banks' financial condition. 
On the other hand, Turkish depositors are found to be risk averse. It was found that, 
besides convenience and variability of other services, financial strength is an 
important factor for Turkish depositors when choosing a depository. Besides, a 
substantial portion of depositors check on banks before investing and use the 
financial press for this purpose. Existing bank-customer relationships were found to 
be the major reason for attracting funds from depositors who do not feel obliged to 
check information before investing. As expected, there were not many depositors that 
expressed their faith in Turkish banking regulation. In addition to that, the capacity 
and willingness of Turkish depositors to evaluate available information on individual 
bank performance was found to be quite substantial. 
To conclude, the assessment of the preconditions of market discipline demonstrates 
that British depositors' ability to exert market discipline is very limited. On the other 
hand, Turkish depositors fulfil more conditions to be a source of market discipline. 
b) The effect of knowledge of compensation schemes: 
Depositor awareness and understanding concerning the compensation arrangements 
was also investigated in the survey analysis. According to the results, 81.0 percent of 
the UK respondents did not know about compensation arrangements. On the other 
hand, that only 14.6 percent of Turkish respondents did not know about 
compensation arrangements might be due to the frequent banking crises that have led 
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to a number of bank collapses in Turkey. The importance attached to the financial 
strength of the bank when opening an account among the depositors who have 
knowledge about compensation schemes and who have not was investigated, and it 
was found that, in the UK, depositors who have knowledge about compensation 
alTangements attach less importance to the financial condition of the banks. On the 
other hand, I could not detect a statistically significant difference among Turkish 
depositors on this subject; regardless of the knowledge of compensation 
alTangements Turkish depositors pay attention to the financial strength of their 
institution. It was also found that both British and Turkish depositors who know 
about deposit insurance have a greater tendency to diversify their savings among 
banks. 
c) The effect of knowledge of bank failures: 
Knowledge of bank failures in their countries was found to be hold be 64.5 percent 
and 97.S percent of British and Turkish depositors respectively, which resulted in a 
statistically significant difference between the two nations' knowledge about bank 
failures. The UK regulators put emphasis on the co-insurance principal stating that 
co-insurance encourages depositors to pay attention where to place their money, 
since the publicity sUlTounding a default makes depositors aware of the fact that 
some people have to bear losses. According to the results of the hypotheses-testing, I 
could not detect any difference in the tendency to monitor the financial condition of 
their bank among depositors who have knowledge about bank failures and those who 
have not in both countries. However, the study shows that, in Turkey, depositors who 
have knowledge about bank failures had a greater propensity to run in the case of 
disturbances in the financial markets. I could not find a statistically significant 
finding for the UK. 
d) Attitudes towards being bailed out: 
It was found that the majority of depositors in both countries expect to be bailed out, 
either partially or fully. Depositors who expect to be bailed out did not feel it 
necessary to pay attention to the financial condition of the institution that they entrust 
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their money to, and this expectation is an obstacle towards achieving the aims of 
market discipline. 
In addition, it is investigated whether there is a "too-big-to-fail" doctrine in place in 
these countries. For the UK, results of the hypotheses testing indicate that the 
depositors of Major British Banking Group banks expect to be bailed out most. On 
the other hand, the depositors of the state-owned banks in Turkey have a greater 
expectation of being bailed out, suggesting that the existence of state banks is an 
obstacle towards achieving the aim of market discipline in Turkey. 
The existence of depositor market discipline in the banking sectors of the UK and 
Turkey has also been examined through econometric analysis and the findings 
confirm the main conclusions of the survey analysis. 
The existence of depositor market discipline was first tested for both countries by 
employing a quantity-based approach, which examines whether depositors punish 
risky banks by withdrawing their funds. In this approach, the relationship between 
the growth rate of banks' deposits and bank-specific variables is modelled. In 
addition to the quantity-based approach, the price-based approach was also applied 
(only for Turkish banks). The price-based approach investigates whether depositors 
ask for higher deposit interest rates from riskier banks. Both approaches were 
modelled and estimated by employing pooled least squares regressions. 
The findings of this econometric analysis do not support the presence of market 
discipline in the UK. The majority of bank specific variables, which are derived from 
the CAMEL rating system, did not demonstrate significant relationships with the 
dependent variable, which is growth of deposits. As the only variable that is 
significant is the ratio of liquid assets to customer deposits, depositor market 
discipline in the UK banking system is very doubtful. 
On the other hand, I found support for the notion that deposit growth falls for failing 
banks in Turkey, and Turkish depositors require higher interest rates from those 
banks prior to their failure. The size of Turkish banks' assets was also found to have 
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a statistically significant impact on the growth rate of deposits, which is important to 
demonstrate depositors' preference towards big banks, in anticipation of being bailed 
out in a crisis. 
The evidence of market discipline that was found in Turkey, despite its explicit 
deposit insurance arrangements which protect all savings deposits, can be explained 
by a perceived weakness in the credibility of the guarantees, and by delays and other 
costs entailed in recovering funds from the guarantor. The finding that even fully 
insured depositors discipline banks in Turkey might be due to a number reasons. 
Depositors could be unsure about how well funded the scheme is, especially in the 
case of Turkey where the scheme has to be activated frequently due to repeated bank 
failures, and face with huge costs. It is also possible that, even if the insurance is 
credible, depositors may want to avoid any costs they might face. Repayments 
through the insurance fund usually take a long time, imposing liquidity costs on 
depositors, coupled with the embarrassment of being stuck at a failed bank. 
7.3 Policy Implications 
The findings of this research contain interesting implications. I was not able to find 
any support for the existence of market discipline in the UK despite of careful design 
of compensation arrangements. The results of the UK survey show that UK 
depositors do not feel confident about obtaining and assessing information about 
their banks. This finding reveals the importance of two points; first, improving the 
disclosure of necessary information that depositors need to assess the safety and 
soundness of a bank, and second, enhancing financial literacy among depositors. 
High quality and timely public disclosure would improve the depositors' risk 
assessment of a bank before opening an account for their savings. Also, information 
must be made available continuously to depositors to make them aware of the change 
in a bank's condition, enabling them to effectively monitor their institution and act 
accordingly. The results of the survey also demonstrate that depositors do not feel 
able to assess the available information. To do effective monitoring, depositors must 
analyse the information being disclosed, understand its nature and correctly assess its 
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consequences. Therefore, improving financial literacy among depositors is seen as an 
important step to establishing effective depositor market discipline in the VK. 
The regulators in the UK mainly stress the fact that, by the incentive effect of the 
"co-insurance" element of the compensation scheme, they expect depositors to pay 
attention to the safety and soundness of their banks. However, the results of the 
survey analysis indicate that depositor awareness and understanding of the 
compensation arrangements is very low and many depositors are not aware of the 
loss they are exposed to in case of a bank failure. Therefore, the features of the 
available compensation scheme, mainly the amount or percentage of a depositor's 
money that is not protected in the case of a bank defaulting, must be clearly stated 
when depositors open a deposit account; and policy-makers should improve the level 
of awareness and understanding of compensation arrangements. 
The empirical findings of this research are also very important for Turkey as they 
indicate that 100 percent deposit insurance does not eliminate the incentive for 
depositors to monitor bank activities, which could be explained by a perceived 
weakness in the credibility ofthe guarantees and by delays and other costs entailed in 
recovering funds from the guarantor. The existence of market discipline observed in 
the Turkish market is not a result of the design features of compensation 
arrangements but purely due to the high number of bank failures in recent years and 
depositors' awareness concerning the costs entailed in recovering funds from the 
guarantor. 
The results concerning the failing banks demonstrate that indiscriminately issuing 
government guarantees and other fDlms of bailout support rewards bad bankers and 
penalises good ones. Because such a policy reduces market discipline and distorts 
risk-taking incentives and imposes unbooked obligations on the national treasury, it 
promises new and deeper crises in years to come. Therefore, taken into consideration 
the frequent bank failures in recent years and the high cost of restructuring those 
banks that were transferred to the SDIF, policy-makers should consider major 
changes in the compensation arrangements and the way they supervise and regulate 
banks in Turkey and start by scaling back insurance coverage. 
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Deposit insurance is enacted in Turkey mainly for avoiding panic withdrawals in 
case of financial instability. However, the findings show that depositors are prone to 
run regardless of the blanket coverage; therefore, policy-makers have to be aware of 
the fact that they cannot secure priority aim and have to be content with the 
secondary aim of implementing deposit insurance, which is protecting small 
depositors. Furthennore, although Turkish depositors were found to exert market 
discipline on failing banks, bank fundamentals do not appear to matter to depositors. 
This result raises questions about the quality of banks' published data. For this 
reason, regulators should assure that banks disclose sound and high quality of 
infonnation in a timely manner. 
As a conclusion on the policy implications of this research, although relying on 
market discipline has gained importance because of the inadequacy of traditional 
supervisory tools, it cannot be a sufficient financial safety net by itself and should be 
a supplement to prudential bank regulation. The findings of this research indicate that 
Turkish depositors exert market discipline not only by withdrawing their funds but 
also requiring higher deposit interest rates from failing banks. However, the Turkish 
case indicates that, as one third of Turkish banks have failed since 1997 despite 
depositor market discipline, reliance on market discipline cannot necessarily restrain 
managerial risk-taking and reduce the cost of bank failures on deposit insurance 
funds. This evidence indicates that inadequacies in supervision and insurer net worth 
can reduce the credibility of an insurer's guarantees. 
The findings also indicate that in the UK environment, where depositors do not 
experience frequent bank failures, it is a difficult task to establish a risk concern 
among depositors. 
Therefore, policy-makers should first establish effective bank regulation and 
supervision and then consider market discipline as another mechanism to maintain 
the safety and soundness of the banking systems. On the other hand, market 
discipline could support prudential bank regulation either by revealing new 
infonnation to bank regulators and acting as an early warning system, or by verifying 
the already known infonnation and making it easier for them to intervene in banks. 
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7.4 Directious for Future Research 
Effective market discipline involves two steps: first, depositors monitor bank 
activities and punish riskier banks; second, banks should respond to depositor 
behaviour. Therefore, a further step of the analysis of market discipline could be the 
investigation of whether banks effectively respond to signals provided by depositors 
in a manner consistent with market discipline. However, this analysis should be 
handled carefully as banks should also respond to regulatory discipline. 
In this study, the presence of market discipline in the UK is examined by using a 
quantity-based approach. The reason for not using a price-based approach for the UK 
banks is the data limitation, as neither implicit nor explicit interest rates could be 
found. However, for Turkey, besides applying a quantity-based approach, a price-
based approach is also employed, as market discipline could be reflected both in 
quantity and interest rate effects. Depending on data availability, using a price-based 
approach could be applied to the UK banking system as further research. 
Finally, because this research has analysed only depositor market discipline, risk-
sensitive debt and equity holders, who are other potential sources that are capable of 
providing market discipline, could be looked at in future research. 
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APPENDIX 1: DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES 
">;",1 .\ . v cov.raj . ... . .' '··'c· .' ". I ' Foreign> 
Interbank 
,.·Year Compul,sory , .' Source of ..... , ...... Risk'Adjus!ed currencies Deposits 
li ... g. Countries Enacted Membership Funded Funding Administration ' Premiums Covered > Covered 
Argentina 1979 Cut-Off ,/ ,/ Private Private ,/ ,/ 
Austria 1979 Co-insurance 0/ Joint Private .; 
Bahrain 1993 Cut-Off .; Private Joint .; 
Bangladesh 1984 Cut-Off .; .; Joint Official 
Belgium 1974 Cut-Off .; .; Joint Joint .; 
Brazil 1995 Cut-Off .; ,/ Private Private .; 
Bulgaria 1995 Cut-Off .; .; Joint JOint .; .; 
Cameraon 1999 Cut-Off .; Joint Joint .; .; 
Canada 1967 Cut-Off .; .; Joint Official .; 
Central African Rep. 1999 Cut-Off ,/ Joint Joint .; .; 
Chad 1999 Cut-Off ,/ Joint Joint ,/ ,/ 
Chile 1986 Co-insurance ,/ Public Official ,/ 
. 
Colombia 1985 Full .; ,/ Private Official ,/ 
Croalia 1997 Cut-Off ,/ .r Joint Joint .; 
Czech Rep. 1994 Co-insurance ., ., Joint Official 
Denmark 1988 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Joint ., 
Dominican Republic 1962 Co-insurance ., Joint Joint ., 
Ecuador 1999 Fun ., ., n.a . Official ., .; 
El Salvador 1999 Cut-Off 0/ ., Joint Official ., ,/ 
Equatorial Guinea 1999 Cut-Off ., Joint Joint ., ., 
Estonia 1998 COMinsurance .f ., Joint Joint ., 
Finland 1969 Cut-Off ,( ., Joint Private ., ',/ 
France 1980 Cut-Off .; Private Private ., 
Gabon 1999 Cut-Off ., Joint Joint ,/ ., 
Germany 1966 COMinsurance .; .; Private Private ., 
Gibraltar 1998 Co-insurance ,/ Private Joint ., n,a. 
Greece 1993 Cut-Off ., ., Private Joint ,/ 
Hungary 1993 Cut-Off 0/ ., Joint Joint ,/ ,/ 
Iceland 1965 Co-insurance ,( .; Private Official ., 
India 1961 Cut-Off .f ., Joint Official ,/ 
Ireland 1989 COMinsurance ., ., Private Official ., 
Italy 1987 Cut-Off ., Joint Joint ,/ ., 
Jamaica 1998 Cut-Off .; ., Joint Official ., 
Japan 1971 Cut-Off ., .r Joint Joint 
Kenya 1985 Cut-Off ,/ ., Joint Official 0/ ., 
Korea 1996 Cut-Off 0/ ., Joint Official 
Latvia 1998 Cut-Off .; .; Joint Official ., 
Lebanon 1967 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Joint .; 
Lithuania 1996 Co-insurance ., ,/ Joint Official ,/ 
Luxembourg 1989 Co-insurance ., Private Private ,/ 
Macedonia 1996 Co-insurance .; Joint Joint ., ., 
Marshall Islands 1975 Cut-Off ,/ Private Official .; .; .f 
Mexico 1986 Full ., ,/ Joint Official ,/ ., 
Micronesia 1963 Cut-Off ., Private Official ,/ ., ., 
Netherlands 1979 Cut-Off ., Joint Official ., 
Nigeria 1988 Cut-Off ., ,/ Joint Official .; 
Norway 1961 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Private ., 
Oman 1995 COMinsurance ., ., Joint Official ., 
Peru 1992 Cut-Olf ,/ ,/ Joint Joint ., ., 
Philippines 1963 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Official ,/ .; 
Poland 1995 Co-insurance ., ., Joint Official ., 
Portugal 1992 Co-insurance ., ., Joint Official ., ., 
Republic of Congo 1999 Cut-Off ,/ Joint Joint ., ., 
Romania 1996 Cut-Off ., ,/ Joint Joint ,/ .; 
Slovak Republic 1996 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Joint ., 
Spain 1977 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Joint ., 
Sri Lanka 1987 Cut-Off ., Joint Official 
Sweden 1996 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Official ,/ ., 
Switzerland 1984 Cut-Off Private Private 
Taiwan 1985 Cut-Off ,/ Joint Official 
Tanzania 1994 Cut-Off .; .; Joint Private 
Trinidad & Tobago 1986 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Official ., .; 
Turkey 1983 Full ., ., Joint Official ,/ ,/ 
Uganda 1994 Cut-Off ., ., Joint Official 
Ukraine 1998 Cut-Off ., .; JO'Int Offlcial .f 
United Kingdom 1982 Co-insurance ., Private Private 0/ 
United States 1934 Cut-Off .; ,/ Joint Official ,/ ., ,/ 
Venezuela 1985 Cut-Off .; ,/ Joint Official 
Source: DemirgO~-Kunt and Sobaci (2000) 
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F. Jpek Eksi 
Loughborough University Business School 
Loughborough 
Leicestershire, LE 11 3TU 
Tel: 01509263171 ex!. 4615 Fax: 01509 223960 
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APPENDIX 2: Cover Letter 
Loughborough University, Business School is currently undertaking research into the 
compensation arrangements available to the customers of banks and building societies 
which fail. As part of this project, this questionnaire seeks to establish customers' 
awareness of these arrangements and to survey other aspects oftheir attitudes and 
experiences. 
We should be grateful if you could spare us ten minutes of your time to fill in the 
enclosed questionnaire. Your contribution will help to ensure the success of this study. 
The responses will be treated with absolute confidentiality. If you have any questions 
about the research project, please do not hesitate to contact us. If you are interested in 
receiving a summary of the research findings please fill in your name in the space 
provided at the end of the questionnaire. 
Please attempt to answer all questions and use the pre-paid envelope to return the 
completed questionnaire to us. 
Thank you very much for taking part in this survey. 
Loughborough University Business School 
Survey of Attitude to Banking 
~ppendix31 
Please circle the number or write your answer as appropriate. When in doubt, indicate the answer that 
corresponds most closely with your views. 
SECTION I: ABOUT YOUR BANK/BUILDING SOCIETY ACCOUNTS 
This section seeks to gather information about your relationship with your bank/building society. 
1) With how many banks and/or building societies do you currently hold your savings in the United 
Kingdom? ................. . 
If you hold your savings with more than one bank or building society please circle only the major 
reason. 
1 Different product offer 
2 Interest rate 
3 Convenience 
4 Spreading risk 
Please answer the following questions with regard to the accouut where you hold MOST OF 
YOUR SAVINGS. Hereafter, both building societies and bauks will be referred to as "BANKS". 
2) Please specify the name of your bank or building society where you hold most of your savings . 
............................................. 
3) How important were the following factors for you in opening the account with your bank? 
Not at all Very 
ImQortant UnimQortant Neutral ImQortant ImQortant 
Interest rate 1 2 3 4 5 
Convenience 1 2 3 4 5 
Financial strength of the bank 2 3 4 5 
Existing bank relationship I 2 3 4 5 
Wen known name (High street bank) I 2 3 4 5 
Good reputation I 2 3 4 5 
Availability of services 1 2 3 4 5 
4) Did you make any attempt to check out any information about the financial condition of your bank 
before opening the account where you hold most of your savings? 
1 Yes 2 No 
If your answer is NO, please circle only the major reason below and proceed to QUESTION 6. 
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1 Being existing customer 
2 Well-known name 
3 Good reputation 
4 Paying high interest rate 
5 Don't know how to check 
6 Assume big banks are safe 
7 Faith in UK regulation 
5) If your answer to question 4 was Yes, which of the following did you use as the main source to 
check the information about the financial condition of your bank? (please circle only one) 
1 Financial press 
2 Annual reports 
3 Professional advice 
4 Other (please specify) .................................................................................. .. 
6) Two main kinds of deposit-takers, namely banks and building societies, must be authorised by the 
Financial Services Authority and the Building Societies Commission respectively. 
Did you check the authorisation of your bank before opening the account? 
Yes 2 No 
7) How much do you hold in that account? 
1 £9,999 or less 
2 £10,000 - £19,999 
3 £20,000 and above 
SECTION 11: ABOUT YOUR ATTITUDES TOWARDS BANKING 
This section seeks to gather information about your behaviour regarding your bank/building society. 
Please indicate your level of agreement Of disagreement with statements no. 8 to 12. 
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
8) I felt competent to assess the 
financial condition of my bank when 1 2 3 4 5 
I opened my account. 
9) I am confident that I have the 
information necessary to monitor the 1 2 3 4 5 
financial condition of my bank. 
10) I am confident that I have the skills 
needed to monitor the financial 1 2 3 4 5 
condition of my bank. 
11) I monitor the financial condition of 
my bank. 1 2 3 4 5 
12) I shop for the very best terms before 
opening accounts. 1 2 3 4 5 
13) Have you ever heard or read about any banks which have failed in the United Kingdom? 
1 Yes 2 No 
lfyour answer is YES, please specify the namers) ofthe bank: .......................................... . 
14) Have you ever lost any money because of a bank failure? 
1 Yes 2 No 
lfyour answer is YES, please specify the nameM ofthe bank: .......................................... .. 
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15) Have you heard or read about the Deposit Protection Scheme in the United Kingdom? 
1 Yes 2 No 
lfyour answer is NO, please proceed to OUESTION 19 
16) How much do you think is the limit of protection? Please specify the amount: £ ' .................... ". 
17) Did the terms of the Deposit Protection Scheme influence your decision when opening the account? 
Yes 2 No 
18) Have you heard or read about the co-insurance e1e~ent of the Deposit Protection Scheme in the 
United Kingdom? 
1 Yes 2 No 
If your answer is YES, please specifY what percentage of your deposit, you believe to be protected? 
............... % 
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with statements no. 19 to 21. 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
19) I am willing to take financial risks. 
20) It is a good idea to split my savings 
among different banks to reduce the 
risk of losing all my deposits if a 
bank collapsed. 
21) It is very important for me to be 
confident that my savings are not at 
risk. 
1 
I 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
22) Have you ever deliberately split your funds amongst banks in order to be safer? 
1 Yes 2 No 
23) What is the maximum amount you would leave with one bank? 
Please specify the amount: £ ....................... . 
4 
4 
4 
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with statements no. 24 to 26. 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
24) I would take action ifI were concerned 
about the financial condition of the 
bank where I hold my savings. 
25) I would decrease the amount of 
savings if I suspected any deterioration 
in the financial condition of my bank. 
26) I would close my account immediately 
on a rumour about my bank being in 
financial difficulty. 
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1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
3 4 
3 4 
3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5 
5 
27) If your bank failed, which of the following would you expect to happen? (Please circle only one 
answer.) 
1 I would expect to receive only my legal entitlement, if any. 
2 I would expect to be bailed out partially. 
3 I would expect to be bailed out fully. 
SECTION Ill: ABOUT YOU 
This section seeks to gather background information about you so that the results can be categorised. 
28) Are you male or female? 
1 Male 2 Female 
29) What is the highest level of qualification you possess? 
No Qualifications 
2 '0' Levels (or equivalent) 
3 'A' Levels (or equivalent) 
30) What was your age last birthday? .............. . 
31) Could you please indicate your employment group? 
Full-time employed 
2 Part-time employed 
3 Not in paid employment 
I SECTION IV: COMMENTS 
4 First Degree 
5 Postgraduate Qualification 
6 Professional Qualification 
4 Retired 
5 Self employed 
If there are any other aspects of deposit insurance you would like to comment on, please do so: 
.......................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................... 
........ , ................................................................................................................ . 
................................... ......... .................................. , ......................................... .. 
................................................................ ...................................................... , ... 
If you would like to receive feedback concerning the study, please fill in your name and address. 
Name of respondent .................................. .. 
Address: ...................................................................................................... . 
The responses will be treated with absolute confidentially. 
Please use the pre-paid envelope to return the completed questionnaire. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION 
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Loughborough Universitesi i~Ietme FakiiItesi 
"Mudi - Banka iIi~kisi" Konulu Ara~tIrma Anketi 
!Appendix ~ 
Liitfen cevablmzl iceren itgili numaraYI daire icine alzmz veya cevabznlZl yaZtnlZ. Tereddiitte kaldlglnlZ 
takdirde gorii~lerinize en uygun cevabl i~aretleyiniz. 
BOLOM A: BANKA HESABINIZ 
Bu bOliim sizin bankamz He olan i1i~kiniz hakkmda bilgi toplamak amaCl ta~lmaktadIr. 
1) Tiirkiye' de kac bankada mevduat hesablmz (vadeli/vadesiz) bulunmaktadlr? .................. . 
Eger mevduatmlzl birden Jazla bankada tutuyorsanzz, Ii1tfen en onemli nedenini i~aretleyiniz. 
1 Driin <;:e~itliligi 
2 Faiz Oram 
3 Kolay Eri~im 
4 Riski dagltmak 
Liitfen asagldaki sorulan en viiksek tutarda mevduat tuttugunuz ballka hesabllllzl gozoniinde 
bulundurarak cevaplaYlnlz. 
<"'my",,"',',, ""'''1'''11'''''''' ,~" """'11?1"'H""- '---'"'"1<''e'''''-~~41'''''~-''' -7"!1'''?''r''''·~''''-);'!'W''''~·~'''T-I'7W'''~'C'V'''t;t>","'·-''';;-T'P""". """!F:"""'-""'''''''''''!'?lrY','''''''''''~''''''''''''''''''"" 
2) Liitfen en yiiksek tutarda mevduat tuttugunuz bankanm admryazmlz. (TLveya doviz mevduatI) • ! 
i- , ' ' , "",' '", _~ 
! ........... .................. ..........1 
...•....... ! 
3) Bankamzda hesap a9arken a~aglda yer alan biiWn faktorlerin (inem derecesi sizin il'in nedir? 
, " .",;",;:,,,, , 
Mevcut Banka ili~kisi 
"Y;;nlum;rBTr isi"! 
HiI' Onemli 
Degil 
1 
iyi BirU~~Sahip Olmasl 
"'7Verdi~iHlzmeije;:!FW" ... 
;;;;U;;"" 
Onemli 
Degil 
2 
Fark 
EtInez 
3 
Onemli 
4 
<;:ok 
Onemli 
5 
4) En yiiksek tutarda mevduat tuttugunuz hesabl a9madan once bankanm finansal dummu hakkmda 
herhangi bir ara~tJrrna yaptJmz ml? 
1 Evet 2 HaYlr 
Eger herhangi bir ara~tlrma yapmadlysanzz liitfen bunun ell ollemli nedenini a~agldaki se,enekler 
arastndan belirleyiniz ve 6. soruya ge,iniz. (Lutfen tek hir cevabl i$aretleyiniz.) 
1 Bankanm eski mii~terisiyim 5 NasIl ara~tJracaglml bilmedigim il'in 
2 Tamnml~ bir banka olmasl 6 Biiyiik bankalar giivenilir oldugu i9in 
3 iyi bir iine sahip olmasl 7 Tiirkiye'de bankaclhk denetimine giivendigim i9in 
4 Yiiksek faiz verrnesi 
Sf. 1 
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5) Eger 4. soruya cevabmlz Evet ise bankamzm finansal durumu hakkmda ara~tIrma yaparken a~aglda 
belirtilen kaynaklardan en yok hangisinden yararJandlmz? (Lutfen tek bir cevabz i~aretleyiniz.) 
"TYazlllbasm vOlllvyil aa(Fi;;ans'd'er!ilTe:~r:ve"g~;~et~;j~1r;rtiili:jji''Sa:;fa!£r:;r;:;. ·1:·7·'··:"Y;i\,,,"·r;:~1~·1 
2 Banka Yllhk raporlan 
3 Profesyonel tavsiye (D:,m'lm:miilj<:, 
4 
6) En yok mevduatImzm bulundugu hesapta TL veya doviz kar~lh!p TL ne miktarda para 
tutuyorsunuz? 
1 10 milyardan az 
2 10 milyar- 50 milyar araSl 
3 50 milyar ve Ustii 
BOlOM B: BANKACllIGA BAKI~ ACINIZ 
Bu biiliim sizin mudisi oldugunuz bankaya bakJ~ a~mlZI ogrenmek amaCl ta~lmaktadIr. 
'Lliifen';:uia~;dayer,alan 1:1Tn(jJu·6ne;mejere·ne·6f9Udekat;i;irkaillmad;~m;zl.bejirtTnrz:""""Y"'~'~'J 
, Kesiniikle Kesinlikle \1 
Katllmlyoru'm ::.' . Katlhyoru~/l 
7) Hesap a,tIglm tarihte 
mevduatlmm bulundugu 
bankamn mali durumunu 
degerIendirme konusunda 
2 3 
." ,,11 
";,:,,, ""x"' .. ~ 
4 5 
kendimi yeterJi hissettim. 
,<"'" "1''''''I'''''TY''''''1W' '1j\""""7'<' "CH" rH" '1'''''''1',/'-,"'''''1','>'<' "'X!"", ',~W~"T:;':" IW:"'f:',:'M'~\;f''''''\F''-~F'''l?''''''i\\ ""VI':;m,nTW"Q'IP' ' .... ~· .. , ........ ' ..... '·"''''' .. w ... rr' ..... 0'' .. · ... ''' 
'. 8)' MeyduatJmm bulundtigu ,'....," 
,i' ','" ,,:, y 'Y , " ,,-,", 'i <', '\1 
bal1kal:un m~lidurumunu ,. 
'takip ectecek bjlgiye 
eri~tigiTI;leemj\1im 
9) Bankalann maJi durumunu 
takip edecek yetenege sahip 
olduguma inamyorum. 
··jO)Mevduai;nunbulundu~·'c' 
bankamn mali durumunu . 
.. t~kipediyorull1 ... 
11) Hesap a,madan once en iyi 
ko~ullan elde etmek i,in 
ara~tIrma yapanm. 
I, ' 2 
I 2 
2 
'i2fTi1rk1Ye~'de'hi9'baianve/v(;ya'devietiii"ej'koydlliUbankaduydunuz 
.. ' , lEi~t ....;. ..." .,.. 2 HaYl~ 
3 
3 4 
3 4 
Eger CeVablnlZ EVET i:;e;' !atfen Izangi banka (veyabankafar) ofdugunu belirtiniz: 
13) Bugiine kadar hi, batan ve/veya devletin el koydugu bir bankada mevduatImz var mlydl? 
1 Evet 2 HaYlr 
Eger cevabznlz EVET ise, fut/en hangi banka (veya bankalar) oldugunu belirtiniz: 
Sf. 2 
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5 
"'"'''''"W'~-''1jTm.c''.'''''w'c· "W(:r '~""q( . "\"'mlq'."""j'n'I.!"".pm!.'1~1 "'."'OP""I)' ""'TIF. '-' .. r"tlw'''',... ••• twmr'jN''.,''!llfl'''''f0'111':''.· r.J!W"'. ", ','.'''''117'''''. 
,14)iTasarrufN,levauatr Sigorta Fomiadmdabiifon duyduiluz mI,11;i;;.· ''i;'''i.1i;', 
J:;, " Cf:',':' ;1':'" ':i> ,,",i' 1/1, ,::,,' 1 ::,. !': ;.;:- '<-';; I ::::k:,: ':::!I::' :>;::\ '! ::'; I, 1.' Eve! .', 2 HaYlr"" .i;i,;;' 
I:i;~iger ~evabznlz!IAYIR lse, liltfenf7, s(Jruya,ger!~iz";"i':'~'" "; 
15) Bugiin itibariyle sizce tasarruf mevduatmm ne kadan mevduat sigortasl kapsammdadlr? 
Liitfen miktar belirtiniz .... .......... , ........... " .... '" ........................................ TL. 
.1 .. Eve!.., 
, .' "'M", ~~'"",' .- '" 'M,:, "n:-'- 1, ,,' ,wcc_ ·"~,ry''''·,-,,-y'',..'(-··'''''''T:' . "''''','!r",··",''ql!''-,:,""-1'7'''''T "~"'pc:r ""rwu/'·""'m,,,,,,, --'1'~-""'-'- w"""'.,, 
16) Tasarruf mevdual1 sigortasmm varhgl mevduat hesabl a,arken karanmzda etkili oldu 
, ': ','" 
... ;,., ........ .;;,.... 2:," fi:iyiX;,';;r',;:: <,iL;::, .. ;,:;L~:,',::'" ,::1];,;1:;', 
Liitfen a~aglda yer alan 17-19 no.lu iinermelere ne iil~iide kabhp katIlmadlgmlzl belirtiniz. 
Kesinlikle Kesinlikle 
Katllmlyorum KatllmIyorum Bilmiyorum Katlllyorum Katlhyorum 
g6ze alabilirirl1., 
18) Mevduahml bir bankanm 
batma riskine kar~l farkh 
bankalar arasmda 2 3 4 5 
payla~tmnamn iyi fikir 
oldugunu dii~iiniiyorum: 
19) Mevduatrmmherh;111gi bir 
riskaltmda olmadlgmdani 
ieminolmak benim i,in 90k 
, ':"onemlidir ".i;:; 
, ",hi<,,,, ",I." ' ,A" ,;";;;,, , Uti,,,, ",',";;; .•• u;;;, •. 
20) Mevduahmzm daha giivencede olabilecegini dii~iinerek hi\, bilin\,li olarak paramZI farkh bankalar 
arasmda payla~hrdmlz ml? 
1 Evet 2 Haylr 
,'"'''' """""'" '. ',""""'" "~':""', ""'~':"""""'T'T';" "",'"'''''' 0,.,,'1":'("" ",",'n" "~"F'1Y"""''''''!!T'''''''''"*",,H/,~'''~'':''W' '''''mm,,(W v,!!,'" 
21) Bir bankada tutacaglmz en fazla mevduat tutan nedir?;'; 
. Liitfen mikta~belirliniz,., .. ", ",' , .... , ....... '.·AL··· ',l.;',,',' 
Liitfen a~aglda yer alan 22-24 no.lu iinermelere ne iilyiide katIhp katIlmadlgmlzl belirtiniz. 
Kesinlikle Kesinlikle 
Katllmlyorum Katllmworum Bilmiyorum KatJl1yorum Katlhyorum 
F~2)"Tasa!Tl1flanlmi"tlIfhi'gtlm"/:':m:~::~ T:7Tl'" "'~'!'" ""0"F':''''''~'''1:r''''~~'''!T''''''''''''''0!r'''''i'I'(1!P-'''''':-''''~T1Y"'''' 'T1""'''')''',','!''''''''''-1';''' ..,m", 
, i, bailkan.l!1 maIi y(iPISI: : .:'.1 
hakkln(la el1di~e duydugum 
takdir<l, d~rhal§nlemahriiJ1. 
23) Bankamm mali yap\S1mn 
bozuldugundan 
~(jphelendigim takdirde, 
mevduatlml azaltma yoluna 
giderim . 
. , 24) Ba'likaml;; m~jjzorluk 
. oldugu dedikodusu iizerine 
hesablml derhal kapatmm, .. 
Sf. 3 
1 
1 
3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
5 
5 
5 
25) Bankamzm batmasl halinde a~agldakilerden hangisinin olmasml beklersiniz? (Lilt/en tek bir cevabz 
i~aretleyiniz. ) 
1 Sadece kanuni haklanmm verilmesini beklerim. 
2 KIsmen kurtanlmaYI, mevduatlmm bir klsmml geri almaYI beklerim. 
3 Tamamen kurtanlmaYl, mevduahmm tamamlm geri almaYI beklerim. 
SOLO M C: siziN HAKKINIZDA 
Bu biiltim, verdiginiz cevapiarm kategorize edilebilmesi i~in sizin hakklmzda bilgi topiamak amaCI 
ta,.maktad.r. 
27) Ogrenim Dereceniz: 
1 ilkokul 
2 Ortaokul 
3 Ortaokul dengi meslek 
29) i~giicii durumunuz: 
1 Ucretli I maa~h 
2 Yevmiyeli (mevsimlik, anzi, ge,i,i) 
3 Kendi hesabma 
4 Ucretsiz aile i~,isi 
I SoLOM D: YORUMLARINIZ 
2 Kadm 
4 Lise 
5 Lise dengi meslek 
6 Yiiksek okull fakiilte 
5 Emekli 
6 Ogrenci 
7 i~siz 
Eger tasarruf mevduah sigortasl hakkmda belirtmek istediginiz ba~ka bir husus varsa liitfen yazlmz: 
Bu ara~tlITna sonu,lan hakkmda bilgi almak istediginiz takdirde liilfen isim ve adresinizi yazmlz: 
isim: ........................................ . 
Adres: ...................................................................................................... . 
Sf. 4 
Ankete veri/en cevaplar kesinlikle ~ok gizli tutulacaktlr. 
Liitfen cevaplarmlzl i~eren anket formunu ekte veri/en zarfa koymak 
suretiyle gonderiniz. 
KA TKILARINIZ iCiN COK TE$EKKOR EDERiz 
APPENDIX 5 
The UK Sample 
Bank Name Data Period 
I) Abbey National 1989-2000 
2) Alliance & Leicester 1989-2000 
3) Bank of Scotland 1989-2000 
4) Barc1ays 1989-2000 
5) Halifax 1989-2000 
6) HSBC (Midland) 1989-2000 
7) Lloyds TSB 1994-2000 
8) National Westminster 1989-2000 
9) Northern Rock 1989-2000 
10) Royal Bank of Scotland 1989-2000 
ll) Woolwich 1989-2000 
r----------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX 6 
The Turkish Sample 
Bank Name Data Period 
State Owned Banks 
1) Ziraat Bankasl 1988-2001 
2) Emlakbank 1988-2000 
3) Ha1kbank 1988-2001 
4) Vaklfbank 1988-2001 
Private Banks 
5) Adabank 1988-2001 
6) Akbank 1988-2001 
7) A1tematif Bank 1992-2001 
8) Anadolubank 1997-2001 
9) Denizbank 1997-2001 
10) Fibabank 1988-2001 
11) Finansbank 1988-2001 
12) KOybank 1988-2001 
13)MNGBank 1992-2001 
14) Oyakbank 1991-2000 
15) ~ekerbank 1988-2001 
16) Tekstil Bankasl 1988-2001 
17) Turkish Bank 1991-2001 
18) Dl~bank 1988-2001 
19) TEB 1988-2001 
20) Garanti Bankasl 1988-2001 
21) imar BankaSl 1988-2001 
22) i$BankaSl 1988-2001 
23) Yapl Kredi Bankasl 1988-2001 
24) Osmanh Bankasl 1988-2000 
25) K6rfezbank 1988-2000 
SDIFBanks 
26) Baymdlrbank 1992-2000 
27) EGS Bank 1996-2000 
28) iktisat Bankasl 1988-2000 
29) Kentbank 1992-2000 
30) Tari~bank 1988-2000 
31) Pamukbank 1988-2001 
32) Sitebank 1991-2000 
33) Toprakbank 1992-2000 
34) Bank Eksp!es 1992-1997 
35) Kapita1 Bank 1991-1999 
36) Demirbank 1988-1999 
37) Egebank 1988-1998 
38) Esbank 1988-1998 
39) Etibank 1988-1999 
40) Interbank 1988-1998 
41) S umerbank 1988-1998 
421 Turkbank 1988-1996 
43) Y a~arbank 1988-1998 
44) Yurtbank 1993-1998 
45) U1usa1 Bank 1988-2000 
• 

